Susan Rose-Ackerman
Biographic Data
| ID | 280789 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Susan Rose-Ackerman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Susan |
| FAMILY NAME | Rose-Ackerman |
| SIGNATURE | ROSE-ACKERMAN S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Yale University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8502-8437 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 74 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 434 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 69 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 5 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1975 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 12 |
Public Sector Performance, Corruption and State Capture in a Globalized World
This chapter considers the rules that govern—and ought to govern— interactions between political actors and anticorruption enforcers across international borders. Those rules determine both whether politicians are able to influence international anticorruption enforcement and whether international anticorruption enforcement affects foreign political processes. The motivating example is President Donald Trump's attempt to influence Ukraine's inves…
Corrupción y Covid-19
La pandemia del coronavirus ha generado incentivos a la corrupción, al fraude y a la auto-contratación que pueden ser explicados mediante los incentivos político-económicos que se tratan en el trabajo. Tres características de la crisis de la COVID-19 son especialmente importantes. En primer lugar, el rápido desarrollo de la pandemia y la correlativa recesión económica han conducido a una feroz competencia por los recursos esenciales. En segundo l…
Corruption and Covid-19
The coronavirus pandemic has created incentives for corruption, fraud, and self-dealing that can be explained by the underlying political-economic incentives at work. Three characteristics of the COVID-19 crisis are especially important. First, the rapidly unfolding pandemic and the accompanying economic recession have led to fierce competition for essential resources. Second, governments have rapidly mobilized public funds (for both healthcare a…
Corruption in Argentina: Towards an Institutional Approach
The book provides an institutional, historical, and sectorial analysis of Argentina’s structural corruption. Looking back over the last 200 years, the book demonstrates that Argentina has historically addressed corruption through ineffective debates between public-private biases or a cultural-criminal approach reinforced by modernization theory, neither of which have helped tackle the problem. Instead, Volosin proposes meaningful institutional re…
Slash and Burn” in the U.S. Congress and the Trump administration: Permanent damage or short-term Setback
Depuis son élection, Donald Trump a été à l’origine de mesures importantes qui ont porté atteinte aux doctrines de droit administratif relatives aux procédures décisionnelles au point de modifier profondément l’élaboration des politiques publiques. Ces mesures de libéralisation, prises par le biais d’ordonnances ou de nominations présidentielles, ont de plus en plus réduit l’expertise technocratique nécessaire à la mise en œuvre des politiques pu…
Report of the Expert Advisory Group on Anti-Corruption, Transparency, and Integrity in Latin America and the Caribbean
Recent corruption scandals have shown the negative effects that corruption may have in countries around the world, including those of the Latin American and Caribbean region. The Inter-American Development Bank has therefore convened an independent group of experts composed by eight governance and anti-corruption scholars and practitioners to identify innovative and effective approaches to combat corruption in the region. Drawing on the members’ …
Corruption & Purity
Corruption is a complex and contested concept that raises difficult ethical and legal issues at the borderline between individuals’ public and private roles. What is appropriate or required in one role may be inappropriate or even illegal in another. Based on these concepts of role and responsibility, I begin this essay by analyzing three cases that fit comfortably into the “illegal corruption” category: so-called grand and petty corruption and e…
What Does “Governance” Mean
Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform
Greed, Corruption, and the Modern State: Essays in Political Economy
What makes the control of corruption so difficult and contested? Drawing on the insights of political science, economics and law, the expert contributors to this book offer diverse perspectives. One group of chapters explores the nature of corruption in democracies and autocracies, and “reforms” that are mere facades. Other contributions examine corruption in infrastructure, tax collection, cross-border trade, and military procurement. Case studi…
Les études d'impact et l'analyse « coûts-avantages »: Modèles américains et traditions juridiques françaises
L’intérêt accru porté à la procédure de l’étude d’impact en France illustre les tensions entre les conceptions traditionnelles du droit administratif et les tendances contemporaines. L’expertise de la fonction publique et son isolement par rapport aux questions politiques quotidiennes visaient traditionnellement à préserver la vision républicaine française de l’intérêt général face aux pressions partisanes et court‐termistes des acteurs politique…
Anti-Corruption Policy: Can International Actors Play a Constructive Role
International institutions’ role in controlling corruption is necessarily limited. Nevertheless, well-executed international efforts can benefit ordinary people and may help domestic and global businesses. Efforts to reduce corruption ought to be linked to the ultimate goals of economic development, government legitimacy, and international competitiveness. Given those goals, I show how they may be furthered by international actors as information …
Étude d'impact et analyse coûts-avantages: Qu'impliquent-elles pour l'élaboration des politiques publiques et les réformes législatives
Les études d’impact font désormais partie du processus législatif en France. L’auteure présente à cette occasion plusieurs éléments tirés de l’expérience nord‐américaine en faisant tout d’abord porter son analyse sur les valeurs (économiques et non économiques) prises ou pouvant être prises en compte dans les études d’impact. Elle souligne que ces différentes valeurs peuvent entrer en conflit. Elle aborde également les forces et les faiblesses de…
Policymaking Accountability: Parliamentary versus Presidential Systems
This unique Handbook offers the most up-to-date and comprehensive, state-of-the-art reviews of the politics of regulation. It presents and discusses the core theories and concepts of regulation in response to the rise of the regulatory state and regulatory capitalism, and in the context of the 'golden age of regulation'. Its eleven sections include forty-eight chapters covering issues as diverse and varied as: theories of regulation; historical p…
When BITs have some bite: The political-economic environment for bilateral investment treaties
International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two
The Law and Economics of Bribery and Extortion
Corruption has serious economic and social costs and can undermine government legitimacy. Economic analysis can help one understand the incentives for bribery and extortion and the deterrent effect of the law. Such analysis suggests that the law in many jurisdictions ought to be redesigned. Penalties are poorly tied to the marginal benefits of bribery. Small bribes often are more effectively deterred than larger ones because penalties are not tie…
Regulation and Public Law in Comparative Perspective
Administrative law is a key determinant of legitimate executive-branch policy making. Democracies cannot realistically limit policy making to the legislature. Delegation under broad, framework statutes is essential for effective government, but it does not eliminate the need for democratic responsiveness. Those interested in strengthening democracy should not be content with the patterns of delegation, consultation, and oversight that arise from …
Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption
Elections serve two functions in representative democracies. First, they select political actors who enact public policies in the light of constituents’ preferences. Second, they permit citizens to hold their representatives accountable and to punish them if they enrich themselves in corrupt or self-serving ways. In other words, elections provide both incentives for politicians to enact certain kinds of policies and constraints on politicians’ ma…
The Voluntary Sector and Public Participation: The Case of Hungary
Government policymakers need to be accountable to citizens, but much government policymaking occurs in ministries that are imperfectly monitored and controlled by the popularly elected legislature. There are good reasons for such delegation, grounded in the expertise of officials and the scarce time of legislators, but the affirmative justifications for delegation do not vitiate the need for public officials to consult with the public and with or…
Corruption and Government
In countries emerging from civil war with weak governments, bribery demands will be used opportunistically by officials operating under unclear rules that allow them to invent offences or simply to extort funds from ordinary people. Furthermore, many people may engage in illegal activities, such as smuggling or illicit trade in arms, and may need the protection of public authorities to continue to operate. Peacebuilding strategies must avoid trig…
From Elections to Democracy in Central Europe: Public Participation and the Role of Civil Society
The new European Union member states in Eastern Europe do not have fully consolidated democracies. True, popularly elected legislatures are responsible for lawmaking, and citizens can challenge the case-by-case implementation of the law. But most statutes are not self-implementing. Before they can be put into effect, governments need to issue general regulations and guidelines that add specificity to the statutory scheme. At present, this type of…
Corruption and reform: Lessons from America's economic history - Edited by Edward L. Glaeser and Claudia Goldin
International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption
Contents: Introduction Susan Rose-Ackerman and Tina Soreide PART I: GENERAL OVERVIEWS 1. Corruption and Sustainable Development Toke S. Aidt 2. Curbing Corruption with Political Institutions Joshua D. Potter and Margit Tavits PART II: PROCUREMENT AND CORRUPTION 3. Delusion, Deception and Corruption in Major Infrastructure Projects: Causes, Consequences and Cures Bent Flyvbjerg and Eamonn Molloy 4. Corruption and Procurement: Strategic Complements…
Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives
Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Edited by Marc Hertogh and Simon Halliday. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 328p. $90.00 cloth, $39.99 paper. The impact of judicial decisions on bureaucracy is poorly understood. Some claim that court judgments have little or no effect. In contrast, others worry that judges will usurp the policymaking role of the political branches and override …
Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption
Electoral rules and constitutional structures can influence the level of political corruption. We show that proportional representation (PR) systems are more susceptible to corrupt political rent-seeking than plurality systems. We argue that this result depends on the different loci of rents in PR and plurality systems, and on the monitoring difficulties faced by both voters and opposition parties under PR. We also examine the interaction between…
Ideals versus Dollars: Donors, Charity Managers, and Government Grants
This paper demonstrates how changes in untied, lump-sum government grants or income from unrestricted endowments will affect the behavior of charities operated by managers with s trong philosophical or professional commitments. An increase in such funds will reduce the charity's accountability to private donors and lower its fund-raising activities. The grant will not be spent entire ly on raising the quantity of output. Instead, it will permit t…
