Aron Szekely
Biographic Data
| ID | 279348 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Aron Szekely |
| GIVEN NAMES | Aron |
| FAMILY NAME | Szekely |
| SIGNATURE | SZEKELY A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Collegio Carlo Alberto |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5651-4711 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
An experimental study on institutions and social norms of tax payment
The production of public goods, which are fundamental to well-functioning societies, requires the payment of taxes, but taxpayers have clear incentives to free-ride because of the low probability of sanctions. Despite these incentives, many do pay, and research suggests that non-monetary mechanisms are important drivers. Here, we focus on social norms and propose that they drive tax paying and mediate the relationship between institutional qualit…
Making Sense of Honor Killings
Honor killings, which occur when women are perceived to have broken purity norms and bring "dishonor" to their family, pose profound moral and societal problems and underrecognized sociological puzzles. Given the immense cost, why do families murder their own daughter, niece, or cousin? Conversely, given the tragic consequences, why are norms broken in the first place? Drawing on accounts of honor killings, we characterize the key actors, actions…
Does information reduce interpersonal violence? Evidence from prisons
Why does interpersonal violence erupt? A key source is conflict over resources and a little-studied mechanism for solving such cases concerns the availability of credible information about individuals' abilities and willingness to use force. Its core prediction is that when such credible information abounds, the outcome of a potential struggle can be anticipated and thus there is no need to fight. I test this prediction using a nationally represe…
Preferences for honesty can support cooperation
Many collective action problems are inherently linked to honesty. By deciding to behave honestly, people contribute to solving the collective action problem. We use a laboratory experiment from two sites ( n = 331 and n = 319) to test whether honest preferences can drive cooperation and whether these preferences can be differentially activated by framing. Subjects participate in an asymmetric information variant of the public goods game in one of…
Recruitment into Organized Crime: An Agent-Based Approach Testing the Impact of Different Policies
How Norms Emerge from Conventions (and Change)
Social norms regulate our behavior in a variety of mundane and far-reaching contexts, from tipping at the restaurant to social distancing during a pandemic. However, how social norms emerge, persist, and change is still poorly understood. Here the authors investigate experimentally whether spontaneously emerging behavioral regularities (i.e., conventions) gain normativity over time and, if so, whether their normative underpinning makes them resis…
Aggression, Conflict, and the Formation of Intimidating Group Reputation
From inmates in prison gangs to soldiers in elite units, the intimidating reputation of groups often precedes its members. While individual reputation is known to affect people’s aggressiveness, whether one’s group reputation can similarly influence behavior in conflict situations is yet to be established. Using an economic game experiment, we isolate the effect of group reputation on aggression and conflict from that of individual reputation. We…
How dominance hierarchies emerge from conflict: A game theoretic model and experimental evidence
Making Sense of Honor Killings
Honor killings, which occur when women are perceived to have broken purity norms and bring "dishonor" to their family, pose profound moral and societal problems and underrecognized sociological puzzles. Given the immense cost, why do families murder their own daughter, niece, or cousin? Conversely, given the tragic consequences, why are norms broken in the first place? Drawing on accounts of honor killings, we characterize the key actors, actions…
How dominance hierarchies emerge from conflict: A game theoretic model and experimental evidence
Aggression, Conflict, and the Formation of Intimidating Group Reputation
From inmates in prison gangs to soldiers in elite units, the intimidating reputation of groups often precedes its members. While individual reputation is known to affect people’s aggressiveness, whether one’s group reputation can similarly influence behavior in conflict situations is yet to be established. Using an economic game experiment, we isolate the effect of group reputation on aggression and conflict from that of individual reputation. We…
How dominance hierarchies emerge from conflict: A game theoretic model and experimental evidence
Recruitment into Organized Crime: An Agent-Based Approach Testing the Impact of Different Policies
How Norms Emerge from Conventions (and Change)
Social norms regulate our behavior in a variety of mundane and far-reaching contexts, from tipping at the restaurant to social distancing during a pandemic. However, how social norms emerge, persist, and change is still poorly understood. Here the authors investigate experimentally whether spontaneously emerging behavioral regularities (i.e., conventions) gain normativity over time and, if so, whether their normative underpinning makes them resis…
Preferences for honesty can support cooperation
Many collective action problems are inherently linked to honesty. By deciding to behave honestly, people contribute to solving the collective action problem. We use a laboratory experiment from two sites ( n = 331 and n = 319) to test whether honest preferences can drive cooperation and whether these preferences can be differentially activated by framing. Subjects participate in an asymmetric information variant of the public goods game in one of…
Does information reduce interpersonal violence? Evidence from prisons
Why does interpersonal violence erupt? A key source is conflict over resources and a little-studied mechanism for solving such cases concerns the availability of credible information about individuals' abilities and willingness to use force. Its core prediction is that when such credible information abounds, the outcome of a potential struggle can be anticipated and thus there is no need to fight. I test this prediction using a nationally represe…
Making Sense of Honor Killings
Honor killings, which occur when women are perceived to have broken purity norms and bring "dishonor" to their family, pose profound moral and societal problems and underrecognized sociological puzzles. Given the immense cost, why do families murder their own daughter, niece, or cousin? Conversely, given the tragic consequences, why are norms broken in the first place? Drawing on accounts of honor killings, we characterize the key actors, actions…
An experimental study on institutions and social norms of tax payment
The production of public goods, which are fundamental to well-functioning societies, requires the payment of taxes, but taxpayers have clear incentives to free-ride because of the low probability of sanctions. Despite these incentives, many do pay, and research suggests that non-monetary mechanisms are important drivers. Here, we focus on social norms and propose that they drive tax paying and mediate the relationship between institutional qualit…
Psychology (7 works) · Social Psychology (6 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Criminology (4 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works)