Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Gaute Torsvik

Biographic Data

ID253074
NAMEGaute Torsvik
GIVEN NAMESGaute
FAMILY NAMETorsvik
SIGNATURETORSVIK G
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Oslo
ORCID0000-0002-8147-144X
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS16
TOTAL CITATIONS55
AUTHOR COUNT16
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1994
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX4
  • Intuitive prosociality: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects or False Positive

    Open Access•Amanda Kvarven, Eirik Strømland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Psychology•2025•References: 2

  • Evaluating compliance gains of expanding tax enforcement

    Open Access•Knut Løyland, Oddbjørn Raaum et al.•ARTICLE•Economica•2024•References: 17

    This paper demonstrates how tax administrations can evaluate future compliance gains from risk‐based tax enforcement that audits all taxpayers above a risk threshold. Expanding tax enforcement in this setting means reducing the audit threshold. The compliance gains from such an expansion consist of a mechanical audit correction effect and a behavioural effect that reflects changes in self‐reporting in the subsequent years. We estimate this behavi…

  • In Their Own Best Interest. Is There a Paternalistic Case for Welfare Conditionality

    Open Access•Anders Molander, Gaute Torsvik•ARTICLE•Journal of Social Policy•2022•Cited by: 2•References: 26

    This paper examines paternalism as a justification for welfare reforms making benefits conditional on participation in activation programs. We clarify different types of what we denote 'throffer paternalism' - a paternalism conjoining an offer with a threat - and ask whether there is a good case for any of them. We argue that hard but non-perfectionistic paternalism provides the most promising defense for mandatory activation but conclude that it…

  • The will to sanction: How sensitive are caseworkers to recipients’ responsibility when imposing sanctions on non‐compliance in a welfare‐to‐work programme

    Open Access•Gaute Torsvik, Anders Molander et al.•ARTICLE•International Journal of Social…•2021•Cited by: 7•References: 10

    The activation trend in social policy entails that caseworkers on the frontlines of the welfare state are expected to decide ‘reasonable’ activation requirements for clients and when and how non‐compliance should be sanctioned. This study investigates how caseworkers form judgements about their clients’ personal responsibility when activation requirements are violated and how their judgements about responsibility matter for the sanctions they imp…

  • Skipping the doctor: Evidence from a case with extended self-certification of paid sick leave

    Open Access•Bruno Ferman, Gaute Torsvik et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Population Economics•2021•Cited by: 1•References: 2

    This paper examines the impact of a policy reform in a municipality in Norway that extended to workers the right to self-certify sickness absence from work. After the reform, workers were no longer obliged to obtain a certificate from a physician to receive sickness benefits. They could call in sick directly to their line leader and had to engage in a counselling program organized by the employer. To estimate the effect of this reform, we contras…

  • Employee Referral, Social Proximity, and Worker Discipline: Theory and Suggestive Evidence from India

    Amrita Dhillon, Vegard Iversen et al.•ARTICLE•Economic Development and Cultural…•2021•References: 24

    We propose a new theory to explain why employers mobilize workplace insiders for the hiring of new staff. In settings with incomplete contracts, we show how workplace insiders can help employers tackle recruit discipline challenges at a lower cost. A key idea is that the employer can use sanctions against the referee to keep the new hire in line. Our model predicts that employers will use existing staff of stature and with accumulated goodwill wi…

  • Who benefits from increased service utilisation? Examining the distributional effects of payment for performance in Tanzania

    Open Access•Peter Binyaruka, Bjarne Robberstad et al.•ARTICLE•International Journal for Equity…•2018

    P4P can enhance equitable healthcare access and use especially when the demand-side barriers to access care such as user fees associated with drug purchase due to stock-outs have been reduced

  • Does payment for performance increase performance inequalities across health providers? A case study of Tanzania

    Open Access•Peter Binyaruka, Bjarne Robberstad et al.•ARTICLE•Health Policy and Planning•2018•Cited by: 2•References: 49

