Don Dedrick
Biographic Data
| ID | 243878 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Don Dedrick |
| GIVEN NAMES | Don |
| FAMILY NAME | Dedrick |
| SIGNATURE | DEDRICK D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Toronto |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1995 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Considering the Prevalence of the "Stimulus Error" in Color Naming Research
In "Does the Basic Color Terms discussion suffer from the Stimulus Error?" Rolf Kuehni describes a research stumbling block known as the "stimulus error," and hints at the difficulties it causes for mainstream color naming research (Kuehni, is Issue). Among the issues intrinsic to Kuehni's "stimulus error" description is the important question of what can generally be inferred from color naming behaviors based on bounded samples of empirical stim…
Color, Color Terms, Categorization, Cognition, Culture: An Afterword
Recent work on color naming challenges the idea that there are shared perceptually salient colors or color categories that are "hardwired" into homo sapiens and provide the basis for one of the most famous cross-cultural claims of all time, Brent Berlin and Paul Kay's claim that there is a small number of "basic" color terms (eleven), and that some subset of these terms is present in every human language (Berlin & Kay, 1969; see Kay and Maffi, 19…
Explanation and Color-Naming Research
Perhaps one of the central assumptions when one comes to think about scientific explanations—an assumption made by philosophers and scientists alike—is that a causal explanation is an optimal explanation. It seems, after all, that an explanation tells us why something happens and that to do so is to specify causes. Although there is nothing wrong with causal explanations per se, many good explanations in science are not in any important sense cau…
“Whatever …”: A Reply to Albahari
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
The Foundations of the Universalist Tradition in Color-Naming Research (and Their Supposed Refutation
In Basic Color Terms, Berlin and Kay argued for a restricted number of "basic" color words—words they claimed to be culturally universal. This claim about language was buttressed by psychologist Eleanor Rosch's famous work on color prototypes. Together, the works of Berlin and Kay and Rosch are the foundation for a contemporary research tradition investigating the biological foundations of color naming. In this article, the author describes some …
Can Colour be Reduced to Anything
C. L. Hardin has argued that the colour opponency of the vision system leads to chromatic subjectivism : chromatic sensory states reduce to neurophysiological states. Much of the force of Hardin's argument derives from a critique of chromatic objectivism . On this view chromatic sensory states are held to reduce to an external property. While I agree with Hardin's critique of objectivism it is far from clear that the problems which beset objectiv…
Objectivism and the Evolutionary Value of Colour Vision
In Color for Philosophers, C. L. Hardin argues that chromatic objectivism-a view that identifies colour with some or other property of objects-must be false. The upshot of Hardin's argument is this: there is, in fact, no principled correlation between physical properties and perceived colours. Since that correlation is a minimal condition for objectivism, objectivism is false. Mohan Matthen, who accepts Hardin's conclusion for what can be called …
Explanation and Color-Naming Research
Perhaps one of the central assumptions when one comes to think about scientific explanations—an assumption made by philosophers and scientists alike—is that a causal explanation is an optimal explanation. It seems, after all, that an explanation tells us why something happens and that to do so is to specify causes. Although there is nothing wrong with causal explanations per se, many good explanations in science are not in any important sense cau…
The Foundations of the Universalist Tradition in Color-Naming Research (and Their Supposed Refutation
In Basic Color Terms, Berlin and Kay argued for a restricted number of "basic" color words—words they claimed to be culturally universal. This claim about language was buttressed by psychologist Eleanor Rosch's famous work on color prototypes. Together, the works of Berlin and Kay and Rosch are the foundation for a contemporary research tradition investigating the biological foundations of color naming. In this article, the author describes some …
Can Colour be Reduced to Anything
C. L. Hardin has argued that the colour opponency of the vision system leads to chromatic subjectivism : chromatic sensory states reduce to neurophysiological states. Much of the force of Hardin's argument derives from a critique of chromatic objectivism . On this view chromatic sensory states are held to reduce to an external property. While I agree with Hardin's critique of objectivism it is far from clear that the problems which beset objectiv…
Color, Color Terms, Categorization, Cognition, Culture: An Afterword
Recent work on color naming challenges the idea that there are shared perceptually salient colors or color categories that are "hardwired" into homo sapiens and provide the basis for one of the most famous cross-cultural claims of all time, Brent Berlin and Paul Kay's claim that there is a small number of "basic" color terms (eleven), and that some subset of these terms is present in every human language (Berlin & Kay, 1969; see Kay and Maffi, 19…
Objectivism and the Evolutionary Value of Colour Vision
In Color for Philosophers, C. L. Hardin argues that chromatic objectivism-a view that identifies colour with some or other property of objects-must be false. The upshot of Hardin's argument is this: there is, in fact, no principled correlation between physical properties and perceived colours. Since that correlation is a minimal condition for objectivism, objectivism is false. Mohan Matthen, who accepts Hardin's conclusion for what can be called …
Objectivism and the Evolutionary Value of Colour Vision
In Color for Philosophers, C. L. Hardin argues that chromatic objectivism-a view that identifies colour with some or other property of objects-must be false. The upshot of Hardin's argument is this: there is, in fact, no principled correlation between physical properties and perceived colours. Since that correlation is a minimal condition for objectivism, objectivism is false. Mohan Matthen, who accepts Hardin's conclusion for what can be called …
Can Colour be Reduced to Anything
C. L. Hardin has argued that the colour opponency of the vision system leads to chromatic subjectivism : chromatic sensory states reduce to neurophysiological states. Much of the force of Hardin's argument derives from a critique of chromatic objectivism . On this view chromatic sensory states are held to reduce to an external property. While I agree with Hardin's critique of objectivism it is far from clear that the problems which beset objectiv…
The Foundations of the Universalist Tradition in Color-Naming Research (and Their Supposed Refutation
In Basic Color Terms, Berlin and Kay argued for a restricted number of "basic" color words—words they claimed to be culturally universal. This claim about language was buttressed by psychologist Eleanor Rosch's famous work on color prototypes. Together, the works of Berlin and Kay and Rosch are the foundation for a contemporary research tradition investigating the biological foundations of color naming. In this article, the author describes some …
“Whatever …”: A Reply to Albahari
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Color, Color Terms, Categorization, Cognition, Culture: An Afterword
Recent work on color naming challenges the idea that there are shared perceptually salient colors or color categories that are "hardwired" into homo sapiens and provide the basis for one of the most famous cross-cultural claims of all time, Brent Berlin and Paul Kay's claim that there is a small number of "basic" color terms (eleven), and that some subset of these terms is present in every human language (Berlin & Kay, 1969; see Kay and Maffi, 19…
Explanation and Color-Naming Research
Perhaps one of the central assumptions when one comes to think about scientific explanations—an assumption made by philosophers and scientists alike—is that a causal explanation is an optimal explanation. It seems, after all, that an explanation tells us why something happens and that to do so is to specify causes. Although there is nothing wrong with causal explanations per se, many good explanations in science are not in any important sense cau…
Considering the Prevalence of the "Stimulus Error" in Color Naming Research
In "Does the Basic Color Terms discussion suffer from the Stimulus Error?" Rolf Kuehni describes a research stumbling block known as the "stimulus error," and hints at the difficulties it causes for mainstream color naming research (Kuehni, is Issue). Among the issues intrinsic to Kuehni's "stimulus error" description is the important question of what can generally be inferred from color naming behaviors based on bounded samples of empirical stim…
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Categorization, perception, and language (4 works) · Color perception and design (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Cognitive psychology (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works)