Harald Wiese
Biographic Data
| ID | 235596 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Harald Wiese |
| GIVEN NAMES | Harald |
| FAMILY NAME | Wiese |
| SIGNATURE | WIESE H |
| AFFILIATIONS | Leipzig University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7881-0308 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Bookkeeping in the Arthaśāstra
This paper focuses on the Arthaśāstra ’s portion II .6.1- II .7.3. The official with the title samāhartṛ is responsible not only for bookkeeping, but also for inflow organization, coin in- and outflow management, supervision, and controlling. Many of the bookkeeping terms remain elusive, but some progress can be made with respect to umbrella terms, such as āyamukha , samudaya , and siddha . Among other assertions, this paper claims that karaṇīya …
Why prāṇa is the most excellent among the vital functions, or: The Shapley value in the Upaniṣad s
This paper deals with the contest of the “vital functions” for superiority in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad and the Chāndogya Upaniṣad , in the Aitareya Āraṇyaka and others. The paper concentrates on two particular approaches to deciding the superiority question, namely (i) singly leaving or entering (breath, sight, etc. leave one after another or enter one after another), and (ii) alternating withdrawal (breath leaves and returns, sight leaves and …
Advanced Microeconomics
Cost minimization and profit maximization
The Essence of Politics. Kamandaki, by Jesse Ross Knutson
Two puzzles of judicial wagers
This paper is about an Old Indian judicial institution called paṇa (“wager”). Within a court proceeding, a judicial wager is a certain sum of money that a conflicting party offers to pay if he ends up losing his case. This paper explains the rationale of judicial wagers by showing that they may signal truthfulness
Kauṭilyan Market Tax
The famous Indian manual on the management of kingdoms (called the Arthaśāstra) suggests an unusual tax that is based on a seller's assessment of the price of the good to be sold. We show that this tax confronts the seller with an optimization problem. In translations, some interpretational issues have arisen that this paper claims to solve
Kauṭilya on Legal and Illegal Cancellations of Contracts
This article tries to clarify Arthaśāstra III .15.1–10 which is a difficult section on legal cancellations of contracts ( anuśaya ) for merchandise and on illegal ones. Previous translators apparently misunderstood the case of perishable goods and the expression anuśayaṃ dadāti . The view put forward in the present paper builds on the distinction between “Kauṭilya Recension” and “Śāstric Redaction”. However, the sections concerned may contain eve…
Indian Principal-Agent Theory, Or, How Varuṇa Helps the King to be Just
Economic principal-agent theory deals with asymmetric information. It has two aspects. (i) If one person is better informed than another one, the former may outwit the latter. Kauṭilya , the Arthaśāstra ’s author, and other artha or dharma authors had a very good understanding of outwitting. (ii) Economic theory teaches that the person in command of superior knowledge may not always be able to benefit from this knowledge. He may need the uninform…
Ordeals: "An economic vindication of ancient Indian "nonsense
Ordeals (by fire, by water, etc.) are a judicial institution in which defendants try to prove their innocence by divine judgement. In a recent law and economics paper, Leeson (2012) suggests that (medieval) ordeals "work" because, and if, ordeal takers have sufficient belief in them and because the priests administering ordeals "manipulate" them in an appropriate manner. We find that Leeson's theory also helps us understand Indian ordeals. Intere…
Reconstructing Granovetter's network theory
Language competition: An Economic Theory of Language Learning and Production
This article employs game theory to contribute to sociolinguistics (or the economics of language). From both the synchronic and the diachronic perspective, we are interested in the conditions (of language learning and literary production) that make some languages dominate others. Two results are particularly noteworthy: (i) Translations have an ambiguous effect on domination. (ii) We offer three different explanations of how a past language like …
Backward Induction in Indian Animal Tales
Backward Induction in Indian Animal Tales
Kauṭilyan Market Tax
The famous Indian manual on the management of kingdoms (called the Arthaśāstra) suggests an unusual tax that is based on a seller's assessment of the price of the good to be sold. We show that this tax confronts the seller with an optimization problem. In translations, some interpretational issues have arisen that this paper claims to solve
Language competition: An Economic Theory of Language Learning and Production
