Philipp Genschel
Biographic Data
| ID | 303306 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Philipp Genschel |
| GIVEN NAMES | Philipp |
| FAMILY NAME | Genschel |
| SIGNATURE | GENSCHEL P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Constructor University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0317-6859 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 43 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 955 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 39 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 4 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 16 |
The politics of international solidarity
Appeals to solidarity are common in international relations, but solidarity is rarely addressed in International Relations research. In this paper, we theorize the concept, propose a strategy of operationalization and map empirical manifestations in a most likely case: natural disasters. Solidarity refers to mutual moral and material support in times of need. It arises when adversity befalls an innocent victim, prompting expressions of compassion…
Capacity‐Building and the New Intergovernmentalism
Conclusion – external threat and internal divisions: How the war in Ukraine shapes mass politics in the EU
I review this Special Section in three steps. First, I summarize the theoretical framework, contrasting bellicist and polity-maintenance perspectives on how outside threats such as the war in Ukraine affect the mass politics of EU integration. Second, I report findings about public attitudes and party positions on the war and the EU's reactions to it. The articles show a broad permissive consensus on more policy integration, and a modest ‘Europea…
The climate crisis, policy distraction and support for fuel taxation
The climate crisis looms but support for fuel taxation is low. How to boost support? The obvious way is to make the connection to the climate crisis explicit. Many observers fear, however, that policy myopia renders this strategy ineffective: As the consequences of the climate crisis are long‐term and insecure, people are loath to pay for costly countermeasures in the short term. We look at policy distraction as a second potential drag. We argue …
Monetary‐Fiscal Interactions and the Problem of Outdated Commitments: Eurozone Crisis Versus Covid‐19
Post-crisis accounts of economic governance in Europe have often analysed the monetary policy decisions of the supranational European Central Bank and the fiscal policy coordination of the intergovernmental Council and Eurogroup separately. This is unfortunate since both policy fields are closely linked and increasingly interdependent. We put forward a theory of monetary-fiscal interactions in the Economic and Monetary Union based on the notion o…
Revenue, Redistribution, and the Rise and Fall of Inheritance Taxation
Why do countries repeal the inheritance tax? To investigate this question, we use a novel dataset on inheritance tax introductions and repeals worldwide. We argue that revenue requirements are the main determinant of repeal risks: The inheritance tax is resilient as long as it is central to the national revenue system; it becomes vulnerable to attacks once the rise of more efficient tax instruments marginalizes its revenue contribution. Devoid of…
War and integration. The Russian attack on Ukraine and the institutional development of the EU
Published online: 02 May 2023
The security state in Europe: Regulatory or Positive
We challenge Kruck and Weiss' argument about the regulatory security state on two counts. First, we contest the notion that the regulatory state is a viable alternative to the positive security state. While regulation and epistemic authority are increasingly important means of security provision, they remain critically dependent power resources and political authority that only the positive state provides. The regulatory security state is premise…
Differentiated integration as symbolic politics? Constitutional differentiation and policy reintegration in core state powers
What are the policy consequences of constitutional differentiation in core state powers? We argue that the most important consequence is not necessarily the exclusion of the constitutional outs from the policies of the ins, but their reintegration by different means. The outs often have strong functional and political incentives to re-join the policies they opted out from, and the ins have good reasons to help them back in. We develop a theoretic…
Bellicist integration? The war in Ukraine, the European Union and core state powers
Published online: 04 November 2022
War, political development, and European integration: A debate on Kelemen and McNamara's ‘State-building and the European Union
Beyond opportunism: Intermediary loyalty in regulation and governance
Regulators and other governors rely on intermediaries to set and implement policies and to regulate targets. Existing literatures focus heavily on intermediaries of a single type – Opportunists, motivated solely by self‐interest. But intermediaries can also be motivated by different types of loyalty: to leaders (Vassals), to policies (Zealots), or to institutions (Mandarins). While all three types of loyalists are resistant to the traditional pro…
Postfunctionalism reversed: Solidarity and rebordering during the Covid-19 pandemic
Published online: 11 February 2021
The Governor's Dilemma: Indirect Governance Beyond Principals and Agents
The Governor’s Dilemma develops a general theory of indirect governance based on the tradeoff between governor control and intermediary competence; the empirical chapters apply that theory to a diverse range of cases encompassing both international relations and comparative politics. The theoretical framework paper starts from the observation that virtually all governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. But governors in indirect …
