Casey Crisman-Cox
Biographic Data
| ID | 2461652 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Casey Crisman-Cox |
| GIVEN NAMES | Casey |
| FAMILY NAME | Crisman-Cox |
| SIGNATURE | CRISMAN-COX C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Texas A&M University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5229-3955 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 41 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Tug of War
We introduce a dynamic game of outbidding where two groups use violence to compete in a tug-of-war fashion for evolving public support. We fit the model to the canonical outbidding rivalry between Hamas and Fatah using newly collected data on Palestinian public support for these groups. Competition has heterogeneous effects, and we demonstrate that intergroup competition can discourage violence. Competition from Hamas leads Fatah to use more terr…
Remittances, terrorism, and democracy
How do remittances affect domestic terrorism? Past work argues that remittances increase groups’ resources and increase terrorism. However, we argue that the effect of remittances depends on political institutions. Within democracies, remittances can help groups overcome barriers to legitimate politics and reduce terrorism's allure. Within autocracies, however, fewer legitimate political opportunities exist, and remittances may lead to more terro…
Detecting and Correcting for Separation in Strategic Choice Models
Separation or “perfect prediction” is a common problem in discrete choice models that, in practice, leads to inflated point estimates and standard errors. Standard statistical packages do not provide clear advice on how to correct these problems. Furthermore, separation can go completely undiagnosed in fitting advanced models that optimize a user-supplied log-likelihood rather than relying on pre-programmed estimation procedures. In this paper, w…
Democracy, reputation for resolve, and civil conflict
There is a long-running disagreement about how regime type affects a country’s ability to project resolve. Specifically, there is an open question about whether being a democracy helps or hurts a country’s reputation for resolve. I consider this question by directly estimating a state’s reputation for resolve using a unified theoretical and statistical approach. To be precise, I derive an empirical model from a dynamic game of continuous-time bar…
Estimating Substantive Effects in Binary Outcome Panel Models
Dummy variable maximum likelihood estimation for binary response panel models struggles to estimate coefficients or substantive quantities in either short or rare event panels. The standard response is a conditional maximum likelihood that consistently estimates the coefficients on time-varying covariates but makes substantive effects impossible to compute. In light of this problem, multiple suggestions have appeared for computing these effects, …
Estimating signaling games in international relations
Signaling games are central to political science but often have multiple equilibria, leading to no definitive prediction. We demonstrate that these indeterminacies create substantial problems when fitting theory to data: they lead to ill-defined and discontinuous likelihoods even if the game generating the data has a unique equilibrium. In our experiments, currently used techniques frequently fail to uncover the parameters of the canonical crisis…
Enemies within
I examine how the chief executive’s political party affects domestic terrorism within democracies. In particular, I contribute to the literature on terrorism within democracies by arguing that domestic terrorist groups prefer attacking when right-wing parties hold office. I find evidence for this claim as well as results indicating that left-wing executives are more likely to cut deals with domestic terrorist groups. These trends suggest that dom…
Audience Costs and the Dynamics of War and Peace
We estimate audience costs and examine their substantive effects on the evolution of interstate disputes by using an infinitely repeated and dynamic game of crisis escalation. Unlike past efforts, our approach estimates country‐specific audience cost parameters without relying on proxy variables, such as democracy measures. Contrary to intuition, increases in a country's audience costs encourage it to initiate disputes in equilibrium because the …
Audience Costs and the Dynamics of War and Peace
We estimate audience costs and examine their substantive effects on the evolution of interstate disputes by using an infinitely repeated and dynamic game of crisis escalation. Unlike past efforts, our approach estimates country‐specific audience cost parameters without relying on proxy variables, such as democracy measures. Contrary to intuition, increases in a country's audience costs encourage it to initiate disputes in equilibrium because the …
Estimating Substantive Effects in Binary Outcome Panel Models
Dummy variable maximum likelihood estimation for binary response panel models struggles to estimate coefficients or substantive quantities in either short or rare event panels. The standard response is a conditional maximum likelihood that consistently estimates the coefficients on time-varying covariates but makes substantive effects impossible to compute. In light of this problem, multiple suggestions have appeared for computing these effects, …
Estimating signaling games in international relations
Signaling games are central to political science but often have multiple equilibria, leading to no definitive prediction. We demonstrate that these indeterminacies create substantial problems when fitting theory to data: they lead to ill-defined and discontinuous likelihoods even if the game generating the data has a unique equilibrium. In our experiments, currently used techniques frequently fail to uncover the parameters of the canonical crisis…
Enemies within