The Economics of nonprofit institutions: Studies in Structure and Policy
Racism and urban structure
Trust, honesty and corruption: Reflection on the State-Building Process
Honesty and trust affect the functioning of the state and the market, and, conversely, the quality of formal rules and institutions has an impact on interpersonal trust. This paper organizes and critiques research on the relationship between trust and government; it stresses the mutual interaction between trust and democracy and the impact of corruption. Given this context, the concluding section discusses the transition process in post-socialist…
What Does “Governance” Mean
Corruption and Government
In countries emerging from civil war with weak governments, bribery demands will be used opportunistically by officials operating under unclear rules that allow them to invent offences or simply to extort funds from ordinary people. Furthermore, many people may engage in illegal activities, such as smuggling or illicit trade in arms, and may need the protection of public authorities to continue to operate. Peacebuilding strategies must avoid trig…
Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic
This paper builds upon some well-known facts about state government to generate new conclusions about social choice on the national level of a federal republic. Citizens vote against national laws that restrict their state's ability to export costs but support laws that reduce the costs imposed on them. Individuals may seek to extend the laws passed in some states to the entire nation or may oppose preemptive laws because they benefit from variet…
From Elections to Democracy in Central Europe: Public Participation and the Role of Civil Society
The new European Union member states in Eastern Europe do not have fully consolidated democracies. True, popularly elected legislatures are responsible for lawmaking, and citizens can challenge the case-by-case implementation of the law. But most statutes are not self-implementing. Before they can be put into effect, governments need to issue general regulations and guidelines that add specificity to the statutory scheme. At present, this type of…
Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights
Inalienability is the stepchild of law and economics.Too often, economists note the existence of restrictions on transferability, ownership, and use, only to dismiss them as obviously inefficient constraints on market trades.Even
Altruism, ideological entrepreneurs and the non-profit firm
Ideology and altruism are central to understanding the non-profit charitable sector. This paper addresses three questions. Why do people make charitable gifts? Why do they usually give to non-profit organisations? When can non-profits run by committed ideologues compete with profitoriented entrepreneurs in the provision of services? The altruistic motives of individuals and the ideological commitments of entrepreneurs come together to support cha…
Democracy and 'grand' corruption
Market models of local government: Exit, voting, and the land market
The political economy of a racist housing market
Corruption in a Paternalistic Democracy: Lessons from Italy for Latin America
SILVIA COLAZINGARI is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Yale University. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN is Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence in the Law School and the Department of Political Science, Yale University. Her book, Corruption and Good Government: Causes, Consequences and Strategies for Reform, is forthcoming in 1999
The Politics of Parenthood: Child Care, Women's Rights, and the Myth of the Good Mother, by Mary Frances Berry
Who is responsible for our children--and why? A distinguished scholar gives us a fascinating and long-overdue historical perspective on parenthood in America
Unintended Consequences: Regulating the Quality of Subsidized Day Care
Advocates for the poor frequently support uniform, high federal standards for subsidized social services. While such standards may improve the quality of services for those who qualify, they can also have unintended but important side effects. Stringent regulations may actually curtail the supply of services, promote segregation, and expand the role of large subsidized for-profit firms. All these possibilities are illustrated by the history of fe…
The Law and Economics of Bribery and Extortion
Corruption has serious economic and social costs and can undermine government legitimacy. Economic analysis can help one understand the incentives for bribery and extortion and the deterrent effect of the law. Such analysis suggests that the law in many jurisdictions ought to be redesigned. Penalties are poorly tied to the marginal benefits of bribery. Small bribes often are more effectively deterred than larger ones because penalties are not tie…
Corruption and Covid-19
The coronavirus pandemic has created incentives for corruption, fraud, and self-dealing that can be explained by the underlying political-economic incentives at work. Three characteristics of the COVID-19 crisis are especially important. First, the rapidly unfolding pandemic and the accompanying economic recession have led to fierce competition for essential resources. Second, governments have rapidly mobilized public funds (for both healthcare a…
Corruption & Purity
Corruption is a complex and contested concept that raises difficult ethical and legal issues at the borderline between individuals’ public and private roles. What is appropriate or required in one role may be inappropriate or even illegal in another. Based on these concepts of role and responsibility, I begin this essay by analyzing three cases that fit comfortably into the “illegal corruption” category: so-called grand and petty corruption and e…
The Strategic Constitution
Journal Article The Strategic Constitution Get access The Strategic Constitution by Robert D. Cooter. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000. 412 pp. $45.00. Susan Rose-Ackerman Susan Rose-Ackerman Yale University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Volume 116, Issue 2, Summer 2001, Page 305, https://doi.org/10.2307/798063 Published: 15 February 2013
