Nicolas Bommarito
Biographic Data
| ID | 2280606 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nicolas Bommarito |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nicolas |
| FAMILY NAME | Bommarito |
| SIGNATURE | BOMMARITO N |
| AFFILIATIONS | John Brown University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7401-729X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 14 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Expressing and receiving negative emotions
Responding to Myisha Cherry's The Case for Rage , I discuss how the book touches on the difficulties of disentangling emotions and their expressions. Then I suggest two ways in which destructive rage might be good, one on Kantian grounds and another via extension from experience. Finally, I raise the issue of whether there might be other Lordean emotions
Virtuous and Vicious Anger
I defend an account of when and why anger is morally virtuous or vicious. Anger often manifests what we care about; a sports fan gets angry when her favorite team loses because she cares about the team doing well. Anger, I argue, is made morally virtuous or vicious by the underlying care or concern. Anger is virtuous when it manifests moral concern and vicious when it manifests moral indifference or ill will. In defending this view, I reject two …
Inner Virtue
What does it mean to be a morally good person? It can be tempting to think that it is simply a matter of performing certain actions and avoiding others. And yet there is much more to moral character than our outward actions. We expect a good person to not only behave in certain ways but also to experience the world in certain ways within
Imaginative Moral Development
Patience and Perspective
In much of Western philosophy, patience tends to be either overlooked or described as being non-moral and valuable only instrumentally. This is in stark contrast with its central role in Buddhist ethics. Offered here is a Buddhistinspired account of how patience can be a moral virtue. It is argued that virtuous patience involves having a perspective on the place of our own desires and values among others and a sense of their relative importance
Modesty as a Virtue of Attention
The contemporary discussion of modesty has focused on whether or not modest people are accurate about their own good qualities. This essay argues that this way of framing the debate is unhelpful and offers examples to show that neither ignorance nor accuracy about the good qualities related to oneself is necessary for modesty. It then offers an attention-based account, claiming that what is necessary for modesty is to direct one’s attention in ce…
Modesty as a Virtue of Attention
The contemporary discussion of modesty has focused on whether or not modest people are accurate about their own good qualities. This essay argues that this way of framing the debate is unhelpful and offers examples to show that neither ignorance nor accuracy about the good qualities related to oneself is necessary for modesty. It then offers an attention-based account, claiming that what is necessary for modesty is to direct one’s attention in ce…
Patience and Perspective
In much of Western philosophy, patience tends to be either overlooked or described as being non-moral and valuable only instrumentally. This is in stark contrast with its central role in Buddhist ethics. Offered here is a Buddhistinspired account of how patience can be a moral virtue. It is argued that virtuous patience involves having a perspective on the place of our own desires and values among others and a sense of their relative importance
Inner Virtue
What does it mean to be a morally good person? It can be tempting to think that it is simply a matter of performing certain actions and avoiding others. And yet there is much more to moral character than our outward actions. We expect a good person to not only behave in certain ways but also to experience the world in certain ways within
Modesty as a Virtue of Attention
The contemporary discussion of modesty has focused on whether or not modest people are accurate about their own good qualities. This essay argues that this way of framing the debate is unhelpful and offers examples to show that neither ignorance nor accuracy about the good qualities related to oneself is necessary for modesty. It then offers an attention-based account, claiming that what is necessary for modesty is to direct one’s attention in ce…
Patience and Perspective
In much of Western philosophy, patience tends to be either overlooked or described as being non-moral and valuable only instrumentally. This is in stark contrast with its central role in Buddhist ethics. Offered here is a Buddhistinspired account of how patience can be a moral virtue. It is argued that virtuous patience involves having a perspective on the place of our own desires and values among others and a sense of their relative importance
Imaginative Moral Development
Virtuous and Vicious Anger
I defend an account of when and why anger is morally virtuous or vicious. Anger often manifests what we care about; a sports fan gets angry when her favorite team loses because she cares about the team doing well. Anger, I argue, is made morally virtuous or vicious by the underlying care or concern. Anger is virtuous when it manifests moral concern and vicious when it manifests moral indifference or ill will. In defending this view, I reject two …
Inner Virtue
What does it mean to be a morally good person? It can be tempting to think that it is simply a matter of performing certain actions and avoiding others. And yet there is much more to moral character than our outward actions. We expect a good person to not only behave in certain ways but also to experience the world in certain ways within
Expressing and receiving negative emotions
Responding to Myisha Cherry's The Case for Rage , I discuss how the book touches on the difficulties of disentangling emotions and their expressions. Then I suggest two ways in which destructive rage might be good, one on Kantian grounds and another via extension from experience. Finally, I raise the issue of whether there might be other Lordean emotions
Epistemology (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Virtue (3 works) · Environmental ethics (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works)