Charles K S Wu
Biographic Data
| ID | 224198 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Charles K S Wu |
| GIVEN NAMES | Charles K S |
| FAMILY NAME | Wu |
| SIGNATURE | WU C K S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of South Alabama |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4986-833X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 20 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 82 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 20 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Crying wolf? Threat perception, and public willingness for self-defense
Most citizens in Taiwan are aware of the growing threat of a Chinese invasion, but does a “war on the horizon” motivate them to be more supportive of self-defense? Psychological research suggests that the perceived urgency of a crisis often influences attitudes and behavior. Building on this literature, we formulate three hypotheses related to the Taiwan case. Using data from eight waves of nationally representative surveys conducted by the Insti…
Media sources, partisanship, and public support for self-defense in Taiwan
In this study, the authors focus on Taiwan, where citizens are increasingly concerned about the possibility of a Chinese invasion. Specifically, the authors want to know if different media sources would influence citizens’ willingness to engage in self-defense. Additionally, they would like to see if partisans experience a backfire effect when exposed to incongruent political information. To test these hypotheses, they designed and conducted an o…
The Ripple Effect: How the Russo–Ukrainian War Shaped Public Perception of Presidential Performance in Taiwan
This study investigates the impact of the 2022 Russo–Ukrainian War on public evaluations of presidential performance in Taiwan. It argues that an international crisis, when perceived as a plausible threat to individuals’ immediate environment and linked to past events with tangible physical or financial consequences, can trigger a rally-around-the-flag effect, leading to increased public support for the incumbent president. Utilising a quasi-expe…
Not listening to big brother: Testing hypotheses on Taiwanese defense
Dying to Win? Casualty Sensitivity, Partnership, and Willingness for Self-Defense in Taiwan
Casualty is one of the most important factors influencing public support for war in the existing literature. In this paper, we use a hypothetical conflict across the Taiwan Strait to ask the following: (1) Are Taiwanese citizens sensitive to increasing battle deaths? (2) Are they more sensitive to civilian deaths as opposed to military ones? (3) Does partisanship shape how citizens respond to casualty information? We fielded an experiment in Taiw…
Media literacy and partisan convergence across social network sites
The existing literature highlights social network sites (SNS) as important channels for consuming news and receiving misinformation. However, people surf multiple SNS daily, such as Facebook, Twitter, Line, etc. People also connect and interact with each other, given the characteristics of specific SNS. Driven by partisan bias, partisan supporters may be driven to converge on a specific SNS due to a political echo chamber that exists there. In su…
Why Does Taiwan Identity Decline
Since 1992, the percentage of Taiwanese identifying as 'Taiwanese only' increased by 50%. The literature explains the increase by generation, democratization, and military threat. None of these foresees the decline of Taiwan identity between 2016 and 2018. We argue that the decline can be explained by issue ownership + hedging. After the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) won both the presidency and the Congress for the first time in 2016, DPP's per…
Strategic Ambiguity, Strategic Clarity, and Dual Clarity
The United States has successfully prevented the military conflict between China and Taiwan since the 1980s through the Strategic Ambiguity (SA) strategy, which discourages both sides from deviating from the status quo by not committing to defend or not to defend Taiwan. The recent US–China tensions and the rising nationalism in China and Taiwan drew critics to SA and suggested it be replaced with the strategic clarity strategy. We argue that the…
Taiwanese Support for Self-Defense after the Russo–Ukrainian War
What impact does the Russo–Ukrainian War have on Taiwanese citizens’ attitudes toward the country’s self-defense? We used seven waves of representative surveys by the Institute for National Defense and Security Research between September 2021 and March 2023 (n = 10,869) in Taiwan. We tested two major hypotheses: that support for self-defense should increase for all citizens after the Ukraine crisis; and that the effect should be visible only amon…
Undercurrent in Taiwan: Nationalism and Calculation of the Cross-Strait Relations (2002–2022)
The literature highlights the conflicting trends between rising nationalism and stable preferences for status quo on cross-strait relations in Taiwan. This article provides new insights from the Taiwan National Security Survey (2002–2022, 14 waves, n = 16, 494) to help explain this apparent inconsistency. The surveys employed “conditional preference” items to capture how the cross-strait attitudes of Taiwanese people are shaped. Since 2002, Taiwa…
