Pierre-André Chiappori
Biographic Data
| ID | 303151 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Pierre-André Chiappori |
| GIVEN NAMES | Pierre-André |
| FAMILY NAME | Chiappori |
| SIGNATURE | CHIAPPORI P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Columbia University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 25 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 399 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 25 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1984 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Changes in Marital Sorting: Theory and Evidence from the United States
Feed the children
To understand the household decision-making process regarding food expenditures for children in poor households in Nairobi, we conduct an experiment with 424 married and monogamous couples. In the experiment, the spouses (individually and jointly) allocate money between themselves and nutritious meals for one of their children. We propose a novel and simple test to distinguish between cooperative/collective and non-cooperative decision behaviour.…
Commitment and the Dynamics of Household Labour Supply
The extent to which individuals commit to their partner for life has important implications. This paper develops a life-cycle collective model of the household, through which it characterises behaviour in three prominent alternative types of commitment: full, limited and no commitment. We propose a test that distinguishes between all three types based on how contemporaneous and historical news affect household behaviour. Our test permits heteroge…
Le capital familial
Le pouvoir dans la famille
The Engel Curves of Non-Cooperative Households
We provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a system of Engel curves to have been generated by a non-cooperative model of family behaviour. These conditions fully characterise the local behaviour of household-level consumption in the cross-section, i.e., as a function of total income and distribution factors. In this setting, any demand system compatible with a non-cooperative model is also compatible with a collective model, but …
The Marriage Market, Labor Supply, and Education Choice
We develop an equilibrium life cycle model of education, marriage, labor supply, and consumption in a transferable utility context. Individuals start by choosing their investments in education anticipating returns in the marriage market and the labor market. They then match on the basis of the economic value of marriage and preferences. Equilibrium in the marriage market determines intrahousehold allocation of resources. Following marriage househ…
Economics of the Family
The family is a complex decision unit in which partners with potentially different objectives make consumption, work and fertility decisions. Couples marry and divorce partly based on their ability to coordinate these activities, which in turn depends on how well they are matched. This book provides a comprehensive, modern and self-contained account of the research in the growing area of family economics. The first half of the book develops sever…
Intrahousehold Inequality
Studies of inequality often ignore resource allocation within the household. In doing so they miss an important element of the distribution of welfare that can vary dramatically depending on overall environmental and economic factors. Thus, measures of inequality that ignore intra household allocations are both incomplete and misleading. We discuss determinants of intrahousehold allocation of resources and welfare. We show how the sharing rule, w…
Modèles d'appariement en économie: Quelques avancées récentes
Si les modèles d’appariement sont utilisés en économie depuis plus d’un demi-siècle, ils suscitent depuis quelques années un renouveau d’intérêt. Cet article se propose tout d’abord de présenter quelques-uns de ces développements récents, en restreignant notre attention aux modèles à utilité transférable. En second lieu, nous montrons que la principale limitation de ces modèles – l’indépendance entre la décision collective et les rapports de forc…
Fatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeconomic Matching on the Marriage Market
We construct a marriage market model of matching along multiple dimensions, some of which are unobservable, in which individual preferences can be summarized by a one-dimensional index combining the various characteristics. We show that, under testable assumptions, these indices are ordinally identified and that the male and female trade-offs between their partners' characteristics are overidentified. Using PSID data onmarried couples, we recover…
Comment on "Excessive Ambitions" (by Jon Elster)
This paper is a comment on Excessive Ambitions by Jon Elster which can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2209382.
Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market
We present a model in which investment in schooling generates two kinds of returns: the labor-market return, resulting from higher wages, and a marriage-market return, defined as the impact of schooling on the marital surplus share one can extract. Men and women may have different incentives to invest in schooling because of different market wages or household roles. This asymmetry can yield a mixed equilibrium with some educated individuals marr…
Efficient Intra-Household Allocations and Distribution Factors: Implications and Identification
This paper provides an exhaustive characterization of testability and identifiability issues in the collective framework in the absence of price variation; it thus provides a theoretical underpinning for a number of empirical works that have been developed recently. We first provide a simple and general test of the Pareto-efficiency hypothesis, which is consistent with all possible assumptions on the private or public nature of goods, all possibl…
Introducing Household Production in Collective Models of Labor Supply
Préférences et interactions: Une Mise en Perspective
Chiappori Pierre-André, Orfali Kristina. Préférences et interactions : une mise en perspective. In: Revue française de sociologie, 1997, 38-3. Sociologie et économie. Textes réunis et présentés par Pierre-Michel Menger, sous la direction de Pierre-Michel Menger. pp. 429-464
Unitary Versus Collective Models of the Household: Is It Time to Shift the Burden of Proof
Most development objectives focus on the well-being of individuals. Policies are targeted to increase the percentage of individuals who avoid poverty, who can read, who are free from hunger and illness, or who can find gainful employment. Individual welfare, however, is based in large part on a complex set of interactions among family members. Until recently most policy analyses implicitly viewed the household as having only one set of preference…
Spatial competition in the banking system: Localization, cross subsidies and the regulation of deposit rates
Income and Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation
There is evidence that one cannot treat many-person households as a single decisionmaker. If so, then factors such as the relative incomes of the household members may affect the final allocation decisions made by the household. The authors develop a method of identifying how incomes affect outcomes given conventional family expenditure data. They assume that household decision processes lead to efficient outcomes. The authors apply their method …
Collective models of household behavior
Collective Labor Supply and Welfare
This paper develops a general, "collective" model of household labor supply in which agents are characterized by their own (possibly altruistic) preferences and household decisions are only assumed to be Pareto efficient. An alternative interpretation is that there are two stages in the internal decision process: agents first share nonlabor income, according to some given sharing rule; then each one optimally chooses his or her own labor supply a…
La théorie du consommateur est-elle réfutable
Chiappori Pierre-André. La théorie du consommateur est-elle réfutable ?. In: Revue économique, volume 41, n°6, 1990. pp. 1001-1026
Rational Household Labor Supply
In this paper, household is modeled as a two-member collectivity taking Pareto-efficient decisions. The consequences of this assumption are analyze d in a three-good model, in which only total consumption and each mem ber's labor supply are observable. If the agents are assumed egoistic (i.e., they are only concerned with their own leisure and consumptio n), it is possible to derive falsifiable conditions upon household la bor supplies from both …
Un modèle de politique monétaire avec aléas stratégiques
[eng] A model of monetary policy with strategical uncertainty Pierre-André Chiappori., Philippe Mongin In the carrent Rational Expectations literature, monetary growth is part of the uncertainly facing the agent, which is thought of as probabilistic in character ; therefore, monetary growth is described by an exogenous random variable. The first aim of this paper is to criticize this apparently inoccuous assumption. It is shown that it does not s…
Sélection naturelle et rationalité absolue des entreprises
Chiappori Pierre-André. Sélection naturelle et rationalité absolue des entreprises. In: Revue économique, volume 35, n°1, 1984. pp. 87-108
Collective Labor Supply and Welfare
This paper develops a general, "collective" model of household labor supply in which agents are characterized by their own (possibly altruistic) preferences and household decisions are only assumed to be Pareto efficient. An alternative interpretation is that there are two stages in the internal decision process: agents first share nonlabor income, according to some given sharing rule; then each one optimally chooses his or her own labor supply a…
Income and Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation
There is evidence that one cannot treat many-person households as a single decisionmaker. If so, then factors such as the relative incomes of the household members may affect the final allocation decisions made by the household. The authors develop a method of identifying how incomes affect outcomes given conventional family expenditure data. They assume that household decision processes lead to efficient outcomes. The authors apply their method …
Introducing Household Production in Collective Models of Labor Supply
Fatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeconomic Matching on the Marriage Market
