Louis Marinoff
Biographic Data
| ID | 2365246 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Louis Marinoff |
| GIVEN NAMES | Louis |
| FAMILY NAME | Marinoff |
| SIGNATURE | MARINOFF L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of British Columbia |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1990 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1994 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
A Resolution of Bertrand's Paradox
Bertrand's random-chord paradox purports to illustrate the inconsistency of the principle of indifference when applied to problems in which the number of possible cases is infinite. This paper shows that Bertrand's original problem is vaguely posed, but demonstrates that clearly stated variations lead to different, but theoretically and empirically self-consistent solutions. The resolution of the paradox lies in appreciating how different geometr…
Maximizing Expected Utilities in the Prisoner's Dilemma
This article reports the results of a computer experiment with iterated prisoner's dilemmas conducted as an interactive tournament of competing strategies and families of strategies. The purposes of the experiment are to complement Axelrod's previous tournaments and to supplement his findings. For his competitions, Axelrod drew on an unregulated population of strategies. In contrast, the interactive tournament regulates the composition of the str…
The Inapplicability of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy to the Prisoner's Dilemma
The Axelrod–Hamilton games-theoretic conflict model, which applies Maynard Smith's concept of evolutionarily stable strategy to the Prisoner's Dilemma, gives rise to an inconsistency between theoretical prescription and empirical results. Proposed resolutions of thisproblem are incongruent with the tenets of the models involved. The independent consistency of each model is restored, and the anomaly thereby circumvented, by a proof that no evoluti…
A Resolution of Bertrand's Paradox
Bertrand's random-chord paradox purports to illustrate the inconsistency of the principle of indifference when applied to problems in which the number of possible cases is infinite. This paper shows that Bertrand's original problem is vaguely posed, but demonstrates that clearly stated variations lead to different, but theoretically and empirically self-consistent solutions. The resolution of the paradox lies in appreciating how different geometr…
Maximizing Expected Utilities in the Prisoner's Dilemma
This article reports the results of a computer experiment with iterated prisoner's dilemmas conducted as an interactive tournament of competing strategies and families of strategies. The purposes of the experiment are to complement Axelrod's previous tournaments and to supplement his findings. For his competitions, Axelrod drew on an unregulated population of strategies. In contrast, the interactive tournament regulates the composition of the str…
The Inapplicability of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy to the Prisoner's Dilemma
The Axelrod–Hamilton games-theoretic conflict model, which applies Maynard Smith's concept of evolutionarily stable strategy to the Prisoner's Dilemma, gives rise to an inconsistency between theoretical prescription and empirical results. Proposed resolutions of thisproblem are incongruent with the tenets of the models involved. The independent consistency of each model is restored, and the anomaly thereby circumvented, by a proof that no evoluti…
The Inapplicability of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy to the Prisoner's Dilemma
The Axelrod–Hamilton games-theoretic conflict model, which applies Maynard Smith's concept of evolutionarily stable strategy to the Prisoner's Dilemma, gives rise to an inconsistency between theoretical prescription and empirical results. Proposed resolutions of thisproblem are incongruent with the tenets of the models involved. The independent consistency of each model is restored, and the anomaly thereby circumvented, by a proof that no evoluti…
Maximizing Expected Utilities in the Prisoner's Dilemma
This article reports the results of a computer experiment with iterated prisoner's dilemmas conducted as an interactive tournament of competing strategies and families of strategies. The purposes of the experiment are to complement Axelrod's previous tournaments and to supplement his findings. For his competitions, Axelrod drew on an unregulated population of strategies. In contrast, the interactive tournament regulates the composition of the str…
A Resolution of Bertrand's Paradox
Bertrand's random-chord paradox purports to illustrate the inconsistency of the principle of indifference when applied to problems in which the number of possible cases is infinite. This paper shows that Bertrand's original problem is vaguely posed, but demonstrates that clearly stated variations lead to different, but theoretically and empirically self-consistent solutions. The resolution of the paradox lies in appreciating how different geometr…
Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Dilemma (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (2 works) · Game theory (2 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works)