Governor's Dilemma: Indirect Governance Beyond Principals and Agents
The Governor's Dilemma develops a general theory of indirect governance based on the tradeoff between governor control and intermediary competence; the empirical chapters apply that theory to a diverse range of cases encompassing both nternational relations and comparative politics. The theoretical framework paper starts from the observation that virtually all governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. But governors in indirect g…
Competence–Control Theory: The Challenge of Governing through Intermediaries
Virtually all governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Governors prefer both to engage intermediaries that are competent and to control intermediary behavior. But governors face a pervasive tradeoff between competence and control. Competent intermediaries are difficult to control, even with complete information, because their capacity to advance or threaten the governor’s policy goals gives them power over it. At the same time,…
Competence versus control: The governor's dilemma
Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal–agent theory views indirect governance primarily as a problem of information: the agent has an informational advantage over the principal, which it can exploit to evade principal control. But indirect governance creates a more fundamental problem of power. Competent intermediaries with needed expertise, credibility, legitimacy, and/or operational capacity are inherently di…
Juncker's Curse? Identity, Interest, and Public Support for the Integration of Core State Powers
In this study we analysed the patterns and covariates of public support for the European integration of core state powers based on an original new survey. We found considerable variation across integration instruments, member states and policy issues. Horizontal transfers are supported more than vertical capacity building; member states from the EU's South‐East are more supportive than states from the North‐West; and support increases from debt r…
From Market Integration to Core State Powers: The Eurozone Crisis, the Refugee Crisis and Integration Theory
The Eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis are showcases of the problems associated with the EU's shift from market integration to the integration of core state powers. The integration of core state powers responds to similar demand factors as market integration (interdependence, externalities and spillover) but its supply is more tightly constrained by a high propensity for zero‐sum conflict, a functional requirement for centralized fiscal, coer…
Dictators don't compete: Autocracy, democracy, and tax competition
It pays to be a tax haven. Ireland has become rich that way. Why do not all countries cut their capital taxes to get wealthy? One reason is structural. As the standard model of tax competition explains, small countries gain from competitive tax cuts while large countries suffer. Yet not all small (large) countries have low (high) capital taxes. Why? The reason, we argue, is political. While the standard model assumes governments to be democratic,…
Did they learn to tax? Taxation trends outside the OECD
We map trends of tax policy change in developing countries and transition economies since the 1980s, compare them to tax trends in the advanced Western democracies and review some of the explanations offered by the contributions to this volume. We find that non-Western countries follow the lead of Western countries in some important respects but not in others. While non-Western countries brought their general revenues closer to Western levels and…
More integration, less federation: The European integration of core state powers
First published online: 18 Jun 2015
Happy taxation: Increasing Tax Compliance Through Positive Rewards
Can governments increase tax compliance by rewarding honest taxpayers? We conducted a controlled laboratory experiment comparing tax compliance under a “deterrence” baseline with tax compliance under two “reward” treatments: a “donation” treatment giving taxpayers a say in the spending purposes of their payments and a “lucky” treatment giving taxpayers the (highly unlikely) chance of winning a lottery. The reward treatments significantly affected…
Two Logics of Indirect Governance: Delegation and Orchestration
This article introduces the concept of orchestration as the mobilization of an intermediary by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal. Orchestrator-Intermediary theory then provides a model of indirect governance that supplements delegation models premised on principal-agent theory. Under both theories, governors enhance their governance capacity by drawing on the capabilities of third parties. Whereas delegati…
The Competition State
From Market Integration to Core State Powers: The Eurozone Crisis, the Refugee Crisis and Integration Theory
The Eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis are showcases of the problems associated with the EU's shift from market integration to the integration of core state powers. The integration of core state powers responds to similar demand factors as market integration (interdependence, externalities and spillover) but its supply is more tightly constrained by a high propensity for zero‐sum conflict, a functional requirement for centralized fiscal, coer…
More integration, less federation: The European integration of core state powers
First published online: 18 Jun 2015
Postfunctionalism reversed: Solidarity and rebordering during the Covid-19 pandemic