    The impact of payment-for-performance (P4P) schemes in the health sector has been documented, but there has been little attention to the distributional effects of P4P across health facilities. We examined the distribution of P4P payouts over time and assessed whether increased service coverage due to P4P differed across facilities in Tanzania. We used two service outcomes that improved due to P4P [facility-based deliveries and provision of antima…

  • Discrimination Against Ethnic Minorities in Activation Programme? Evidence from a Vignette Experiment

    Open Access•Lars Inge Terum, Gaute Torsvik et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Social Policy•2018•Cited by: 11•References: 19

    We conducted a vignette experiment involving 470 Norwegian front-line workers to investigate whether their decisions to sanction non-compliance of activation requirements varied with the ethnicity of the welfare claimant. This is the first vignette experiment on ethnic discrimination in the administration of activation programmes in Europe. The study shows that front-line workers did not sanction claimants with a North African name more often tha…

  • Workplace Productivity and Bonus Preferences: Why Do Men With Low Productivity Prefer Individual Pay

    Open Access•Gaute Torsvik•ARTICLE•Economica•2017•References: 26

    This paper examines the relationship between workers' productivity and preferred bonus scheme. The data are from a company where agents work in teams and receive a bonus that depends on individual and team performance. Standard agency theory predicts that workers with productivity below the team average prefer a team bonus, while high‐productivity agents prefer an individual bonus. Risk aversion may temper the taste for individual pay. This model…

  • Costs and consequences of abortions to women and their households: A cross-sectional study in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

    Open Access•P G C Ilboudo, Patrick G Ilboudo et al.•ARTICLE•Health Policy and Planning•2015•Cited by: 2•References: 28

    Little is known about the costs and consequences of abortions to women and their households. Our aim was to study both costs and consequences of induced and spontaneous abortions and complications. We carried out a cross-sectional study between February and September 2012 in Ouagadougou, the capital city of Burkina Faso. Quantitative data of 305 women whose pregnancy ended with either an induced or a spontaneous abortion were prospectively collec…

  • Using incentives to attract nurses to remote areas of Tanzania: A contingent valuation study

    Open Access•M A Munga, Michael Munga et al.•ARTICLE•Health Policy and Planning•2014•Cited by: 1•References: 23

    This article analyses (1) how financial incentives (salary top-ups) and non-financial incentives (housing and education) affect nurses' willingness to work in remote areas of Tanzania and (2) how the magnitude of the incentives needed to attract health workers varies with the nurses' geographic origin and their intrinsic motivation. A contingent valuation method was used to elicit the location preferences of 362 nursing students. Without any inte…

  • Anticipated discussion and cooperation in a social dilemma

    Open Access•Gaute Torsvik, Anders Molander et al.•ARTICLE•Rationality and Society•2011•References: 20

    We study how announced post-play, face-to-face discussions affect individual contributions to a public good in an experimental setting. To our surprise ex-post discussions reduced the average contribution to the public good. The negative impact of discussions was turned around when we labelled the choice of not contributing to the public good as ‘free-riding’. The same label had no impact in the no-discussion baseline version of our game. Our exp…

  • Foreign economic aid; should donors cooperate

    Open Access•Gaute Torsvik•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2005•Cited by: 18•References: 1

  • Social Capital and Economic Development: A Plea for the Mechanisms

    Open Access•Gaute Torsvik•ARTICLE•Rationality and Society•2000•Cited by: 11•References: 10

    Social capital is a topical concept in economic development. The claim is that regional differences in economic success can be explained in terms of differences in various social variables, called social capital. This paper attempts to delineate the mechanisms that link social capital and economic development. I show that social capital can produce two kinds of trust, both of which can reduce transaction costs. It is important to keep these two s…

  • When groups contribute to a public good: The importance of institutional framework for making collective decisions

    Open Access•Gaute Torsvik•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1994•References: 6

  • Foreign economic aid; should donors cooperate

    Open Access•Gaute Torsvik•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2005•Cited by: 18•References: 1

  • Discrimination Against Ethnic Minorities in Activation Programme? Evidence from a Vignette Experiment

