Paul Silva Jr
Biographic Data
| ID | 2385330 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Paul Silva Jr |
| GIVEN NAMES | Paul |
| FAMILY NAME | Silva Jr |
| SIGNATURE | JR P S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Cologne |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0321-1562 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Legal Standards of Proof
The relation of normic support offers a novel solution to the proof paradox: a paradox in evidence law arising from legal cases involving merely statistical evidence (Smith in Mind 127: 1193–1218, 2018). Central to the normic support solution has been the thesis that merely statistical evidence cannot confer normic support. However, it has been observed that there are exceptions to this: there exist cases where merely statistical evidence can giv…
Preservationism in Memory
Preservationism in the philosophy of memory is dead, according to many. This opinion is not ill‐founded. It appears to be justified both by common sense and by empirical psychology. But in what follows we explain how and why an independently motivated form of preservationism, modal preservationism, survives
The functional mind and the trinitarian God
Within the space of monotheistic options, trinitarian monotheism holds a puzzling place. It asserts that God is a single being who is, somehow, also three distinct persons. This form of monotheism has regularly been charged with being either inconsistent, unintelligible, or undermotivated – and possibly all three. While recent explorations of trinitarian monotheism have tended to rely on work in metaphysics, this paper turns to the philosophy of …
Awareness by degree
Do factive mental states come in degrees? If so, what is their underlying structure, and what is their theoretical significance? Many have observed that ‘knows that’ is not a gradable verb and have taken this to be strong evidence that propositional knowledge does not come in degrees. This paper demonstrates that the adjective ‘aware that’ passes all the standard tests of gradability, and thus strongly motivates the idea that it refers to a facti…
Propositional and Doxastic Justification
Possessing reasons
In order for a reason to justify an action or attitude it must be one that is possessed by an agent. Knowledge-centric views of possession ground our possession of reasons, at least partially, either in our knowledge of them or in our being in a position to know them. On virtually all accounts, knowing P is some kind of non-accidental true belief that P. This entails that knowing P is a kind of non-accidental true representation that P. I outline…
Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge
Many have found it plausible that knowledge is a constitutively normative state, i.e. a state that is grounded in the possession of reasons. Many have also found it plausible that certain cases of proprioceptive knowledge, memorial knowledge, and self‐evident knowledge are cases of knowledge that are not grounded in the possession of reasons. I refer to these as cases of basic knowledge . The existence of basic knowledge forms a primary objection…
A Bayesian explanation of the irrationality of sexist and racist beliefs involving generic content
Possessing reasons
In order for a reason to justify an action or attitude it must be one that is possessed by an agent. Knowledge-centric views of possession ground our possession of reasons, at least partially, either in our knowledge of them or in our being in a position to know them. On virtually all accounts, knowing P is some kind of non-accidental true belief that P. This entails that knowing P is a kind of non-accidental true representation that P. I outline…
Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge
Many have found it plausible that knowledge is a constitutively normative state, i.e. a state that is grounded in the possession of reasons. Many have also found it plausible that certain cases of proprioceptive knowledge, memorial knowledge, and self‐evident knowledge are cases of knowledge that are not grounded in the possession of reasons. I refer to these as cases of basic knowledge . The existence of basic knowledge forms a primary objection…
A Bayesian explanation of the irrationality of sexist and racist beliefs involving generic content
A Bayesian explanation of the irrationality of sexist and racist beliefs involving generic content
Possessing reasons
In order for a reason to justify an action or attitude it must be one that is possessed by an agent. Knowledge-centric views of possession ground our possession of reasons, at least partially, either in our knowledge of them or in our being in a position to know them. On virtually all accounts, knowing P is some kind of non-accidental true belief that P. This entails that knowing P is a kind of non-accidental true representation that P. I outline…
Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge
Many have found it plausible that knowledge is a constitutively normative state, i.e. a state that is grounded in the possession of reasons. Many have also found it plausible that certain cases of proprioceptive knowledge, memorial knowledge, and self‐evident knowledge are cases of knowledge that are not grounded in the possession of reasons. I refer to these as cases of basic knowledge . The existence of basic knowledge forms a primary objection…
Propositional and Doxastic Justification
Awareness by degree
Do factive mental states come in degrees? If so, what is their underlying structure, and what is their theoretical significance? Many have observed that ‘knows that’ is not a gradable verb and have taken this to be strong evidence that propositional knowledge does not come in degrees. This paper demonstrates that the adjective ‘aware that’ passes all the standard tests of gradability, and thus strongly motivates the idea that it refers to a facti…
Legal Standards of Proof
The relation of normic support offers a novel solution to the proof paradox: a paradox in evidence law arising from legal cases involving merely statistical evidence (Smith in Mind 127: 1193–1218, 2018). Central to the normic support solution has been the thesis that merely statistical evidence cannot confer normic support. However, it has been observed that there are exceptions to this: there exist cases where merely statistical evidence can giv…
Preservationism in Memory
Preservationism in the philosophy of memory is dead, according to many. This opinion is not ill‐founded. It appears to be justified both by common sense and by empirical psychology. But in what follows we explain how and why an independently motivated form of preservationism, modal preservationism, survives
The functional mind and the trinitarian God
Within the space of monotheistic options, trinitarian monotheism holds a puzzling place. It asserts that God is a single being who is, somehow, also three distinct persons. This form of monotheism has regularly been charged with being either inconsistent, unintelligible, or undermotivated – and possibly all three. While recent explorations of trinitarian monotheism have tended to rely on work in metaphysics, this paper turns to the philosophy of …
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Dilemma (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Normative (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works)