Navin Kartik
Biographic Data
| ID | 2352359 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Navin Kartik |
| GIVEN NAMES | Navin |
| FAMILY NAME | Kartik |
| SIGNATURE | KARTIK N |
| AFFILIATIONS | Columbia University |
| ORCID | 0009-0003-5604-4483 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 32 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage
We study dynamic models of electoral accountability. Politicians’ policy preferences are their private information, so officeholders act to influence the electorate’s beliefs — i.e., to build reputation — and improve their re-election prospects. The resulting behavior may be socially desirable (good reputation effects) or undesirable (bad reputation effects). When newly-elected officeholders face stronger reputation pressures than their establish…
Muddled Information
We study a model of signaling in which agents are heterogeneous on two dimensions. An agent's natural action is the action taken in the absence of signaling concerns. Her gaming ability parameterizes the cost of increasing the action. Equilibrium behavior muddles information across dimensions. As incentives to take higher actions increase—due to higher stakes or more manipulable signaling technology—more information is revealed about gaming abili…
Contests for Experimentation
We study contests for innovation with learning about the innovation’s feasibility and opponents’ outcomes. We characterize contests that maximize innovation when the designer chooses a prize-sharing scheme and a disclosure policy. A “public winner-takes-all” contest dominates public contests—where any success is immediately disclosed—with any other prize-sharing scheme as well as winner-takes-all contests with any other disclosure policy. Yet, jo…
Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation
We introduce a Downsian model in which policy‐relevant information is revealed to the elected politician after the election. The electorate benefits from giving the elected politician discretion to adapt policies to his information. But limits on discretion are desirable when politicians do not share the electorate's policy preferences. Optimal political representation generally consists of a mixture of the delegate (no discretion) and trustee (f…
Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
Implementation with evidence
We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e., evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but nonprohibitive costs in different states. In such environments, social choice functions that are not Maskin-monotonic can be implemented. We formulate a more general property, evidence monotonicity, and show that …
Opinions as Incentives
We study costs and benefits of differences of opinion between an adviser and a decision maker. Even when they share the same underlying preferences over decisions, a difference of opinion about payoff-relevant information leads to strategic information acquisition and transmission. A decision maker faces a fundamental trade-off: a greater difference of opinion increases an adviser's incentives to acquire information but exacerbates the strategic …
Opinions as Incentives
We study costs and benefits of differences of opinion between an adviser and a decision maker. Even when they share the same underlying preferences over decisions, a difference of opinion about payoff-relevant information leads to strategic information acquisition and transmission. A decision maker faces a fundamental trade-off: a greater difference of opinion increases an adviser's incentives to acquire information but exacerbates the strategic …
Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation
We introduce a Downsian model in which policy‐relevant information is revealed to the elected politician after the election. The electorate benefits from giving the elected politician discretion to adapt policies to his information. But limits on discretion are desirable when politicians do not share the electorate's policy preferences. Optimal political representation generally consists of a mixture of the delegate (no discretion) and trustee (f…
Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage
We study dynamic models of electoral accountability. Politicians’ policy preferences are their private information, so officeholders act to influence the electorate’s beliefs — i.e., to build reputation — and improve their re-election prospects. The resulting behavior may be socially desirable (good reputation effects) or undesirable (bad reputation effects). When newly-elected officeholders face stronger reputation pressures than their establish…
Muddled Information
We study a model of signaling in which agents are heterogeneous on two dimensions. An agent's natural action is the action taken in the absence of signaling concerns. Her gaming ability parameterizes the cost of increasing the action. Equilibrium behavior muddles information across dimensions. As incentives to take higher actions increase—due to higher stakes or more manipulable signaling technology—more information is revealed about gaming abili…
Contests for Experimentation
We study contests for innovation with learning about the innovation’s feasibility and opponents’ outcomes. We characterize contests that maximize innovation when the designer chooses a prize-sharing scheme and a disclosure policy. A “public winner-takes-all” contest dominates public contests—where any success is immediately disclosed—with any other prize-sharing scheme as well as winner-takes-all contests with any other disclosure policy. Yet, jo…
Opinions as Incentives
We study costs and benefits of differences of opinion between an adviser and a decision maker. Even when they share the same underlying preferences over decisions, a difference of opinion about payoff-relevant information leads to strategic information acquisition and transmission. A decision maker faces a fundamental trade-off: a greater difference of opinion increases an adviser's incentives to acquire information but exacerbates the strategic …
Implementation with evidence
We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e., evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but nonprohibitive costs in different states. In such environments, social choice functions that are not Maskin-monotonic can be implemented. We formulate a more general property, evidence monotonicity, and show that …
Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
Contests for Experimentation
We study contests for innovation with learning about the innovation’s feasibility and opponents’ outcomes. We characterize contests that maximize innovation when the designer chooses a prize-sharing scheme and a disclosure policy. A “public winner-takes-all” contest dominates public contests—where any success is immediately disclosed—with any other prize-sharing scheme as well as winner-takes-all contests with any other disclosure policy. Yet, jo…
Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation
We introduce a Downsian model in which policy‐relevant information is revealed to the elected politician after the election. The electorate benefits from giving the elected politician discretion to adapt policies to his information. But limits on discretion are desirable when politicians do not share the electorate's policy preferences. Optimal political representation generally consists of a mixture of the delegate (no discretion) and trustee (f…
Muddled Information
We study a model of signaling in which agents are heterogeneous on two dimensions. An agent's natural action is the action taken in the absence of signaling concerns. Her gaming ability parameterizes the cost of increasing the action. Equilibrium behavior muddles information across dimensions. As incentives to take higher actions increase—due to higher stakes or more manipulable signaling technology—more information is revealed about gaming abili…
Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage
We study dynamic models of electoral accountability. Politicians’ policy preferences are their private information, so officeholders act to influence the electorate’s beliefs — i.e., to build reputation — and improve their re-election prospects. The resulting behavior may be socially desirable (good reputation effects) or undesirable (bad reputation effects). When newly-elected officeholders face stronger reputation pressures than their establish…
Economics (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Microeconomics (6 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (5 works) · Game Theory and Applications (5 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Political science (3 works)