The Voluntary Sector and Public Participation: The Case of Hungary
Government policymakers need to be accountable to citizens, but much government policymaking occurs in ministries that are imperfectly monitored and controlled by the popularly elected legislature. There are good reasons for such delegation, grounded in the expertise of officials and the scarce time of legislators, but the affirmative justifications for delegation do not vitiate the need for public officials to consult with the public and with or…
Rethinking the Progressive Agenda: The Reform of the American Regulatory State
Shortchanging the Public
Regulation and Public Law in Comparative Perspective
Administrative law is a key determinant of legitimate executive-branch policy making. Democracies cannot realistically limit policy making to the legislature. Delegation under broad, framework statutes is essential for effective government, but it does not eliminate the need for democratic responsiveness. Those interested in strengthening democracy should not be content with the patterns of delegation, consultation, and oversight that arise from …
The economics of corruption
Racism and urban structure
Economy and Environment/Rationality and Ritual
The political economy of a racist housing market
Corruption: A Study in Political Economy
Market models of local government: Exit, voting, and the land market
Shortchanging the Public
Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic
This paper builds upon some well-known facts about state government to generate new conclusions about social choice on the national level of a federal republic. Citizens vote against national laws that restrict their state's ability to export costs but support laws that reduce the costs imposed on them. Individuals may seek to extend the laws passed in some states to the entire nation or may oppose preemptive laws because they benefit from variet…
Winning the Contest by Agenda Manipulation
Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation
I will demonstrate that previous analysts have dismissed the issue of "unfair" competition too quickly. While I agree that nofiprofits are no more likely to engage in predatory pricing than for-profits, I will show that for-profit investors may be injured even when predation does not occur. Forprofit investors' claims of injury are neither obviously correct nor patently false. Their validity depends both on one's definition of fairness and on a s…
Social Services and the Market
Unintended Consequences: Regulating the Quality of Subsidized Day Care
Advocates for the poor frequently support uniform, high federal standards for subsidized social services. While such standards may improve the quality of services for those who qualify, they can also have unintended but important side effects. Stringent regulations may actually curtail the supply of services, promote segregation, and expand the role of large subsidized for-profit firms. All these possibilities are illustrated by the history of fe…
Revolt against Regulation: The Rise and Pause of the Consumer Movement, by Michael Pertschuk
Journal Article Revolt against Regulation: The Rise and Pause of the Consumer Movement, by Michael Pertschuk Get access Revolt Against Regulation: The Rise and Pause of the Consumer Movement by Michael Pertschuk. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982. 192 pp. $12.95. Susan Rose-Ackerman Susan Rose-Ackerman Columbia University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Volume 98, …
Controlling Regulatory Sprawl: Presidential Strategies from Nixon to Reagan, by Howard Ball
Journal Article Controlling Regulatory Sprawl: Presidential Strategies from Nixon to Reagan, by Howard Ball Get access Controlling Regulatory Sprawl: Presidential Strategies from Nixon to Reagan by Howard Ball. Westport, Conn, Greenwood Press, 1984. 206 pp. $29.95. Susan Rose-Ackerman Susan Rose-Ackerman Columbia University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Volume 99, Issue 4, Wi…
United States
DNA repair maintains genomic stability and the loss of DNA repair capacity results in genetic instability that may lead to a decline of cellular function. Adult stem cells are extremely important in the long-term maintenance of tissues throughout life. They regenerate and renew tissues in response to damage and replace senescent terminally differentiated cells that no longer function. Oxidative stress, toxic byproducts, reduced mitochondrial func…
Bureaucratic Failure and Public Expenditure.William Spangar Peirce
The Uncertain Balance: Governmental Regulators in the Political Process, by Glenn Davis and Gary D. Helfand
Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights
Inalienability is the stepchild of law and economics.Too often, economists note the existence of restrictions on transferability, ownership, and use, only to dismiss them as obviously inefficient constraints on market trades.Even
The Economics of nonprofit institutions: Studies in Structure and Policy
Monitoring and Compliance: The Political Economy of Inspection
[Privatization as Institutional Choice]: Comment
Braking the Special Interests: Trucking Deregulation and the Politics of Policy Reform, by Dorothy Robyn
Ideals versus Dollars: Donors, Charity Managers, and Government Grants
This paper demonstrates how changes in untied, lump-sum government grants or income from unrestricted endowments will affect the behavior of charities operated by managers with s trong philosophical or professional commitments. An increase in such funds will reduce the charity's accountability to private donors and lower its fund-raising activities. The grant will not be spent entire ly on raising the quantity of output. Instead, it will permit t…
The Economic Structure of Tort Law
Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America, by David Vogel
Political science (69 works) · Law (50 works) · Economics (43 works) · Politics (37 works) · Law (30 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (27 works) · Public Administration (25 works) · Language change (24 works) · Business (21 works) · Political economy (18 works)