Rachel Kranton
Biographic Data
| ID | 2293175 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Rachel Kranton |
| GIVEN NAMES | Rachel |
| FAMILY NAME | Kranton |
| SIGNATURE | KRANTON R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Duke University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 117 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 16 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Competition, Cooperation and Social Perceptions
Can competition or cooperation for economic gain affect people’s social perceptions of others? This paper experimentally examines this possible link from the economic to the social realm. Subjects engage in a task facing either a tournament or a cooperative pay scheme, after which subjects are asked their social perceptions of their counterparts in the task—how similar they are and how much they have in common. The pay schemes do not affect answe…
Cover-ups
Oversampling of minority categories drives misperceptions of group compositions
The hidden cost of humanization
Amount and time exert independent influences on intertemporal choice
Rumors and Social Networks
This article studies the transmission of rumors in social networks. We consider a model with biased and unbiased agents. Biased agents want to enforce a specific decision and unbiased agents to match the true state. One agent learns the true state and sends a message to her neighbors, who decide whether or not to transmit it further. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game, show that the social network can act as a filter, and…
Games Played on Networks
This chapter studies games played on fixed networks. These games capture a wide variety of economic settings, including local public goods, peer effects, and technology adoption. The chapter establishes a common analytical framework to study a wide game class. The authors review and advance existing results by showing how they tie together within the common framework. The chapter discusses the game-theoretic underpinnings of key notions including…
Exploring the Generalization Process from Past Behavior to Predicting Future Behavior
Substantial evidence in social psychology documents that traits predict behavior. Research in behavioral economics establishes prior behavioral information—the actual behavior of another person in the past—influences future decision making, suggestive of the role of traits in guiding future behavior, but agnostic to the specific psychological mechanism. Yet the entire generalization process from past behavior to predicting future behavior has not…
Strategic Interaction and Networks
Geography and social links shape economic interactions. In industries, schools, and markets, the entire network determines outcomes. This paper analyzes a large class of games and obtains a striking result. Equilibria depend on a single network measure: the lowest eigenvalue. This paper is the first to uncover the importance of the lowest eigenvalue to economic and social outcomes. It captures how much the network amplifies agents' actions. The p…
Identity Economics
Identity Economics provides an important and compelling new way to understand human behavior, revealing how our identities--and not just economic incentives--influence our decisions. In 1995, economist Rachel Kranton wrote future Nobel Prize-winner George Akerlof a letter insisting that his most recent paper was wrong. Identity, she argued, was the missing element that would help to explain why people--facing the same economic circumstances--woul…
Identity and the Economics of Organizations
The economics of organizations is replete with the pitfalls of monetary rewards and punishments to motivate workers. If economic incentives do not work, what does? This paper proposes that workers' self-image as jobholders, coupled with their ideal as to how their job should be done, can be a major work incentive. It shows how such identities can flatten reward schedules, as they solve "principal agent" problem. The paper also identifies and expl…
Competition and the Incentive to Produce High Quality
Previous literature indicates that, when quality is a choice variable, firms have an incentive to produce high quality to maintain their reputations with consumers. The strategic interaction among firms and competition for market share is not considered. This paper finds that, when firms compete for market share, perfect equilibria in which firms produce high‐quality goods need not exist. Competition for customers can eliminate the price premium …
Identity and Schooling
Economics and Identity
This paper considers how identity, a person's sense of self, affects economic outcomes. We incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior. In the utility function we propose, identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave. We then construct a simple game-theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions. The paper adapts these …
The hazards of piecemeal reform
The Formation of Cooperative Relationships
This article investigates how individuals forge and maintain cooperative relationships when there is always the possibility of starting again with a new partner. The analysis shows that an ever-present opportunity to form new relationships need not destroy cooperation. Simple strategies achieve the (constrained) optimal level of cooperation. These strategies involve a "bond" in the form of reduced utility at the beginning of a relationship Two ne…
Identity and the Economics of Organizations
The economics of organizations is replete with the pitfalls of monetary rewards and punishments to motivate workers. If economic incentives do not work, what does? This paper proposes that workers' self-image as jobholders, coupled with their ideal as to how their job should be done, can be a major work incentive. It shows how such identities can flatten reward schedules, as they solve "principal agent" problem. The paper also identifies and expl…
The hazards of piecemeal reform
The Formation of Cooperative Relationships
This article investigates how individuals forge and maintain cooperative relationships when there is always the possibility of starting again with a new partner. The analysis shows that an ever-present opportunity to form new relationships need not destroy cooperation. Simple strategies achieve the (constrained) optimal level of cooperation. These strategies involve a "bond" in the form of reduced utility at the beginning of a relationship Two ne…