Public support for the use of force in non-Western and non-major powers: The case of a China–Taiwan war
Studies of public support for war among non-Western and non-major powers (NWNM) states are distinctive from United States foreign military operations. First, these wars often intrude on subjects’ direct livelihood. Second, great powers’ intervention can drastically alter the outcome of these wars. These factors have not been examined extensively in the war support literature. We fill this gap by spearheading several hypotheses of war support uniq…
The Multiverse of Taiwan’s Future: Reconsidering the Independence–Unification ( Tondu ) Attitudes
For decades, scholars have constructed various ways to measure Taiwanese public opinion on the nation’s future, the independence–unification ( Tondu) question. While existing surveys find that Taiwanese people become more likely to support independence, the majority still favors the “status quo” option. Existing measurements have a number of weaknesses. For instance, most do not inform citizens what the “status quo” means, nor do they specify whe…
High-level visit and national security policy: Evidence from a quasi-experiment in Taiwan
Great powers often use high-level visits to reassure weaker states. The literature on public diplomacy shows that these visits can bring a number of advantages while overlooking their potential impact on increasing support for the great power’s security agenda and confidence in the host country’s defense policy and military. This note employed a quasi-experiment in Taiwan, in which three high-profile US Senators visited Taiwan unexpectedly during…
China’s soft power and US public opinion
In recent years, China has been using its soft power (most notably, the establishment of Confucius Institutes) to influence public opinion in foreign countries. However, the literature on soft power has yet to provide a definitive answer about whether that has led to a positive image of China in the foreign audience. Additionally, it is not clear if a positive image would influence public attitudes concerning foreign policies in those countries, …
The non‐consensus 1992 consensus
The 1992 Consensus is perhaps the most crucial political term for cross‐strait relations. Surveys show that the public consistently supports it in Taiwan. Despite the alleged broad support, there has not been an academic study examining if Taiwanese people understand the content of the 1992 Consensus. Such an inquiry is important as the administration in Taiwan has yet accepted the Consensus in its interactions with Beijing. A nearly representati…
Diversionary Behavior for Weak States: A Case Study of Taiwan
This paper explores the mechanisms and circumstances under which leaders in weak states adopt diversionary behavior to deal with domestic problems. We examine the case of Taiwan to see if its President, Tsai Ingwen, has adopted diversionary behavior from 2016 to the present. We found that, unlike great powers, weak-state leaders often resort to non-force tactics such as blaming foreign opponents, but the emergence of diversionary behavior is cond…
Response: Public Opinion as an Influential Factor in Sunflower Movement Success
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
How Public Opinion Shapes Taiwan's Sunflower Movement
The 2014 Sunflower Movement succeeded in blocking Taiwan's Congress from ratifying the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA), a bill that proposed to liberalize trade with China. Since most of the participants in this movement were students and NGO members, they had limited economic and political resources to influence policy change, which makes their success in stopping a trade deal remarkable. Many attribute this important success to an…
When war hits home: Taiwanese public support for war of necessity
When a war directly intrudes citizens’ living space, it becomes a war of necessity for the public to defend themselves. However, current literature on public support for war has focused exclusively on wars of choice, not of necessity. Thus, we wonder if existing indicators of war support have explanatory power in this context. In this article, we examine existing indicators in a war of necessity—a cross-Strait conflict between Taiwan and China—to…
Active Solidarity: Intersectional Solidarity in Action
While solidarity lies at the heart of collective action, it is not easily achieved. Social movements are characterized not only by difference within activist ranks but also by power asymmetries that reflect broader domination and distrust. The concept of intersectional solidarity is central to contemporary social justice movements’ efforts to negotiate these divisions, but how can it be achieved? To answer this question, we offer some guidelines …
Active Solidarity: Intersectional Solidarity in Action
While solidarity lies at the heart of collective action, it is not easily achieved. Social movements are characterized not only by difference within activist ranks but also by power asymmetries that reflect broader domination and distrust. The concept of intersectional solidarity is central to contemporary social justice movements’ efforts to negotiate these divisions, but how can it be achieved? To answer this question, we offer some guidelines …
Public support for the use of force in non-Western and non-major powers: The case of a China–Taiwan war
