Carmine Guerriero
Biographic Data
| ID | 264613 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Carmine Guerriero |
| GIVEN NAMES | Carmine |
| FAMILY NAME | Guerriero |
| SIGNATURE | GUERRIERO C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Bologna |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4046-1082 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Understanding legal origins: On the determinants and impact of legal traditions
Endogenous property rights and the nature of the firm
While focusing on residual control rights, the property rights theory of the firm overlooks that the legal protection of each party's input shapes its ex post bargaining power. To evaluate this issue, we assume that the property rights on the inputs are selected by a legislator to maximize full investment and, conditional on this goal being reached, minimize inefficient deviations to intermediate investment profiles. Our model delivers three key …
The economic and institutional determinants of trade expansion in Bronze Age Greater Mesopotamia
Endogenous Institutions and Economic Outcomes
To evaluate the relative importance of a culture of cooperation and inclusive political institutions, I divide Europe into 120 km×120 km grid cells, and exploit the exogenous variation in both institutions created by medieval history. I document strong first‐stage relationships between present‐day norms of respect and trust and the severity of consumption risk—i.e. climate volatility—over the period 1000–1600 and between the inclusiveness of pres…
The Property-Contract Balance
We identify a key trade-off between protecting property rights and enhancing reliance on contracts. For instance, when a dishonest intermediary transfers a good to an innocent buyer without the owner's consent, should the buyer or the owner retain the good? We show that the optimal rule maximizes the agents' valuation of the good rather than their incentives to protect property and inquire about title. Furthermore, enhancing reliance on contracts…
The economic and institutional determinants of trade expansion in Bronze Age Greater Mesopotamia
Endogenous property rights and the nature of the firm
While focusing on residual control rights, the property rights theory of the firm overlooks that the legal protection of each party's input shapes its ex post bargaining power. To evaluate this issue, we assume that the property rights on the inputs are selected by a legislator to maximize full investment and, conditional on this goal being reached, minimize inefficient deviations to intermediate investment profiles. Our model delivers three key …
Endogenous Institutions and Economic Outcomes
To evaluate the relative importance of a culture of cooperation and inclusive political institutions, I divide Europe into 120 km×120 km grid cells, and exploit the exogenous variation in both institutions created by medieval history. I document strong first‐stage relationships between present‐day norms of respect and trust and the severity of consumption risk—i.e. climate volatility—over the period 1000–1600 and between the inclusiveness of pres…
The Property-Contract Balance
We identify a key trade-off between protecting property rights and enhancing reliance on contracts. For instance, when a dishonest intermediary transfers a good to an innocent buyer without the owner's consent, should the buyer or the owner retain the good? We show that the optimal rule maximizes the agents' valuation of the good rather than their incentives to protect property and inquire about title. Furthermore, enhancing reliance on contracts…
Endogenous Institutions and Economic Outcomes
To evaluate the relative importance of a culture of cooperation and inclusive political institutions, I divide Europe into 120 km×120 km grid cells, and exploit the exogenous variation in both institutions created by medieval history. I document strong first‐stage relationships between present‐day norms of respect and trust and the severity of consumption risk—i.e. climate volatility—over the period 1000–1600 and between the inclusiveness of pres…
The economic and institutional determinants of trade expansion in Bronze Age Greater Mesopotamia
Endogenous property rights and the nature of the firm
While focusing on residual control rights, the property rights theory of the firm overlooks that the legal protection of each party's input shapes its ex post bargaining power. To evaluate this issue, we assume that the property rights on the inputs are selected by a legislator to maximize full investment and, conditional on this goal being reached, minimize inefficient deviations to intermediate investment profiles. Our model delivers three key …
Understanding legal origins: On the determinants and impact of legal traditions
Economics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (2 works) · Economy (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Property (philosophy) (2 works) · Agriculture (1 works) · Ancient Near East History (1 works)