    Open Access•Lars Inge Terum, Gaute Torsvik et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Social Policy•2018•Cited by: 11•References: 19

    We conducted a vignette experiment involving 470 Norwegian front-line workers to investigate whether their decisions to sanction non-compliance of activation requirements varied with the ethnicity of the welfare claimant. This is the first vignette experiment on ethnic discrimination in the administration of activation programmes in Europe. The study shows that front-line workers did not sanction claimants with a North African name more often tha…

  • Social Capital and Economic Development: A Plea for the Mechanisms

    Open Access•Gaute Torsvik•ARTICLE•Rationality and Society•2000•Cited by: 11•References: 10

    Social capital is a topical concept in economic development. The claim is that regional differences in economic success can be explained in terms of differences in various social variables, called social capital. This paper attempts to delineate the mechanisms that link social capital and economic development. I show that social capital can produce two kinds of trust, both of which can reduce transaction costs. It is important to keep these two s…

  • The will to sanction: How sensitive are caseworkers to recipients’ responsibility when imposing sanctions on non‐compliance in a welfare‐to‐work programme

    Open Access•Gaute Torsvik, Anders Molander et al.•ARTICLE•International Journal of Social…•2021•Cited by: 7•References: 10

    The activation trend in social policy entails that caseworkers on the frontlines of the welfare state are expected to decide ‘reasonable’ activation requirements for clients and when and how non‐compliance should be sanctioned. This study investigates how caseworkers form judgements about their clients’ personal responsibility when activation requirements are violated and how their judgements about responsibility matter for the sanctions they imp…

  • In Their Own Best Interest. Is There a Paternalistic Case for Welfare Conditionality

    Open Access•Anders Molander, Gaute Torsvik•ARTICLE•Journal of Social Policy•2022•Cited by: 2•References: 26

    This paper examines paternalism as a justification for welfare reforms making benefits conditional on participation in activation programs. We clarify different types of what we denote 'throffer paternalism' - a paternalism conjoining an offer with a threat - and ask whether there is a good case for any of them. We argue that hard but non-perfectionistic paternalism provides the most promising defense for mandatory activation but conclude that it…

  • Does payment for performance increase performance inequalities across health providers? A case study of Tanzania

    Open Access•Peter Binyaruka, Bjarne Robberstad et al.•ARTICLE•Health Policy and Planning•2018•Cited by: 2•References: 49

    The impact of payment-for-performance (P4P) schemes in the health sector has been documented, but there has been little attention to the distributional effects of P4P across health facilities. We examined the distribution of P4P payouts over time and assessed whether increased service coverage due to P4P differed across facilities in Tanzania. We used two service outcomes that improved due to P4P [facility-based deliveries and provision of antima…

  • Costs and consequences of abortions to women and their households: A cross-sectional study in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

    Open Access•P G C Ilboudo, Patrick G Ilboudo et al.•ARTICLE•Health Policy and Planning•2015•Cited by: 2•References: 28

    Little is known about the costs and consequences of abortions to women and their households. Our aim was to study both costs and consequences of induced and spontaneous abortions and complications. We carried out a cross-sectional study between February and September 2012 in Ouagadougou, the capital city of Burkina Faso. Quantitative data of 305 women whose pregnancy ended with either an induced or a spontaneous abortion were prospectively collec…

  • Skipping the doctor: Evidence from a case with extended self-certification of paid sick leave

    Open Access•Bruno Ferman, Gaute Torsvik et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Population Economics•2021•Cited by: 1•References: 2

    This paper examines the impact of a policy reform in a municipality in Norway that extended to workers the right to self-certify sickness absence from work. After the reform, workers were no longer obliged to obtain a certificate from a physician to receive sickness benefits. They could call in sick directly to their line leader and had to engage in a counselling program organized by the employer. To estimate the effect of this reform, we contras…

  • Using incentives to attract nurses to remote areas of Tanzania: A contingent valuation study

    Open Access•M A Munga, Michael Munga et al.•ARTICLE•Health Policy and Planning•2014•Cited by: 1•References: 23