I examine how the chief executive’s political party affects domestic terrorism within democracies. In particular, I contribute to the literature on terrorism within democracies by arguing that domestic terrorist groups prefer attacking when right-wing parties hold office. I find evidence for this claim as well as results indicating that left-wing executives are more likely to cut deals with domestic terrorist groups. These trends suggest that dom…
Remittances, terrorism, and democracy
How do remittances affect domestic terrorism? Past work argues that remittances increase groups’ resources and increase terrorism. However, we argue that the effect of remittances depends on political institutions. Within democracies, remittances can help groups overcome barriers to legitimate politics and reduce terrorism's allure. Within autocracies, however, fewer legitimate political opportunities exist, and remittances may lead to more terro…
Detecting and Correcting for Separation in Strategic Choice Models
Separation or “perfect prediction” is a common problem in discrete choice models that, in practice, leads to inflated point estimates and standard errors. Standard statistical packages do not provide clear advice on how to correct these problems. Furthermore, separation can go completely undiagnosed in fitting advanced models that optimize a user-supplied log-likelihood rather than relying on pre-programmed estimation procedures. In this paper, w…
Democracy, reputation for resolve, and civil conflict
There is a long-running disagreement about how regime type affects a country’s ability to project resolve. Specifically, there is an open question about whether being a democracy helps or hurts a country’s reputation for resolve. I consider this question by directly estimating a state’s reputation for resolve using a unified theoretical and statistical approach. To be precise, I derive an empirical model from a dynamic game of continuous-time bar…
Enemies within
I examine how the chief executive’s political party affects domestic terrorism within democracies. In particular, I contribute to the literature on terrorism within democracies by arguing that domestic terrorist groups prefer attacking when right-wing parties hold office. I find evidence for this claim as well as results indicating that left-wing executives are more likely to cut deals with domestic terrorist groups. These trends suggest that dom…
Audience Costs and the Dynamics of War and Peace
We estimate audience costs and examine their substantive effects on the evolution of interstate disputes by using an infinitely repeated and dynamic game of crisis escalation. Unlike past efforts, our approach estimates country‐specific audience cost parameters without relying on proxy variables, such as democracy measures. Contrary to intuition, increases in a country's audience costs encourage it to initiate disputes in equilibrium because the …
Democracy, reputation for resolve, and civil conflict
There is a long-running disagreement about how regime type affects a country’s ability to project resolve. Specifically, there is an open question about whether being a democracy helps or hurts a country’s reputation for resolve. I consider this question by directly estimating a state’s reputation for resolve using a unified theoretical and statistical approach. To be precise, I derive an empirical model from a dynamic game of continuous-time bar…
Estimating Substantive Effects in Binary Outcome Panel Models
Dummy variable maximum likelihood estimation for binary response panel models struggles to estimate coefficients or substantive quantities in either short or rare event panels. The standard response is a conditional maximum likelihood that consistently estimates the coefficients on time-varying covariates but makes substantive effects impossible to compute. In light of this problem, multiple suggestions have appeared for computing these effects, …
Estimating signaling games in international relations
Signaling games are central to political science but often have multiple equilibria, leading to no definitive prediction. We demonstrate that these indeterminacies create substantial problems when fitting theory to data: they lead to ill-defined and discontinuous likelihoods even if the game generating the data has a unique equilibrium. In our experiments, currently used techniques frequently fail to uncover the parameters of the canonical crisis…
Remittances, terrorism, and democracy
How do remittances affect domestic terrorism? Past work argues that remittances increase groups’ resources and increase terrorism. However, we argue that the effect of remittances depends on political institutions. Within democracies, remittances can help groups overcome barriers to legitimate politics and reduce terrorism's allure. Within autocracies, however, fewer legitimate political opportunities exist, and remittances may lead to more terro…
Detecting and Correcting for Separation in Strategic Choice Models
Separation or “perfect prediction” is a common problem in discrete choice models that, in practice, leads to inflated point estimates and standard errors. Standard statistical packages do not provide clear advice on how to correct these problems. Furthermore, separation can go completely undiagnosed in fitting advanced models that optimize a user-supplied log-likelihood rather than relying on pre-programmed estimation procedures. In this paper, w…
Tug of War
We introduce a dynamic game of outbidding where two groups use violence to compete in a tug-of-war fashion for evolving public support. We fit the model to the canonical outbidding rivalry between Hamas and Fatah using newly collected data on Palestinian public support for these groups. Competition has heterogeneous effects, and we demonstrate that intergroup competition can discourage violence. Competition from Hamas leads Fatah to use more terr…
Economics (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Law (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Politics (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (4 works) · Political economy (4 works) · Democracy (3 works) · Econometrics (3 works)