Studies of public support for war among non-Western and non-major powers (NWNM) states are distinctive from United States foreign military operations. First, these wars often intrude on subjects’ direct livelihood. Second, great powers’ intervention can drastically alter the outcome of these wars. These factors have not been examined extensively in the war support literature. We fill this gap by spearheading several hypotheses of war support uniq…
High-level visit and national security policy: Evidence from a quasi-experiment in Taiwan
Great powers often use high-level visits to reassure weaker states. The literature on public diplomacy shows that these visits can bring a number of advantages while overlooking their potential impact on increasing support for the great power’s security agenda and confidence in the host country’s defense policy and military. This note employed a quasi-experiment in Taiwan, in which three high-profile US Senators visited Taiwan unexpectedly during…
Diversionary Behavior for Weak States: A Case Study of Taiwan
This paper explores the mechanisms and circumstances under which leaders in weak states adopt diversionary behavior to deal with domestic problems. We examine the case of Taiwan to see if its President, Tsai Ingwen, has adopted diversionary behavior from 2016 to the present. We found that, unlike great powers, weak-state leaders often resort to non-force tactics such as blaming foreign opponents, but the emergence of diversionary behavior is cond…
When war hits home: Taiwanese public support for war of necessity
When a war directly intrudes citizens’ living space, it becomes a war of necessity for the public to defend themselves. However, current literature on public support for war has focused exclusively on wars of choice, not of necessity. Thus, we wonder if existing indicators of war support have explanatory power in this context. In this article, we examine existing indicators in a war of necessity—a cross-Strait conflict between Taiwan and China—to…
Why Does Taiwan Identity Decline
Since 1992, the percentage of Taiwanese identifying as 'Taiwanese only' increased by 50%. The literature explains the increase by generation, democratization, and military threat. None of these foresees the decline of Taiwan identity between 2016 and 2018. We argue that the decline can be explained by issue ownership + hedging. After the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) won both the presidency and the Congress for the first time in 2016, DPP's per…
How Public Opinion Shapes Taiwan's Sunflower Movement
The 2014 Sunflower Movement succeeded in blocking Taiwan's Congress from ratifying the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA), a bill that proposed to liberalize trade with China. Since most of the participants in this movement were students and NGO members, they had limited economic and political resources to influence policy change, which makes their success in stopping a trade deal remarkable. Many attribute this important success to an…
Strategic Ambiguity, Strategic Clarity, and Dual Clarity
The United States has successfully prevented the military conflict between China and Taiwan since the 1980s through the Strategic Ambiguity (SA) strategy, which discourages both sides from deviating from the status quo by not committing to defend or not to defend Taiwan. The recent US–China tensions and the rising nationalism in China and Taiwan drew critics to SA and suggested it be replaced with the strategic clarity strategy. We argue that the…
The non‐consensus 1992 consensus
The 1992 Consensus is perhaps the most crucial political term for cross‐strait relations. Surveys show that the public consistently supports it in Taiwan. Despite the alleged broad support, there has not been an academic study examining if Taiwanese people understand the content of the 1992 Consensus. Such an inquiry is important as the administration in Taiwan has yet accepted the Consensus in its interactions with Beijing. A nearly representati…
Media literacy and partisan convergence across social network sites
The existing literature highlights social network sites (SNS) as important channels for consuming news and receiving misinformation. However, people surf multiple SNS daily, such as Facebook, Twitter, Line, etc. People also connect and interact with each other, given the characteristics of specific SNS. Driven by partisan bias, partisan supporters may be driven to converge on a specific SNS due to a political echo chamber that exists there. In su…
Undercurrent in Taiwan: Nationalism and Calculation of the Cross-Strait Relations (2002–2022)
The literature highlights the conflicting trends between rising nationalism and stable preferences for status quo on cross-strait relations in Taiwan. This article provides new insights from the Taiwan National Security Survey (2002–2022, 14 waves, n = 16, 494) to help explain this apparent inconsistency. The surveys employed “conditional preference” items to capture how the cross-strait attitudes of Taiwanese people are shaped. Since 2002, Taiwa…
The Multiverse of Taiwan’s Future: Reconsidering the Independence–Unification ( Tondu ) Attitudes