    This article analyses (1) how financial incentives (salary top-ups) and non-financial incentives (housing and education) affect nurses' willingness to work in remote areas of Tanzania and (2) how the magnitude of the incentives needed to attract health workers varies with the nurses' geographic origin and their intrinsic motivation. A contingent valuation method was used to elicit the location preferences of 362 nursing students. Without any inte…

  • When groups contribute to a public good: The importance of institutional framework for making collective decisions

    Open Access•Gaute Torsvik•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1994•References: 6

  • Social Capital and Economic Development: A Plea for the Mechanisms

    Open Access•Gaute Torsvik•ARTICLE•Rationality and Society•2000•Cited by: 11•References: 10

    Social capital is a topical concept in economic development. The claim is that regional differences in economic success can be explained in terms of differences in various social variables, called social capital. This paper attempts to delineate the mechanisms that link social capital and economic development. I show that social capital can produce two kinds of trust, both of which can reduce transaction costs. It is important to keep these two s…

  • Foreign economic aid; should donors cooperate

    Open Access•Gaute Torsvik•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2005•Cited by: 18•References: 1

  • Anticipated discussion and cooperation in a social dilemma

    Open Access•Gaute Torsvik, Anders Molander et al.•ARTICLE•Rationality and Society•2011•References: 20

    We study how announced post-play, face-to-face discussions affect individual contributions to a public good in an experimental setting. To our surprise ex-post discussions reduced the average contribution to the public good. The negative impact of discussions was turned around when we labelled the choice of not contributing to the public good as ‘free-riding’. The same label had no impact in the no-discussion baseline version of our game. Our exp…

  • Using incentives to attract nurses to remote areas of Tanzania: A contingent valuation study

    Open Access•M A Munga, Michael Munga et al.•ARTICLE•Health Policy and Planning•2014•Cited by: 1•References: 23

    This article analyses (1) how financial incentives (salary top-ups) and non-financial incentives (housing and education) affect nurses' willingness to work in remote areas of Tanzania and (2) how the magnitude of the incentives needed to attract health workers varies with the nurses' geographic origin and their intrinsic motivation. A contingent valuation method was used to elicit the location preferences of 362 nursing students. Without any inte…

  • Costs and consequences of abortions to women and their households: A cross-sectional study in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

    Open Access•P G C Ilboudo, Patrick G Ilboudo et al.•ARTICLE•Health Policy and Planning•2015•Cited by: 2•References: 28

    Little is known about the costs and consequences of abortions to women and their households. Our aim was to study both costs and consequences of induced and spontaneous abortions and complications. We carried out a cross-sectional study between February and September 2012 in Ouagadougou, the capital city of Burkina Faso. Quantitative data of 305 women whose pregnancy ended with either an induced or a spontaneous abortion were prospectively collec…

  • Workplace Productivity and Bonus Preferences: Why Do Men With Low Productivity Prefer Individual Pay

    Open Access•Gaute Torsvik•ARTICLE•Economica•2017•References: 26

    This paper examines the relationship between workers' productivity and preferred bonus scheme. The data are from a company where agents work in teams and receive a bonus that depends on individual and team performance. Standard agency theory predicts that workers with productivity below the team average prefer a team bonus, while high‐productivity agents prefer an individual bonus. Risk aversion may temper the taste for individual pay. This model…

  • Who benefits from increased service utilisation? Examining the distributional effects of payment for performance in Tanzania

    Open Access•Peter Binyaruka, Bjarne Robberstad et al.•ARTICLE•International Journal for Equity…•2018

    P4P can enhance equitable healthcare access and use especially when the demand-side barriers to access care such as user fees associated with drug purchase due to stock-outs have been reduced

  • Does payment for performance increase performance inequalities across health providers? A case study of Tanzania

    Open Access•Peter Binyaruka, Bjarne Robberstad et al.•ARTICLE•Health Policy and Planning•2018•Cited by: 2•References: 49