This article employs game theory to contribute to sociolinguistics (or the economics of language). From both the synchronic and the diachronic perspective, we are interested in the conditions (of language learning and literary production) that make some languages dominate others. Two results are particularly noteworthy: (i) Translations have an ambiguous effect on domination. (ii) We offer three different explanations of how a past language like …
Backward Induction in Indian Animal Tales
Reconstructing Granovetter's network theory
Language competition: An Economic Theory of Language Learning and Production
This article employs game theory to contribute to sociolinguistics (or the economics of language). From both the synchronic and the diachronic perspective, we are interested in the conditions (of language learning and literary production) that make some languages dominate others. Two results are particularly noteworthy: (i) Translations have an ambiguous effect on domination. (ii) We offer three different explanations of how a past language like …
Indian Principal-Agent Theory, Or, How Varuṇa Helps the King to be Just
Economic principal-agent theory deals with asymmetric information. It has two aspects. (i) If one person is better informed than another one, the former may outwit the latter. Kauṭilya , the Arthaśāstra ’s author, and other artha or dharma authors had a very good understanding of outwitting. (ii) Economic theory teaches that the person in command of superior knowledge may not always be able to benefit from this knowledge. He may need the uninform…
Ordeals: "An economic vindication of ancient Indian "nonsense
Ordeals (by fire, by water, etc.) are a judicial institution in which defendants try to prove their innocence by divine judgement. In a recent law and economics paper, Leeson (2012) suggests that (medieval) ordeals "work" because, and if, ordeal takers have sufficient belief in them and because the priests administering ordeals "manipulate" them in an appropriate manner. We find that Leeson's theory also helps us understand Indian ordeals. Intere…
Kauṭilya on Legal and Illegal Cancellations of Contracts
This article tries to clarify Arthaśāstra III .15.1–10 which is a difficult section on legal cancellations of contracts ( anuśaya ) for merchandise and on illegal ones. Previous translators apparently misunderstood the case of perishable goods and the expression anuśayaṃ dadāti . The view put forward in the present paper builds on the distinction between “Kauṭilya Recension” and “Śāstric Redaction”. However, the sections concerned may contain eve…
Advanced Microeconomics
Cost minimization and profit maximization
The Essence of Politics. Kamandaki, by Jesse Ross Knutson
Two puzzles of judicial wagers
This paper is about an Old Indian judicial institution called paṇa (“wager”). Within a court proceeding, a judicial wager is a certain sum of money that a conflicting party offers to pay if he ends up losing his case. This paper explains the rationale of judicial wagers by showing that they may signal truthfulness
Kauṭilyan Market Tax
The famous Indian manual on the management of kingdoms (called the Arthaśāstra) suggests an unusual tax that is based on a seller's assessment of the price of the good to be sold. We show that this tax confronts the seller with an optimization problem. In translations, some interpretational issues have arisen that this paper claims to solve
Why prāṇa is the most excellent among the vital functions, or: The Shapley value in the Upaniṣad s
This paper deals with the contest of the “vital functions” for superiority in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad and the Chāndogya Upaniṣad , in the Aitareya Āraṇyaka and others. The paper concentrates on two particular approaches to deciding the superiority question, namely (i) singly leaving or entering (breath, sight, etc. leave one after another or enter one after another), and (ii) alternating withdrawal (breath leaves and returns, sight leaves and …
Bookkeeping in the Arthaśāstra
This paper focuses on the Arthaśāstra ’s portion II .6.1- II .7.3. The official with the title samāhartṛ is responsible not only for bookkeeping, but also for inflow organization, coin in- and outflow management, supervision, and controlling. Many of the bookkeeping terms remain elusive, but some progress can be made with respect to umbrella terms, such as āyamukha , samudaya , and siddha . Among other assertions, this paper claims that karaṇīya …
Economics (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Business (4 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Indian and Buddhist Studies (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Economic theories and models (3 works) · Historical Economic and Legal Thought (3 works)