For decades, scholars have constructed various ways to measure Taiwanese public opinion on the nation’s future, the independence–unification ( Tondu) question. While existing surveys find that Taiwanese people become more likely to support independence, the majority still favors the “status quo” option. Existing measurements have a number of weaknesses. For instance, most do not inform citizens what the “status quo” means, nor do they specify whe…
China’s soft power and US public opinion
In recent years, China has been using its soft power (most notably, the establishment of Confucius Institutes) to influence public opinion in foreign countries. However, the literature on soft power has yet to provide a definitive answer about whether that has led to a positive image of China in the foreign audience. Additionally, it is not clear if a positive image would influence public attitudes concerning foreign policies in those countries, …
Response: Public Opinion as an Influential Factor in Sunflower Movement Success
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
How Public Opinion Shapes Taiwan's Sunflower Movement
The 2014 Sunflower Movement succeeded in blocking Taiwan's Congress from ratifying the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA), a bill that proposed to liberalize trade with China. Since most of the participants in this movement were students and NGO members, they had limited economic and political resources to influence policy change, which makes their success in stopping a trade deal remarkable. Many attribute this important success to an…
When war hits home: Taiwanese public support for war of necessity
When a war directly intrudes citizens’ living space, it becomes a war of necessity for the public to defend themselves. However, current literature on public support for war has focused exclusively on wars of choice, not of necessity. Thus, we wonder if existing indicators of war support have explanatory power in this context. In this article, we examine existing indicators in a war of necessity—a cross-Strait conflict between Taiwan and China—to…
Active Solidarity: Intersectional Solidarity in Action
While solidarity lies at the heart of collective action, it is not easily achieved. Social movements are characterized not only by difference within activist ranks but also by power asymmetries that reflect broader domination and distrust. The concept of intersectional solidarity is central to contemporary social justice movements’ efforts to negotiate these divisions, but how can it be achieved? To answer this question, we offer some guidelines …
Diversionary Behavior for Weak States: A Case Study of Taiwan
This paper explores the mechanisms and circumstances under which leaders in weak states adopt diversionary behavior to deal with domestic problems. We examine the case of Taiwan to see if its President, Tsai Ingwen, has adopted diversionary behavior from 2016 to the present. We found that, unlike great powers, weak-state leaders often resort to non-force tactics such as blaming foreign opponents, but the emergence of diversionary behavior is cond…
China’s soft power and US public opinion
In recent years, China has been using its soft power (most notably, the establishment of Confucius Institutes) to influence public opinion in foreign countries. However, the literature on soft power has yet to provide a definitive answer about whether that has led to a positive image of China in the foreign audience. Additionally, it is not clear if a positive image would influence public attitudes concerning foreign policies in those countries, …
The non‐consensus 1992 consensus
The 1992 Consensus is perhaps the most crucial political term for cross‐strait relations. Surveys show that the public consistently supports it in Taiwan. Despite the alleged broad support, there has not been an academic study examining if Taiwanese people understand the content of the 1992 Consensus. Such an inquiry is important as the administration in Taiwan has yet accepted the Consensus in its interactions with Beijing. A nearly representati…
The Multiverse of Taiwan’s Future: Reconsidering the Independence–Unification ( Tondu ) Attitudes
For decades, scholars have constructed various ways to measure Taiwanese public opinion on the nation’s future, the independence–unification ( Tondu) question. While existing surveys find that Taiwanese people become more likely to support independence, the majority still favors the “status quo” option. Existing measurements have a number of weaknesses. For instance, most do not inform citizens what the “status quo” means, nor do they specify whe…
High-level visit and national security policy: Evidence from a quasi-experiment in Taiwan
Great powers often use high-level visits to reassure weaker states. The literature on public diplomacy shows that these visits can bring a number of advantages while overlooking their potential impact on increasing support for the great power’s security agenda and confidence in the host country’s defense policy and military. This note employed a quasi-experiment in Taiwan, in which three high-profile US Senators visited Taiwan unexpectedly during…
Strategic Ambiguity, Strategic Clarity, and Dual Clarity
The United States has successfully prevented the military conflict between China and Taiwan since the 1980s through the Strategic Ambiguity (SA) strategy, which discourages both sides from deviating from the status quo by not committing to defend or not to defend Taiwan. The recent US–China tensions and the rising nationalism in China and Taiwan drew critics to SA and suggested it be replaced with the strategic clarity strategy. We argue that the…