Amount and time exert independent influences on intertemporal choice
The hidden cost of humanization
Rumors and Social Networks
This article studies the transmission of rumors in social networks. We consider a model with biased and unbiased agents. Biased agents want to enforce a specific decision and unbiased agents to match the true state. One agent learns the true state and sends a message to her neighbors, who decide whether or not to transmit it further. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game, show that the social network can act as a filter, and…
Competition and the Incentive to Produce High Quality
Previous literature indicates that, when quality is a choice variable, firms have an incentive to produce high quality to maintain their reputations with consumers. The strategic interaction among firms and competition for market share is not considered. This paper finds that, when firms compete for market share, perfect equilibria in which firms produce high‐quality goods need not exist. Competition for customers can eliminate the price premium …
The Formation of Cooperative Relationships
This article investigates how individuals forge and maintain cooperative relationships when there is always the possibility of starting again with a new partner. The analysis shows that an ever-present opportunity to form new relationships need not destroy cooperation. Simple strategies achieve the (constrained) optimal level of cooperation. These strategies involve a "bond" in the form of reduced utility at the beginning of a relationship Two ne…
The hazards of piecemeal reform
Economics and Identity
This paper considers how identity, a person's sense of self, affects economic outcomes. We incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior. In the utility function we propose, identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave. We then construct a simple game-theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions. The paper adapts these …
Identity and Schooling
Competition and the Incentive to Produce High Quality
Previous literature indicates that, when quality is a choice variable, firms have an incentive to produce high quality to maintain their reputations with consumers. The strategic interaction among firms and competition for market share is not considered. This paper finds that, when firms compete for market share, perfect equilibria in which firms produce high‐quality goods need not exist. Competition for customers can eliminate the price premium …
Identity and the Economics of Organizations
The economics of organizations is replete with the pitfalls of monetary rewards and punishments to motivate workers. If economic incentives do not work, what does? This paper proposes that workers' self-image as jobholders, coupled with their ideal as to how their job should be done, can be a major work incentive. It shows how such identities can flatten reward schedules, as they solve "principal agent" problem. The paper also identifies and expl…
Identity Economics
Identity Economics provides an important and compelling new way to understand human behavior, revealing how our identities--and not just economic incentives--influence our decisions. In 1995, economist Rachel Kranton wrote future Nobel Prize-winner George Akerlof a letter insisting that his most recent paper was wrong. Identity, she argued, was the missing element that would help to explain why people--facing the same economic circumstances--woul…
Strategic Interaction and Networks
Geography and social links shape economic interactions. In industries, schools, and markets, the entire network determines outcomes. This paper analyzes a large class of games and obtains a striking result. Equilibria depend on a single network measure: the lowest eigenvalue. This paper is the first to uncover the importance of the lowest eigenvalue to economic and social outcomes. It captures how much the network amplifies agents' actions. The p…
Exploring the Generalization Process from Past Behavior to Predicting Future Behavior
Substantial evidence in social psychology documents that traits predict behavior. Research in behavioral economics establishes prior behavioral information—the actual behavior of another person in the past—influences future decision making, suggestive of the role of traits in guiding future behavior, but agnostic to the specific psychological mechanism. Yet the entire generalization process from past behavior to predicting future behavior has not…
Games Played on Networks
This chapter studies games played on fixed networks. These games capture a wide variety of economic settings, including local public goods, peer effects, and technology adoption. The chapter establishes a common analytical framework to study a wide game class. The authors review and advance existing results by showing how they tie together within the common framework. The chapter discusses the game-theoretic underpinnings of key notions including…
Rumors and Social Networks
This article studies the transmission of rumors in social networks. We consider a model with biased and unbiased agents. Biased agents want to enforce a specific decision and unbiased agents to match the true state. One agent learns the true state and sends a message to her neighbors, who decide whether or not to transmit it further. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game, show that the social network can act as a filter, and…
Amount and time exert independent influences on intertemporal choice
Oversampling of minority categories drives misperceptions of group compositions
The hidden cost of humanization
Cover-ups
Competition, Cooperation and Social Perceptions
Can competition or cooperation for economic gain affect people’s social perceptions of others? This paper experimentally examines this possible link from the economic to the social realm. Subjects engage in a task facing either a tournament or a cooperative pay scheme, after which subjects are asked their social perceptions of their counterparts in the task—how similar they are and how much they have in common. The pay schemes do not affect answe…
Economics (10 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Microeconomics (7 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Incentive (5 works) · Social Psychology (5 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Business (3 works)