Eric D U Gutierrez
Biographic Data
| ID | 231167 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Eric D U Gutierrez |
| GIVEN NAMES | Eric D U |
| FAMILY NAME | Gutierrez |
| SIGNATURE | GUTIERREZ E D U |
| AFFILIATIONS | International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Hague, Netherlands |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7906-0502 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 26 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Precarity, illicit markets, and the 'mystery' of prices
Stand-alone price analysis of illicit opium and coca does not explain why smallholders turn to illicit crops for coping and survival. Under conditions of precarity, illicit crop markets can stimulate productivity. They generate returns that can tame crises and relieve pressures. To smallholders facing marginalisation, violence, and climate change - growing opium and coca, despite their illegality, can reduce or spread risks and provide more predi…
Criminal entrepreneurs as pioneers, intermediaries, and arbitrageurs in borderland economies
Many discussions of mafia and criminal entrepreneurs typically focus on violence and illegality, and less on their possible roles in rural transformation, even when they are located in borderland economies linking the subsistence cultivators of illicit crops to regional and global markets. This paper assesses the life stories of drug lords, the Castaño brothers of Colombia and Roberto Suárez Gomez of Bolivia, to draw inferences into how such rura…
The paradox of illicit economies: Survival, resilience, and the limits of development and drug policy orthodoxy
The illicit drug crops opium and coca are conventionally regarded as sources of instability, an ‘evil’ that breeds fragility and violence. Fragile states are supposed to be most vulnerable to their production and consequent harms. Yet by looking into the local contexts of the world’s leading opium and coca producers – Afghanistan, Myanmar, Colombia and Bolivia – these illicit crops are found to also be sources of stability, even drivers of econom…
Mitigating Crime and Violence in Coca-growing Areas
Puzzled about why and how coca-growing areas in Bolivia do not have the same levels of violence and criminality experienced in their communities, eight peasant leaders from various coca-growing areas of Colombia joined a study tour to investigate. Notwithstanding differences in histories of conflict, political economy, infrastructure, and state-society relations, two explanations stood out. First, the usually overlooked intermediation role of str…
Delivering pro-poor water and sanitation services: The technical and political challenges in Malawi and Zambia
From Ilaga to Abu Sayyaf: New Entrepreneurs in Violence and Their Impact on Local Politics in Mindanao
The history of conflict in Mindanao is marked by the violence associated with groups like the llagas and the Abu Sayyaf. Between them are many other similar groups and individual young men—from the different Tadtad cults to the range of ragtag, non-ideological peasant supporters of the Moro insurgencies—who have found varied uses for violence. These are not the classic rebel fighters with visions or political programs in mind. Rather, they are of…
The paradox of illicit economies: Survival, resilience, and the limits of development and drug policy orthodoxy
The illicit drug crops opium and coca are conventionally regarded as sources of instability, an ‘evil’ that breeds fragility and violence. Fragile states are supposed to be most vulnerable to their production and consequent harms. Yet by looking into the local contexts of the world’s leading opium and coca producers – Afghanistan, Myanmar, Colombia and Bolivia – these illicit crops are found to also be sources of stability, even drivers of econom…
Delivering pro-poor water and sanitation services: The technical and political challenges in Malawi and Zambia
Precarity, illicit markets, and the 'mystery' of prices
Stand-alone price analysis of illicit opium and coca does not explain why smallholders turn to illicit crops for coping and survival. Under conditions of precarity, illicit crop markets can stimulate productivity. They generate returns that can tame crises and relieve pressures. To smallholders facing marginalisation, violence, and climate change - growing opium and coca, despite their illegality, can reduce or spread risks and provide more predi…
Criminal entrepreneurs as pioneers, intermediaries, and arbitrageurs in borderland economies
Many discussions of mafia and criminal entrepreneurs typically focus on violence and illegality, and less on their possible roles in rural transformation, even when they are located in borderland economies linking the subsistence cultivators of illicit crops to regional and global markets. This paper assesses the life stories of drug lords, the Castaño brothers of Colombia and Roberto Suárez Gomez of Bolivia, to draw inferences into how such rura…
Mitigating Crime and Violence in Coca-growing Areas
Puzzled about why and how coca-growing areas in Bolivia do not have the same levels of violence and criminality experienced in their communities, eight peasant leaders from various coca-growing areas of Colombia joined a study tour to investigate. Notwithstanding differences in histories of conflict, political economy, infrastructure, and state-society relations, two explanations stood out. First, the usually overlooked intermediation role of str…
From Ilaga to Abu Sayyaf: New Entrepreneurs in Violence and Their Impact on Local Politics in Mindanao
The history of conflict in Mindanao is marked by the violence associated with groups like the llagas and the Abu Sayyaf. Between them are many other similar groups and individual young men—from the different Tadtad cults to the range of ragtag, non-ideological peasant supporters of the Moro insurgencies—who have found varied uses for violence. These are not the classic rebel fighters with visions or political programs in mind. Rather, they are of…
From Ilaga to Abu Sayyaf: New Entrepreneurs in Violence and Their Impact on Local Politics in Mindanao
The history of conflict in Mindanao is marked by the violence associated with groups like the llagas and the Abu Sayyaf. Between them are many other similar groups and individual young men—from the different Tadtad cults to the range of ragtag, non-ideological peasant supporters of the Moro insurgencies—who have found varied uses for violence. These are not the classic rebel fighters with visions or political programs in mind. Rather, they are of…
Delivering pro-poor water and sanitation services: The technical and political challenges in Malawi and Zambia
Mitigating Crime and Violence in Coca-growing Areas
Puzzled about why and how coca-growing areas in Bolivia do not have the same levels of violence and criminality experienced in their communities, eight peasant leaders from various coca-growing areas of Colombia joined a study tour to investigate. Notwithstanding differences in histories of conflict, political economy, infrastructure, and state-society relations, two explanations stood out. First, the usually overlooked intermediation role of str…
The paradox of illicit economies: Survival, resilience, and the limits of development and drug policy orthodoxy
The illicit drug crops opium and coca are conventionally regarded as sources of instability, an ‘evil’ that breeds fragility and violence. Fragile states are supposed to be most vulnerable to their production and consequent harms. Yet by looking into the local contexts of the world’s leading opium and coca producers – Afghanistan, Myanmar, Colombia and Bolivia – these illicit crops are found to also be sources of stability, even drivers of econom…
Criminal entrepreneurs as pioneers, intermediaries, and arbitrageurs in borderland economies
Many discussions of mafia and criminal entrepreneurs typically focus on violence and illegality, and less on their possible roles in rural transformation, even when they are located in borderland economies linking the subsistence cultivators of illicit crops to regional and global markets. This paper assesses the life stories of drug lords, the Castaño brothers of Colombia and Roberto Suárez Gomez of Bolivia, to draw inferences into how such rura…
Precarity, illicit markets, and the 'mystery' of prices
Stand-alone price analysis of illicit opium and coca does not explain why smallholders turn to illicit crops for coping and survival. Under conditions of precarity, illicit crop markets can stimulate productivity. They generate returns that can tame crises and relieve pressures. To smallholders facing marginalisation, violence, and climate change - growing opium and coca, despite their illegality, can reduce or spread risks and provide more predi…
Political science (5 works) · Economics (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Coca (3 works) · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance (3 works) · Development economics (3 works) · Economic growth (3 works) · Geography (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political economy (3 works)