Taiwanese Support for Self-Defense after the Russo–Ukrainian War
What impact does the Russo–Ukrainian War have on Taiwanese citizens’ attitudes toward the country’s self-defense? We used seven waves of representative surveys by the Institute for National Defense and Security Research between September 2021 and March 2023 (n = 10,869) in Taiwan. We tested two major hypotheses: that support for self-defense should increase for all citizens after the Ukraine crisis; and that the effect should be visible only amon…
Undercurrent in Taiwan: Nationalism and Calculation of the Cross-Strait Relations (2002–2022)
The literature highlights the conflicting trends between rising nationalism and stable preferences for status quo on cross-strait relations in Taiwan. This article provides new insights from the Taiwan National Security Survey (2002–2022, 14 waves, n = 16, 494) to help explain this apparent inconsistency. The surveys employed “conditional preference” items to capture how the cross-strait attitudes of Taiwanese people are shaped. Since 2002, Taiwa…
Public support for the use of force in non-Western and non-major powers: The case of a China–Taiwan war
Studies of public support for war among non-Western and non-major powers (NWNM) states are distinctive from United States foreign military operations. First, these wars often intrude on subjects’ direct livelihood. Second, great powers’ intervention can drastically alter the outcome of these wars. These factors have not been examined extensively in the war support literature. We fill this gap by spearheading several hypotheses of war support uniq…
The Ripple Effect: How the Russo–Ukrainian War Shaped Public Perception of Presidential Performance in Taiwan
This study investigates the impact of the 2022 Russo–Ukrainian War on public evaluations of presidential performance in Taiwan. It argues that an international crisis, when perceived as a plausible threat to individuals’ immediate environment and linked to past events with tangible physical or financial consequences, can trigger a rally-around-the-flag effect, leading to increased public support for the incumbent president. Utilising a quasi-expe…
Not listening to big brother: Testing hypotheses on Taiwanese defense
Dying to Win? Casualty Sensitivity, Partnership, and Willingness for Self-Defense in Taiwan
Casualty is one of the most important factors influencing public support for war in the existing literature. In this paper, we use a hypothetical conflict across the Taiwan Strait to ask the following: (1) Are Taiwanese citizens sensitive to increasing battle deaths? (2) Are they more sensitive to civilian deaths as opposed to military ones? (3) Does partisanship shape how citizens respond to casualty information? We fielded an experiment in Taiw…
Media literacy and partisan convergence across social network sites
The existing literature highlights social network sites (SNS) as important channels for consuming news and receiving misinformation. However, people surf multiple SNS daily, such as Facebook, Twitter, Line, etc. People also connect and interact with each other, given the characteristics of specific SNS. Driven by partisan bias, partisan supporters may be driven to converge on a specific SNS due to a political echo chamber that exists there. In su…
Why Does Taiwan Identity Decline
Since 1992, the percentage of Taiwanese identifying as 'Taiwanese only' increased by 50%. The literature explains the increase by generation, democratization, and military threat. None of these foresees the decline of Taiwan identity between 2016 and 2018. We argue that the decline can be explained by issue ownership + hedging. After the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) won both the presidency and the Congress for the first time in 2016, DPP's per…
Crying wolf? Threat perception, and public willingness for self-defense
Most citizens in Taiwan are aware of the growing threat of a Chinese invasion, but does a “war on the horizon” motivate them to be more supportive of self-defense? Psychological research suggests that the perceived urgency of a crisis often influences attitudes and behavior. Building on this literature, we formulate three hypotheses related to the Taiwan case. Using data from eight waves of nationally representative surveys conducted by the Insti…
Media sources, partisanship, and public support for self-defense in Taiwan
In this study, the authors focus on Taiwan, where citizens are increasingly concerned about the possibility of a Chinese invasion. Specifically, the authors want to know if different media sources would influence citizens’ willingness to engage in self-defense. Additionally, they would like to see if partisans experience a backfire effect when exposed to incongruent political information. To test these hypotheses, they designed and conducted an o…
Political science (18 works) · Law (14 works) · Law (12 works) · Politics (12 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (11 works) · Sociology (9 works) · Economics (8 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (8 works) · China (7 works) · Psychology (7 works)