Published online: 11 February 2021
Two Logics of Indirect Governance: Delegation and Orchestration
This article introduces the concept of orchestration as the mobilization of an intermediary by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal. Orchestrator-Intermediary theory then provides a model of indirect governance that supplements delegation models premised on principal-agent theory. Under both theories, governors enhance their governance capacity by drawing on the capabilities of third parties. Whereas delegati…
Competence versus control: The governor's dilemma
Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal–agent theory views indirect governance primarily as a problem of information: the agent has an informational advantage over the principal, which it can exploit to evade principal control. But indirect governance creates a more fundamental problem of power. Competent intermediaries with needed expertise, credibility, legitimacy, and/or operational capacity are inherently di…
Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Welfare State
Does globalization undermine the fiscal basis of the welfare state? Some observers are not convinced. They claim that aggregate data on Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries show no drop in tax levels and conclude from this that tax competition is not a serious challenge for the welfare state. This conclusion is unwarranted. The article shows that tax competition systematically constrains national tax autonomy in a serio…
Regulatory competition and international co-operation
Recent research has shown that regulatory competition does not necessarily lead to downward pressures on regulation, but may at times also push the level of regulation upwards. Extending David Vogel's 'California effect' argument, this article shows that such upward pressure may not only result directly from the dynamics of the competitive process but also from international co-operation. Evidence from two case studies on international capital ma…
Globalization and the welfare state: A Retrospective
There are basically three stories about the globalization-welfare state nexus. The first story argues that globalization is the cause of the chronic crisis of the welfare state. As national economies open to the international market, governments are forced to adapt to the imperatives of global competition, and this means cutting cost-intensive welfare programmes (globalization theory). The second story argues that, whatever the cause of the welfa…
Bellicist integration? The war in Ukraine, the European Union and core state powers
Published online: 04 November 2022
War and integration. The Russian attack on Ukraine and the institutional development of the EU
Published online: 02 May 2023
Tax Competition in the European Union
Der Steuerwettbewerb stellt die internationale Kooperation vor ein Defektionsund ein Verteilungsproblem. Die Kooperation kann scheitern, weil Kooperationszusagen opportunistisch ausgebeutet werden oder weil Verteilungskonflikte verhindern, das es uberhaupt zu solchen Zusagen kommt. Die bisherige Literatur hat sich fast ausschlieslich auf das erste Problem konzentriert. Sie zeigt, das der Steuerwettbewerb die Struktur eines Gefangenendilemmas hat …
The Dynamics of Inertia: Institutional Persistence and Change in Telecommunications and Health Care
Important strands of the new institutionalism assume that the efficiency of institutions declines over time. Institutions, according to this view, are more stable than their environment, which supposedly results in an ever increasing misfit. This misfit, it is hypothesized, can only be corrected by the creative destruction of the institutions. The article takes issue with this view. Using case studies from the international telecommunications reg…
Taxation and democracy in the EU
Is corporate tax competition a threat to democracy in the European Union (EU)? The answer depends crucially on a positive analysis of the effects of tax competition on national policy autonomy. Most analyses focus on direct effects on corporate tax rates and revenues. We contend that this focus is too narrow. It overlooks the fact that corporate tax competition also has important indirect effects on the progressivity and revenue-raising potential…
Juncker's Curse? Identity, Interest, and Public Support for the Integration of Core State Powers
In this study we analysed the patterns and covariates of public support for the European integration of core state powers based on an original new survey. We found considerable variation across integration instruments, member states and policy issues. Horizontal transfers are supported more than vertical capacity building; member states from the EU's South‐East are more supportive than states from the North‐West; and support increases from debt r…
Accelerating Downhill: How the EU Shapes Corporate Tax Competition in the Single Market
Tax competition in the European Union is shaped by four partly opposed institutional mechanisms. While market integration and enlargement increase competitive pressure, the tax co-ordination of the Council of Ministers and the tax jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice could potentially reduce it. The net effect is to accelerate tax competition. This article presents quantitative evidence to suggest that tax competition is stronger in the…
How the European Union constrains the state: Multilevel governance of taxation
This article challenges the common assumption that the European Union (EU) has little power over taxation. Based on a comprehensive analysis of EU tax legislation and European Court of Justice (ECJ) tax jurisprudence from 1958 to 2007, the article shows that the EU exerts considerable regulatory control over the Member States' taxing power and imposes tighter constraints on Member State taxes than the American federal government imposes on Americ…