    The impact of payment-for-performance (P4P) schemes in the health sector has been documented, but there has been little attention to the distributional effects of P4P across health facilities. We examined the distribution of P4P payouts over time and assessed whether increased service coverage due to P4P differed across facilities in Tanzania. We used two service outcomes that improved due to P4P [facility-based deliveries and provision of antima…

  • Discrimination Against Ethnic Minorities in Activation Programme? Evidence from a Vignette Experiment

    Open Access•Lars Inge Terum, Gaute Torsvik et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Social Policy•2018•Cited by: 11•References: 19

    We conducted a vignette experiment involving 470 Norwegian front-line workers to investigate whether their decisions to sanction non-compliance of activation requirements varied with the ethnicity of the welfare claimant. This is the first vignette experiment on ethnic discrimination in the administration of activation programmes in Europe. The study shows that front-line workers did not sanction claimants with a North African name more often tha…

  • The will to sanction: How sensitive are caseworkers to recipients’ responsibility when imposing sanctions on non‐compliance in a welfare‐to‐work programme

    Open Access•Gaute Torsvik, Anders Molander et al.•ARTICLE•International Journal of Social…•2021•Cited by: 7•References: 10

    The activation trend in social policy entails that caseworkers on the frontlines of the welfare state are expected to decide ‘reasonable’ activation requirements for clients and when and how non‐compliance should be sanctioned. This study investigates how caseworkers form judgements about their clients’ personal responsibility when activation requirements are violated and how their judgements about responsibility matter for the sanctions they imp…

  • Skipping the doctor: Evidence from a case with extended self-certification of paid sick leave

    Open Access•Bruno Ferman, Gaute Torsvik et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Population Economics•2021•Cited by: 1•References: 2

    This paper examines the impact of a policy reform in a municipality in Norway that extended to workers the right to self-certify sickness absence from work. After the reform, workers were no longer obliged to obtain a certificate from a physician to receive sickness benefits. They could call in sick directly to their line leader and had to engage in a counselling program organized by the employer. To estimate the effect of this reform, we contras…

  • Employee Referral, Social Proximity, and Worker Discipline: Theory and Suggestive Evidence from India

    Amrita Dhillon, Vegard Iversen et al.•ARTICLE•Economic Development and Cultural…•2021•References: 24

    We propose a new theory to explain why employers mobilize workplace insiders for the hiring of new staff. In settings with incomplete contracts, we show how workplace insiders can help employers tackle recruit discipline challenges at a lower cost. A key idea is that the employer can use sanctions against the referee to keep the new hire in line. Our model predicts that employers will use existing staff of stature and with accumulated goodwill wi…

  • In Their Own Best Interest. Is There a Paternalistic Case for Welfare Conditionality

    Open Access•Anders Molander, Gaute Torsvik•ARTICLE•Journal of Social Policy•2022•Cited by: 2•References: 26

    This paper examines paternalism as a justification for welfare reforms making benefits conditional on participation in activation programs. We clarify different types of what we denote 'throffer paternalism' - a paternalism conjoining an offer with a threat - and ask whether there is a good case for any of them. We argue that hard but non-perfectionistic paternalism provides the most promising defense for mandatory activation but conclude that it…

  • Evaluating compliance gains of expanding tax enforcement

    Open Access•Knut Løyland, Oddbjørn Raaum et al.•ARTICLE•Economica•2024•References: 17

    This paper demonstrates how tax administrations can evaluate future compliance gains from risk‐based tax enforcement that audits all taxpayers above a risk threshold. Expanding tax enforcement in this setting means reducing the audit threshold. The compliance gains from such an expansion consist of a mechanical audit correction effect and a behavioural effect that reflects changes in self‐reporting in the subsequent years. We estimate this behavi…

  • Intuitive prosociality: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects or False Positive

    Open Access•Amanda Kvarven, Eirik Strømland et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Psychology•2025•References: 2

Economics (14 works) · Business (8 works) · Political science (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Medicine (5 works) · Public economics (5 works) · Economic growth (4 works) · Global Maternal and Child Health (4 works) · Incentive (4 works) · Law and economics (4 works)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae