Oliver E Williamson
Biographic Data
| ID | 262437 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Oliver E Williamson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Oliver E |
| FAMILY NAME | Williamson |
| SIGNATURE | WILLIAMSON O E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Berkeley |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 42 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1706 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 40 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1965 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| H-INDEX | 8 |
Prices: Issues in Theory, Practice, and Public Policy
Hierarchies and Markets
Transaction Costs and Property Rights
Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression
Oliver E. Williamson delivered his Prize Lecture on 8 December 2009 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University. He was introduced by Professor Bertil Holmlund, Chairman of the Economic Sciences Prize Committee.
New Institutional Economics: A Guidebook
Institutions frame behaviors and exchanges in markets, business networks, communities, and organizations throughout the world. Thanks to the pioneering work of Ronald Coase, Douglas North and Olivier Williamson, institutions are now recognized as being a key factor in explaining differences in performance between industries, nations, and regions. The fast-growing field of new institutional economics analyzes the economics of institutions and orga…
The Economics of Governance
The economics of governance is an effort to implement the “study of good order and workable arrangements,” where good order includes both spontaneous order in the market, which is a venerated tradition in economics (Adam Smith, 1776; Friedrich Hayek, 1945; Kenneth A. Arrow and Gerard Debreu, 1954), and intentional order, of a “conscious, deliberate, purposeful” kind (Chester Irving Barnard, 1938 p. 9). Also, I interpret workable arrangements to m…
Why Law, Economics, and Organization
This review shows that a combined law, economics, and organization theory approach leads to different and deeper understandings of the purposes served by complex contract and economic organization. The business firm for these purposes is described not in technological terms (as a production function) but in organizational terms (as an alternative mode of governance). Firm and market are thus examined comparatively with respect to their capacities…
Interview
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The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract
The propositions that organization matters and that it is susceptible to analysis were long greeted by skepticism by economists. One reason why this message took a long time to register is that it is much easier to say that organization matters than it is to show how and why. The prevalence of the science of choice approach to economics has also been an obstacle. As developed herein, the lessons of organization theory for economics are both diffe…
Utopia and Campaign Spending
The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead
This paper examines the progressive development of the new institutional economics over the past quarter century. It begins by distinguishing four levels of social analysis, with special emphasis on the institutional environment and the institutions of governance. It then turns to some of the good ideas out of which the NIE works: the description of human actors, feasibility, firms as governance structures, and operationalization. Applications, i…
Public and private bureaucracies: A transaction cost economics perspectives
The public bureaucracy is a puzzle. How is it that an organizational form that is so widely used is also believed to be inefficient - both in relation to a hypothetical ideal and in comparison with private bureaucracies? This article examines public bureaucracy through the lens of transaction cost economics, according to which the public bureaucracy, like other alternative modes of governance, is well suited to some transactions and poorly suited…
Transaction Cost Economics: How It Works; Where It is Headed
The mechanisms of governance
This book brings together in one place the work of one of our most respected economic theorists, on a field in which he has played a large part in originating: the New Institutional Economics. Transaction cost economics, which studies the governance of contractual relations, is the branch of the New Institutional Economics with which Oliver Williamson is especially associated. Transaction cost economics takes issue with one of the fundamental bui…
Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange
Credible commitments and credible threats share the following common attribute: both appear mainly in conjunction with irreversible, specialized investments. But whereas credible commitments are undertaken in support of alliances and to promote exchange, credible threats appear in the context of conflict and rivalry. The former involve reciprocal acts designed to safeguard a relationship, while the latter are unilateral efforts to preempt an adva…
Economic Evolution: An Enquiry into the Foundations of New Institutional Economics
Journal Article Economic Evolution: An Enquiry into the Foundations of New Institutional Economics Get access Economic Evolution: An Enquiry into the Foundations of New Institutional Economics. By (JACK J.) Vromen. (London and New York: Routledge, 1995. Pp. viii + 245. £50.00 hardback, £15.99 paperback. ISBN 0 415 12812 9, 0415 12813 7.) Oliver E. Williamson Oliver E. Williamson University of California, Berkeley Search for other works by this au…
Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond
This book is made up of chapters by experts in organization theory who have addressed issues originally formulated by Chester Barnard in his seminal book, The Functions of the Executive. Each author discusses concepts introduced by Barnard, and then explores future prospects for organization theory. The authors provide many perspectives on organization theory that carry forward the work begun by Barnard. The book derives from a seminar series giv…
Contested Exchange Versus the Governance of Contractual Relations
There is much in the paper by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis ["The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy"] with which I agree. But there are also real differences-which is to be expected, since they and I examine economic organization through very different lenses. Thus whereas they view economic organization through the lens of power and contested exchange, I believe that economizing and governance…
Will the Real Ronald Coase Please Stand Up
The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development
Journal Article The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development Get access The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development. Edited by (OLIVER E.) Williamson and (SIDNEY G.) Winter. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press/OUP, USA, 1991. Pp. viii+235. £25.00 hardback. ISBN 0 19 506590 5.) R. Rothschild R. Rothschild University of Lancaster Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Ec…
The Firm As a Nexus of Treaties
Part 1 Knowledge - its acquisition, sharing and/or asymmetry: the participatory generation of information rents and the theory of the firm, Masahiko Aoki common knowledge and the co-ordination of economic activities, Jacques Cremer profit sharing, information and employment, Matti Pohjola. Part 2 Vertical integration and the strategic management of the enterprise: what is vertical integration?, Michael H.Riordan vertical integration, transaction …
Multinational Corporations: An Elgar Reference Collection
Journal Article Multinational Corporations: An Elgar Reference Collection Get access Multinational Corporations: An Elgar Reference Collection. Edited by CASSON (MARK). (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990. Pp. xvii + 609. £95.00 hardback. ISBN 1 85278 192 0.)The Economics of Innovation: An Elgar Reference Collection. Edited by FREEMAN (CHRISTOPHER). (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990. Pp. xx + 504. £76.50 hardback. ISBN 1 85278 171 8.)Entrepreneurship: An…
Die ökonomischen Institutionen des Kapitalismus: Unternehmen, Märkte, Kooperationen
Oliver E. Williamson geht von der Annahme aus, daß Menschen sich nur in begrenztem Maße rational verhalten und dazu neigen, im Eigeninteresse zu handeln. Er zeigt, wie es im Rahmen von Leistungsbeziehungen, die einer hohen Umweltunsicherheit unterliegen und spezifische Investitionen erfordern, zu nachvertraglichen Problemen kommt. Kapitalistische Wirtschaftssysteme stellen für die Bewältigung dieser Probleme zahlreiche Institutionen bzw. Koordina…
Economics and Sociology: Redefining Their Boundaries: Conversations with Economists and Sociologists
The boundary between economics and sociology is presently being redefined--but how, why, and by whom? Richard Swedberg answers these questions in this thought-provoking book of conversations with well-known economists and sociologists. Among the economists interviewed are Gary Becker, Amartya Sen, Kenneth Arrow, and Albert O. Hirschman; the sociologists include Daniel Bell, Harrison White, James Coleman, and Mark Granovetter. The picture that eme…
Chapter 3 Transaction cost economics
Markets and Hierarchies : analysis and antitrust implications: A study in the Economics of internal organization
The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach
The transaction cost approach to the study of economic organization regards the transaction as the basic unit of analysis and holds that an understanding of transaction cost economizing is central to the study of organizations. Applications of this approach require that transactions be dimensionalized and that alternative governance structures be described. Economizing is accomplished by assigning transactions to governance structures in a discri…
The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract
The propositions that organization matters and that it is susceptible to analysis were long greeted by skepticism by economists. One reason why this message took a long time to register is that it is much easier to say that organization matters than it is to show how and why. The prevalence of the science of choice approach to economics has also been an obstacle. As developed herein, the lessons of organization theory for economics are both diffe…
Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size
There is a great deal of evidence that almost all organizational structures tend to produce false images in the decision-maker, and that the larger and more authoritarian the organization, the better the chance that its top decision-makers will be operating in purely imaginary worlds. This perhaps is the most fundamental reason for supposing that there are ultimately diminishing returns to scale