State Transformations in OECD Countries
Is the state still the basic unit of political authority in OECD countries? International relations scholars discuss whether international institutions undermine or buttress state authority. Students of comparative political economy argue about the extent to which political authority has migrated to private market actors. We inventory and compare the main arguments in both debates. Our findings suggest a different pattern of state transformation …
Happy taxation: Increasing Tax Compliance Through Positive Rewards
Can governments increase tax compliance by rewarding honest taxpayers? We conducted a controlled laboratory experiment comparing tax compliance under a “deterrence” baseline with tax compliance under two “reward” treatments: a “donation” treatment giving taxpayers a say in the spending purposes of their payments and a “lucky” treatment giving taxpayers the (highly unlikely) chance of winning a lottery. The reward treatments significantly affected…
Did they learn to tax? Taxation trends outside the OECD
We map trends of tax policy change in developing countries and transition economies since the 1980s, compare them to tax trends in the advanced Western democracies and review some of the explanations offered by the contributions to this volume. We find that non-Western countries follow the lead of Western countries in some important respects but not in others. While non-Western countries brought their general revenues closer to Western levels and…
War, political development, and European integration: A debate on Kelemen and McNamara's ‘State-building and the European Union
Dictators don't compete: Autocracy, democracy, and tax competition
It pays to be a tax haven. Ireland has become rich that way. Why do not all countries cut their capital taxes to get wealthy? One reason is structural. As the standard model of tax competition explains, small countries gain from competitive tax cuts while large countries suffer. Yet not all small (large) countries have low (high) capital taxes. Why? The reason, we argue, is political. While the standard model assumes governments to be democratic,…
Differentiated integration as symbolic politics? Constitutional differentiation and policy reintegration in core state powers
What are the policy consequences of constitutional differentiation in core state powers? We argue that the most important consequence is not necessarily the exclusion of the constitutional outs from the policies of the ins, but their reintegration by different means. The outs often have strong functional and political incentives to re-join the policies they opted out from, and the ins have good reasons to help them back in. We develop a theoretic…
Beyond opportunism: Intermediary loyalty in regulation and governance
Regulators and other governors rely on intermediaries to set and implement policies and to regulate targets. Existing literatures focus heavily on intermediaries of a single type – Opportunists, motivated solely by self‐interest. But intermediaries can also be motivated by different types of loyalty: to leaders (Vassals), to policies (Zealots), or to institutions (Mandarins). While all three types of loyalists are resistant to the traditional pro…
From National Hierarchies to International Standardization: Modal Changes in the Governance of Telecommunications
The emergence of large technical systems like railroads, telecommunication networks or power grids was closely associated with hierarchical governance. Despite the success of hierarchical structures in promoting the development of these systems they have recently come under strain. They are suspected of being too slow, too cumbersome, and too unimaginative to deal with the complexity and turbulence of modern technology. Practical people as well a…
The security state in Europe: Regulatory or Positive
We challenge Kruck and Weiss' argument about the regulatory security state on two counts. First, we contest the notion that the regulatory state is a viable alternative to the positive security state. While regulation and epistemic authority are increasingly important means of security provision, they remain critically dependent power resources and political authority that only the positive state provides. The regulatory security state is premise…
From National Hierarchies to International Standardization: Modal Changes in the Governance of Telecommunications
The emergence of large technical systems like railroads, telecommunication networks or power grids was closely associated with hierarchical governance. Despite the success of hierarchical structures in promoting the development of these systems they have recently come under strain. They are suspected of being too slow, too cumbersome, and too unimaginative to deal with the complexity and turbulence of modern technology. Practical people as well a…
Regulatory competition and international co-operation
Recent research has shown that regulatory competition does not necessarily lead to downward pressures on regulation, but may at times also push the level of regulation upwards. Extending David Vogel's 'California effect' argument, this article shows that such upward pressure may not only result directly from the dynamics of the competitive process but also from international co-operation. Evidence from two case studies on international capital ma…
The Dynamics of Inertia: Institutional Persistence and Change in Telecommunications and Health Care
