Raymond Guiteras
Biographic Data
| ID | 2475859 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Raymond Guiteras |
| GIVEN NAMES | Raymond |
| FAMILY NAME | Guiteras |
| SIGNATURE | GUITERAS R |
| AFFILIATIONS | North Carolina State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4333-6829 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 27 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
To use financial incentives or not? Insights from experiments in encouraging sanitation investments in four countries
Social and financial incentives for overcoming a collective action problem
Addressing public health externalities often requires community-level collective action. Due to social norms, each person's sanitation investment decisions may depend on the decisions of neighbors. We report on a cluster randomized controlled trial conducted with 19,000 households in rural Bangladesh where we grouped neighboring households and introduced (either financial or social recognition) rewards with a joint liability component for the gro…
The implications of three major new trials for the effect of water, sanitation and hygiene on childhood diarrhea and stunting
BACKGROUND: Three large new trials of unprecedented scale and cost, which included novel factorial designs, have found no effect of basic water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) interventions on childhood stunting, and only mixed effects on childhood diarrhea. Arriving at the inception of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals, and the bold new target of safely managed water, sanitation and hygiene for all by 2030, these results warrant t…
Eliciting and Utilizing Willingness to Pay
We utilize the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) mechanism to estimate the willingness to pay for clean drinking water technology in northern Ghana. The BDM mechanism has attractive properties for empirical research, allowing us to directly estimate demand, compute heterogeneous treatment effects, and study the screening and causal effects of prices with minor modifications to a standard field experiment setting. We demonstrate the implementation of…
Productivity in piece-rate labor markets
Eliciting and Utilizing Willingness to Pay
We utilize the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) mechanism to estimate the willingness to pay for clean drinking water technology in northern Ghana. The BDM mechanism has attractive properties for empirical research, allowing us to directly estimate demand, compute heterogeneous treatment effects, and study the screening and causal effects of prices with minor modifications to a standard field experiment setting. We demonstrate the implementation of…
Productivity in piece-rate labor markets
Social and financial incentives for overcoming a collective action problem
Addressing public health externalities often requires community-level collective action. Due to social norms, each person's sanitation investment decisions may depend on the decisions of neighbors. We report on a cluster randomized controlled trial conducted with 19,000 households in rural Bangladesh where we grouped neighboring households and introduced (either financial or social recognition) rewards with a joint liability component for the gro…
Productivity in piece-rate labor markets
The implications of three major new trials for the effect of water, sanitation and hygiene on childhood diarrhea and stunting
BACKGROUND: Three large new trials of unprecedented scale and cost, which included novel factorial designs, have found no effect of basic water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) interventions on childhood stunting, and only mixed effects on childhood diarrhea. Arriving at the inception of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals, and the bold new target of safely managed water, sanitation and hygiene for all by 2030, these results warrant t…
Eliciting and Utilizing Willingness to Pay
We utilize the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) mechanism to estimate the willingness to pay for clean drinking water technology in northern Ghana. The BDM mechanism has attractive properties for empirical research, allowing us to directly estimate demand, compute heterogeneous treatment effects, and study the screening and causal effects of prices with minor modifications to a standard field experiment setting. We demonstrate the implementation of…
Social and financial incentives for overcoming a collective action problem
Addressing public health externalities often requires community-level collective action. Due to social norms, each person's sanitation investment decisions may depend on the decisions of neighbors. We report on a cluster randomized controlled trial conducted with 19,000 households in rural Bangladesh where we grouped neighboring households and introduced (either financial or social recognition) rewards with a joint liability component for the gro…
To use financial incentives or not? Insights from experiments in encouraging sanitation investments in four countries
Child Nutrition and Water Access (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Global Maternal and Child Health (3 works) · Incentive (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Public economics (3 works) · Sanitation (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Economic growth (2 works) · Finance (2 works)