Marius Radean
Biographic Data
| ID | 296669 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Marius Radean |
| GIVEN NAMES | Marius |
| FAMILY NAME | Radean |
| SIGNATURE | RADEAN M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Essex |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7833-4260 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 42 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Not-so-average after all: Individual vs. aggregate effects in substantive research
In non-linear models, the effect of a given variable cannot be gauged directly from the associated coefficient. Instead, researchers typically compute the average effect in the population to assess the substantive significance of the variable of interest. Based on the average response, analysts often make policy recommendations that are to be implemented at the individual level (i.e. the unit of analysis level). Such extrapolations, however, can …
The Significance of Differences Interval: Assessing the Statistical and Substantive Difference between Two Quantities of Interest
The standard practice in discussing results has shifted from coefficients to substantive quantities of interest. Hypothesis testing nowadays entails computing substantive effects with the 95% CI for alternative scenarios and comparing them. Absent an evaluation of the difference in estimates, current practice often cannot provide a definitive answer. When CIs overlap, the estimates \\emph{may or may not} be statistically different. This ambiguity…
Going, going, gone? Varieties of dissent and leader exit
We examine how popular dissent affects the likelihood that political leaders lose power, distinguishing between types of dissent in terms of nonviolent/violent primary tactics as well as the level of individual participation. We posit that protests threaten leaders both directly through the governance costs of citizen non-compliance, and indirectly through the increased risk of elite defections in the ruling coalition. In a series of propositions…
Perfect timing: Leveraging the timing of defection to assess the effect of electoral rules on party switching
When legislators switch parties between elections this may be viewed as undemocratic since, bypassing voters, they are changing the outcomes of elections. Do electoral institutions affect the likelihood of party switching? I argue that legislators are less likely to switch in candidate-centered electoral systems where, because of personal voting, parties cannot insulate defectors from voter retribution. When they switch though, legislators do so …
Negotiations in the Shadow of Outside Alternatives: An Estimation Strategy
Many political and socioeconomic binary outcomes are the result of multiactor interaction: states joining a given international institution (e.g., military alliance, economic block) and not its rivals, people entering the workforce as an employee of a specific firm and not of its competitors, and so on. Yet most empirical studies analyze multilateral phenomena as the (joint) binary choice of either a single or, at most, two decision makers. This …
Sometimes you cannot have it all: Party switching and affiliation motivations as substitutes
Existing research on when legislators switch parties reports inconsistent results about motivations for switching (e.g. office, ideology, and votes). I treat the motivations for party switching as substitutes and argue that many of the inconsistencies that persist can be explained by modelling the interactive effects between these motivations. For example, scholars differ in terms of whether they find that electoral considerations are an importan…
Legal Institutions and Democratic Survival
Do institutions designed to limit arbitrary government promote the survival of democratic regimes? Although the international effort to build the rule of law is predicated on a belief that they do, mainstream research on democratic survival typically treats institutions as epiphenomenal. We argue that institutions encourage regime survival by addressing problems of monitoring and social coordination that complicate democratic compromise. We find …
Legal Institutions and Democratic Survival
Do institutions designed to limit arbitrary government promote the survival of democratic regimes? Although the international effort to build the rule of law is predicated on a belief that they do, mainstream research on democratic survival typically treats institutions as epiphenomenal. We argue that institutions encourage regime survival by addressing problems of monitoring and social coordination that complicate democratic compromise. We find …
The Significance of Differences Interval: Assessing the Statistical and Substantive Difference between Two Quantities of Interest
The standard practice in discussing results has shifted from coefficients to substantive quantities of interest. Hypothesis testing nowadays entails computing substantive effects with the 95% CI for alternative scenarios and comparing them. Absent an evaluation of the difference in estimates, current practice often cannot provide a definitive answer. When CIs overlap, the estimates \\emph{may or may not} be statistically different. This ambiguity…
Sometimes you cannot have it all: Party switching and affiliation motivations as substitutes