We construct a marriage market model of matching along multiple dimensions, some of which are unobservable, in which individual preferences can be summarized by a one-dimensional index combining the various characteristics. We show that, under testable assumptions, these indices are ordinally identified and that the male and female trade-offs between their partners' characteristics are overidentified. Using PSID data onmarried couples, we recover…
The Marriage Market, Labor Supply, and Education Choice
We develop an equilibrium life cycle model of education, marriage, labor supply, and consumption in a transferable utility context. Individuals start by choosing their investments in education anticipating returns in the marriage market and the labor market. They then match on the basis of the economic value of marriage and preferences. Equilibrium in the marriage market determines intrahousehold allocation of resources. Following marriage househ…
Préférences et interactions: Une Mise en Perspective
Chiappori Pierre-André, Orfali Kristina. Préférences et interactions : une mise en perspective. In: Revue française de sociologie, 1997, 38-3. Sociologie et économie. Textes réunis et présentés par Pierre-Michel Menger, sous la direction de Pierre-Michel Menger. pp. 429-464
The Engel Curves of Non-Cooperative Households
We provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a system of Engel curves to have been generated by a non-cooperative model of family behaviour. These conditions fully characterise the local behaviour of household-level consumption in the cross-section, i.e., as a function of total income and distribution factors. In this setting, any demand system compatible with a non-cooperative model is also compatible with a collective model, but …
Sélection naturelle et rationalité absolue des entreprises
Chiappori Pierre-André. Sélection naturelle et rationalité absolue des entreprises. In: Revue économique, volume 35, n°1, 1984. pp. 87-108
Un modèle de politique monétaire avec aléas stratégiques
[eng] A model of monetary policy with strategical uncertainty Pierre-André Chiappori., Philippe Mongin In the carrent Rational Expectations literature, monetary growth is part of the uncertainly facing the agent, which is thought of as probabilistic in character ; therefore, monetary growth is described by an exogenous random variable. The first aim of this paper is to criticize this apparently inoccuous assumption. It is shown that it does not s…
Sélection naturelle et rationalité absolue des entreprises
Chiappori Pierre-André. Sélection naturelle et rationalité absolue des entreprises. In: Revue économique, volume 35, n°1, 1984. pp. 87-108
Rational Household Labor Supply
In this paper, household is modeled as a two-member collectivity taking Pareto-efficient decisions. The consequences of this assumption are analyze d in a three-good model, in which only total consumption and each mem ber's labor supply are observable. If the agents are assumed egoistic (i.e., they are only concerned with their own leisure and consumptio n), it is possible to derive falsifiable conditions upon household la bor supplies from both …
La théorie du consommateur est-elle réfutable
Chiappori Pierre-André. La théorie du consommateur est-elle réfutable ?. In: Revue économique, volume 41, n°6, 1990. pp. 1001-1026
Collective models of household behavior
Collective Labor Supply and Welfare
This paper develops a general, "collective" model of household labor supply in which agents are characterized by their own (possibly altruistic) preferences and household decisions are only assumed to be Pareto efficient. An alternative interpretation is that there are two stages in the internal decision process: agents first share nonlabor income, according to some given sharing rule; then each one optimally chooses his or her own labor supply a…
Income and Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation
There is evidence that one cannot treat many-person households as a single decisionmaker. If so, then factors such as the relative incomes of the household members may affect the final allocation decisions made by the household. The authors develop a method of identifying how incomes affect outcomes given conventional family expenditure data. They assume that household decision processes lead to efficient outcomes. The authors apply their method …
Unitary Versus Collective Models of the Household: Is It Time to Shift the Burden of Proof
Most development objectives focus on the well-being of individuals. Policies are targeted to increase the percentage of individuals who avoid poverty, who can read, who are free from hunger and illness, or who can find gainful employment. Individual welfare, however, is based in large part on a complex set of interactions among family members. Until recently most policy analyses implicitly viewed the household as having only one set of preference…
Spatial competition in the banking system: Localization, cross subsidies and the regulation of deposit rates
Introducing Household Production in Collective Models of Labor Supply
Préférences et interactions: Une Mise en Perspective
Chiappori Pierre-André, Orfali Kristina. Préférences et interactions : une mise en perspective. In: Revue française de sociologie, 1997, 38-3. Sociologie et économie. Textes réunis et présentés par Pierre-Michel Menger, sous la direction de Pierre-Michel Menger. pp. 429-464
Comment on "Excessive Ambitions" (by Jon Elster)
This paper is a comment on Excessive Ambitions by Jon Elster which can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2209382.
Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market
We present a model in which investment in schooling generates two kinds of returns: the labor-market return, resulting from higher wages, and a marriage-market return, defined as the impact of schooling on the marital surplus share one can extract. Men and women may have different incentives to invest in schooling because of different market wages or household roles. This asymmetry can yield a mixed equilibrium with some educated individuals marr…
Efficient Intra-Household Allocations and Distribution Factors: Implications and Identification
This paper provides an exhaustive characterization of testability and identifiability issues in the collective framework in the absence of price variation; it thus provides a theoretical underpinning for a number of empirical works that have been developed recently. We first provide a simple and general test of the Pareto-efficiency hypothesis, which is consistent with all possible assumptions on the private or public nature of goods, all possibl…
Modèles d'appariement en économie: Quelques avancées récentes
Si les modèles d’appariement sont utilisés en économie depuis plus d’un demi-siècle, ils suscitent depuis quelques années un renouveau d’intérêt. Cet article se propose tout d’abord de présenter quelques-uns de ces développements récents, en restreignant notre attention aux modèles à utilité transférable. En second lieu, nous montrons que la principale limitation de ces modèles – l’indépendance entre la décision collective et les rapports de forc…
Fatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeconomic Matching on the Marriage Market
We construct a marriage market model of matching along multiple dimensions, some of which are unobservable, in which individual preferences can be summarized by a one-dimensional index combining the various characteristics. We show that, under testable assumptions, these indices are ordinally identified and that the male and female trade-offs between their partners' characteristics are overidentified. Using PSID data onmarried couples, we recover…
Economics of the Family
The family is a complex decision unit in which partners with potentially different objectives make consumption, work and fertility decisions. Couples marry and divorce partly based on their ability to coordinate these activities, which in turn depends on how well they are matched. This book provides a comprehensive, modern and self-contained account of the research in the growing area of family economics. The first half of the book develops sever…
Intrahousehold Inequality
Studies of inequality often ignore resource allocation within the household. In doing so they miss an important element of the distribution of welfare that can vary dramatically depending on overall environmental and economic factors. Thus, measures of inequality that ignore intra household allocations are both incomplete and misleading. We discuss determinants of intrahousehold allocation of resources and welfare. We show how the sharing rule, w…
The Marriage Market, Labor Supply, and Education Choice
We develop an equilibrium life cycle model of education, marriage, labor supply, and consumption in a transferable utility context. Individuals start by choosing their investments in education anticipating returns in the marriage market and the labor market. They then match on the basis of the economic value of marriage and preferences. Equilibrium in the marriage market determines intrahousehold allocation of resources. Following marriage househ…
The Engel Curves of Non-Cooperative Households
We provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a system of Engel curves to have been generated by a non-cooperative model of family behaviour. These conditions fully characterise the local behaviour of household-level consumption in the cross-section, i.e., as a function of total income and distribution factors. In this setting, any demand system compatible with a non-cooperative model is also compatible with a collective model, but …
Le pouvoir dans la famille
Le capital familial
Commitment and the Dynamics of Household Labour Supply
The extent to which individuals commit to their partner for life has important implications. This paper develops a life-cycle collective model of the household, through which it characterises behaviour in three prominent alternative types of commitment: full, limited and no commitment. We propose a test that distinguishes between all three types based on how contemporaneous and historical news affect household behaviour. Our test permits heteroge…
Changes in Marital Sorting: Theory and Evidence from the United States
Feed the children
To understand the household decision-making process regarding food expenditures for children in poor households in Nairobi, we conduct an experiment with 424 married and monogamous couples. In the experiment, the spouses (individually and jointly) allocate money between themselves and nutritious meals for one of their children. We propose a novel and simple test to distinguish between cooperative/collective and non-cooperative decision behaviour.…
Economics (16 works) · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics (15 works) · Microeconomics (10 works) · Computer Science (9 works) · Labour economics (8 works) · Mathematics (8 works) · Economic theories and models (7 works) · Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis (7 works) · Econometrics (6 works) · Political science (6 works)