The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development
Journal Article The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development Get access The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development. Edited by (OLIVER E.) Williamson and (SIDNEY G.) Winter. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press/OUP, USA, 1991. Pp. viii+235. £25.00 hardback. ISBN 0 19 506590 5.) R. Rothschild R. Rothschild University of Lancaster Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Ec…
Economic organization: Firms, Markets, and Policy Control
Economic Evolution: An Enquiry into the Foundations of New Institutional Economics
Journal Article Economic Evolution: An Enquiry into the Foundations of New Institutional Economics Get access Economic Evolution: An Enquiry into the Foundations of New Institutional Economics. By (JACK J.) Vromen. (London and New York: Routledge, 1995. Pp. viii + 245. £50.00 hardback, £15.99 paperback. ISBN 0 415 12812 9, 0415 12813 7.) Oliver E. Williamson Oliver E. Williamson University of California, Berkeley Search for other works by this au…
Social Choice: A Probabilistic Approach
Journal Article Social Choice: A Probabilistic Approach Get access Oliver E. Williamson, Oliver E. Williamson Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Thomas J. Sargent Thomas J. Sargent Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 77, Issue 308, 1 December 1967, Pages 797–813, https://doi.org/10.2307/2229568 Published: 01 December 1967
Contested Exchange Versus the Governance of Contractual Relations
There is much in the paper by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis ["The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy"] with which I agree. But there are also real differences-which is to be expected, since they and I examine economic organization through very different lenses. Thus whereas they view economic organization through the lens of power and contested exchange, I believe that economizing and governance…
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relations, Contracting
Journal Article The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relations, Contracting Get access The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relations, Contracting. By OLIVER E.WILLIAMSON. (New York & London: The Free Press, 1985. Pp. xiv + 450. US$27.95 hardback.) Robin Marris Robin Marris Birkbeck College, London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 98, Issu…
Innovation and Market Structure
Why Law, Economics, and Organization
This review shows that a combined law, economics, and organization theory approach leads to different and deeper understandings of the purposes served by complex contract and economic organization. The business firm for these purposes is described not in technological terms (as a production function) but in organizational terms (as an alternative mode of governance). Firm and market are thus examined comparatively with respect to their capacities…
Innovation and Market Structure
The economics of discretionary behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm
A rational theory of the federal budgeting process
Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size
There is a great deal of evidence that almost all organizational structures tend to produce false images in the decision-maker, and that the larger and more authoritarian the organization, the better the chance that its top decision-makers will be operating in purely imaginary worlds. This perhaps is the most fundamental reason for supposing that there are ultimately diminishing returns to scale
Externalities, Insurance, and Disability Analysis
Although the recent literature on externalities has done much to clarify the issues2, important problems in the analysis of externalities remain. This article attempts to deal with some of them. As Coase has observed, Satisfactory views on policy can only come from a patient study of how, in practice, the market, firms, and governments handle the problem of harmful effects [5, p. 18]. We would agree and extend this to include a statement that a p…
Social Choice: A Probabilistic Approach
Journal Article Social Choice: A Probabilistic Approach Get access Oliver E. Williamson, Oliver E. Williamson Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Thomas J. Sargent Thomas J. Sargent Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 77, Issue 308, 1 December 1967, Pages 797–813, https://doi.org/10.2307/2229568 Published: 01 December 1967
Exit and voice: Some implications for the study of the modern corporation
Markets and Hierarchies : analysis and antitrust implications: A study in the Economics of internal organization
Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange
Oliver E. Williamson, Michael L. Wachter, Jeffrey E. Harris, Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring, 1975), pp. 250-278
Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to Catv
The orthodox attitude among economists toward regulation is one of "disdain and contempt." The general reputation is undeserved, but it fails to discriminate among different economic activities and different types of regulation. An effort to distinguish between those circumstances in which regulation, in some form, is immanent from those in which market modes can be made to work relatively well is needed.