Existing research on when legislators switch parties reports inconsistent results about motivations for switching (e.g. office, ideology, and votes). I treat the motivations for party switching as substitutes and argue that many of the inconsistencies that persist can be explained by modelling the interactive effects between these motivations. For example, scholars differ in terms of whether they find that electoral considerations are an importan…
Going, going, gone? Varieties of dissent and leader exit
We examine how popular dissent affects the likelihood that political leaders lose power, distinguishing between types of dissent in terms of nonviolent/violent primary tactics as well as the level of individual participation. We posit that protests threaten leaders both directly through the governance costs of citizen non-compliance, and indirectly through the increased risk of elite defections in the ruling coalition. In a series of propositions…
Perfect timing: Leveraging the timing of defection to assess the effect of electoral rules on party switching
When legislators switch parties between elections this may be viewed as undemocratic since, bypassing voters, they are changing the outcomes of elections. Do electoral institutions affect the likelihood of party switching? I argue that legislators are less likely to switch in candidate-centered electoral systems where, because of personal voting, parties cannot insulate defectors from voter retribution. When they switch though, legislators do so …
Legal Institutions and Democratic Survival
Do institutions designed to limit arbitrary government promote the survival of democratic regimes? Although the international effort to build the rule of law is predicated on a belief that they do, mainstream research on democratic survival typically treats institutions as epiphenomenal. We argue that institutions encourage regime survival by addressing problems of monitoring and social coordination that complicate democratic compromise. We find …
Sometimes you cannot have it all: Party switching and affiliation motivations as substitutes
Existing research on when legislators switch parties reports inconsistent results about motivations for switching (e.g. office, ideology, and votes). I treat the motivations for party switching as substitutes and argue that many of the inconsistencies that persist can be explained by modelling the interactive effects between these motivations. For example, scholars differ in terms of whether they find that electoral considerations are an importan…
Negotiations in the Shadow of Outside Alternatives: An Estimation Strategy
Many political and socioeconomic binary outcomes are the result of multiactor interaction: states joining a given international institution (e.g., military alliance, economic block) and not its rivals, people entering the workforce as an employee of a specific firm and not of its competitors, and so on. Yet most empirical studies analyze multilateral phenomena as the (joint) binary choice of either a single or, at most, two decision makers. This …
Perfect timing: Leveraging the timing of defection to assess the effect of electoral rules on party switching
When legislators switch parties between elections this may be viewed as undemocratic since, bypassing voters, they are changing the outcomes of elections. Do electoral institutions affect the likelihood of party switching? I argue that legislators are less likely to switch in candidate-centered electoral systems where, because of personal voting, parties cannot insulate defectors from voter retribution. When they switch though, legislators do so …
The Significance of Differences Interval: Assessing the Statistical and Substantive Difference between Two Quantities of Interest
The standard practice in discussing results has shifted from coefficients to substantive quantities of interest. Hypothesis testing nowadays entails computing substantive effects with the 95% CI for alternative scenarios and comparing them. Absent an evaluation of the difference in estimates, current practice often cannot provide a definitive answer. When CIs overlap, the estimates \\emph{may or may not} be statistically different. This ambiguity…
Going, going, gone? Varieties of dissent and leader exit
We examine how popular dissent affects the likelihood that political leaders lose power, distinguishing between types of dissent in terms of nonviolent/violent primary tactics as well as the level of individual participation. We posit that protests threaten leaders both directly through the governance costs of citizen non-compliance, and indirectly through the increased risk of elite defections in the ruling coalition. In a series of propositions…
Not-so-average after all: Individual vs. aggregate effects in substantive research
In non-linear models, the effect of a given variable cannot be gauged directly from the associated coefficient. Instead, researchers typically compute the average effect in the population to assess the substantive significance of the variable of interest. Based on the average response, analysts often make policy recommendations that are to be implemented at the individual level (i.e. the unit of analysis level). Such extrapolations, however, can …
Law (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (3 works) · Law and economics (3 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (2 works) · Democracy (2 works)