Economic Man Versus Organization Man
The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach
The transaction cost approach to the study of economic organization regards the transaction as the basic unit of analysis and holds that an understanding of transaction cost economizing is central to the study of organizations. Applications of this approach require that transactions be dimensionalized and that alternative governance structures be described. Economizing is accomplished by assigning transactions to governance structures in a discri…
Efficient Labour Organization
There are two general approaches to the study of efficient labour organization. The one is in the neo-classical tradition which emphasizes incentives, efficient risk-bearing, factor proportion distortions, and the like. The second has more recent origins. It emphasizes the contracting process and the transaction costs that are associated therewith. A comparative institutional assessment of alternative governance structures is attempted, the objec…
Economic organization: Firms, Markets, and Policy Control
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relations, Contracting
Journal Article The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relations, Contracting Get access The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relations, Contracting. By OLIVER E.WILLIAMSON. (New York & London: The Free Press, 1985. Pp. xiv + 450. US$27.95 hardback.) Robin Marris Robin Marris Birkbeck College, London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 98, Issu…
Work and Industry: Structures, Markets, and Processes
The past decade has witnessed growing research interest in the organization of work and of industry. Although increases in international trade and competition have had some- thing to do with this research trend, a more important factor has been the emergence of new conceptual apparatuses. Much of the recent research works out of a more microanalytic, comparative institutional, and interdisciplinary orientation than was previously employed. Both s…
Chapter 3 Transaction cost economics
Die ökonomischen Institutionen des Kapitalismus: Unternehmen, Märkte, Kooperationen
Oliver E. Williamson geht von der Annahme aus, daß Menschen sich nur in begrenztem Maße rational verhalten und dazu neigen, im Eigeninteresse zu handeln. Er zeigt, wie es im Rahmen von Leistungsbeziehungen, die einer hohen Umweltunsicherheit unterliegen und spezifische Investitionen erfordern, zu nachvertraglichen Problemen kommt. Kapitalistische Wirtschaftssysteme stellen für die Bewältigung dieser Probleme zahlreiche Institutionen bzw. Koordina…
Economics and Sociology: Redefining Their Boundaries: Conversations with Economists and Sociologists
The boundary between economics and sociology is presently being redefined--but how, why, and by whom? Richard Swedberg answers these questions in this thought-provoking book of conversations with well-known economists and sociologists. Among the economists interviewed are Gary Becker, Amartya Sen, Kenneth Arrow, and Albert O. Hirschman; the sociologists include Daniel Bell, Harrison White, James Coleman, and Mark Granovetter. The picture that eme…
Multinational Corporations: An Elgar Reference Collection
Journal Article Multinational Corporations: An Elgar Reference Collection Get access Multinational Corporations: An Elgar Reference Collection. Edited by CASSON (MARK). (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990. Pp. xvii + 609. £95.00 hardback. ISBN 1 85278 192 0.)The Economics of Innovation: An Elgar Reference Collection. Edited by FREEMAN (CHRISTOPHER). (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990. Pp. xx + 504. £76.50 hardback. ISBN 1 85278 171 8.)Entrepreneurship: An…
Will the Real Ronald Coase Please Stand Up
The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development
Journal Article The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development Get access The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development. Edited by (OLIVER E.) Williamson and (SIDNEY G.) Winter. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press/OUP, USA, 1991. Pp. viii+235. £25.00 hardback. ISBN 0 19 506590 5.) R. Rothschild R. Rothschild University of Lancaster Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Ec…
The Firm As a Nexus of Treaties
Part 1 Knowledge - its acquisition, sharing and/or asymmetry: the participatory generation of information rents and the theory of the firm, Masahiko Aoki common knowledge and the co-ordination of economic activities, Jacques Cremer profit sharing, information and employment, Matti Pohjola. Part 2 Vertical integration and the strategic management of the enterprise: what is vertical integration?, Michael H.Riordan vertical integration, transaction …
Contested Exchange Versus the Governance of Contractual Relations
There is much in the paper by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis ["The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy"] with which I agree. But there are also real differences-which is to be expected, since they and I examine economic organization through very different lenses. Thus whereas they view economic organization through the lens of power and contested exchange, I believe that economizing and governance…
Economics (28 works) · Economic Theory and Institutions (17 works) · Political science (17 works) · Business (16 works) · Law (12 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (12 works) · Microeconomics (12 works) · Neoclassical economics (12 works) · Transaction cost (11 works) · Computer Science (10 works)