Important strands of the new institutionalism assume that the efficiency of institutions declines over time. Institutions, according to this view, are more stable than their environment, which supposedly results in an ever increasing misfit. This misfit, it is hypothesized, can only be corrected by the creative destruction of the institutions. The article takes issue with this view. Using case studies from the international telecommunications reg…
Tax Competition in the European Union
Der Steuerwettbewerb stellt die internationale Kooperation vor ein Defektionsund ein Verteilungsproblem. Die Kooperation kann scheitern, weil Kooperationszusagen opportunistisch ausgebeutet werden oder weil Verteilungskonflikte verhindern, das es uberhaupt zu solchen Zusagen kommt. Die bisherige Literatur hat sich fast ausschlieslich auf das erste Problem konzentriert. Sie zeigt, das der Steuerwettbewerb die Struktur eines Gefangenendilemmas hat …
Der Wohlfahrtsstaat im Steuerwettbewerb
Does globalization undermine the fiscal basis of the welfare state? The conventional wisdom believes so: open borders invite tax competition, which in turn erodes the revenues from capital taxation. However, there is little evidence to support this view. The data show that revenues from capital taxation are fairly stable in OECD countries. Some observers conclude that globalization is not much of a challenge to the welfare state. In this paper, I…
Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Welfare State
Does globalization undermine the fiscal basis of the welfare state? Some observers are not convinced. They claim that aggregate data on Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries show no drop in tax levels and conclude from this that tax competition is not a serious challenge for the welfare state. This conclusion is unwarranted. The article shows that tax competition systematically constrains national tax autonomy in a serio…
Globalization as a problem, as a solution, and as a part of the landscape
There are basically three stories about the globalization– welfare state nexus. The first story argues that globalization is the cause of the chronic crisis of the welfare state. The second maintains that whatever the cause of the welfare state crisis, globalization is not part of it. The third story holds that globalization, far from causing the welfare state’s troubles, is a consequence of these troubles and part of their solution. The paper re…
Globalization and the welfare state: A Retrospective
There are basically three stories about the globalization-welfare state nexus. The first story argues that globalization is the cause of the chronic crisis of the welfare state. As national economies open to the international market, governments are forced to adapt to the imperatives of global competition, and this means cutting cost-intensive welfare programmes (globalization theory). The second story argues that, whatever the cause of the welfa…
Why no mutual recognition of VAT? Regulation, taxation and the integration of the EU's internal market for goods
Why does the principle of mutual recognition apply to product regulation but not to product taxation, i.e. to value added tax (VAT)? It is not for lack of trying. The Commission called for mutual recognition of VAT long before the European Court of Justice ‘invented’ it for product regulation, and the thrust of much of the EU's VAT policy was to implement this principle. I argue that three factors explain the failure of this policy and the compar…
Taxation and democracy in the EU
Is corporate tax competition a threat to democracy in the European Union (EU)? The answer depends crucially on a positive analysis of the effects of tax competition on national policy autonomy. Most analyses focus on direct effects on corporate tax rates and revenues. We contend that this focus is too narrow. It overlooks the fact that corporate tax competition also has important indirect effects on the progressivity and revenue-raising potential…
Tax competition: A literature review
This article reviews the social science literature on tax competition in three steps. The first step is to look at the baseline model of tax competition on which most of the literature implicitly or explicitly builds. The key feature is that governments in a context of open borders will engage in wasteful competition for mobile economic assets and activities through tax reductions. The second step is to focus more closely on tax-induced cross-bor…
How the European Union constrains the state: Multilevel governance of taxation
This article challenges the common assumption that the European Union (EU) has little power over taxation. Based on a comprehensive analysis of EU tax legislation and European Court of Justice (ECJ) tax jurisprudence from 1958 to 2007, the article shows that the EU exerts considerable regulatory control over the Member States' taxing power and imposes tighter constraints on Member State taxes than the American federal government imposes on Americ…
Accelerating Downhill: How the EU Shapes Corporate Tax Competition in the Single Market
Tax competition in the European Union is shaped by four partly opposed institutional mechanisms. While market integration and enlargement increase competitive pressure, the tax co-ordination of the Council of Ministers and the tax jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice could potentially reduce it. The net effect is to accelerate tax competition. This article presents quantitative evidence to suggest that tax competition is stronger in the…
L'État et l'exercice de l'autorité politique Dénationalisation et administration
Cet article, à visée essentiellement analytique, a été écrit en s'appuyant sur les travaux empiriques et théoriques développés dans le cadre du programme TranState (voir l'introduction du numéro). Reprenant les principales tendances passées de la nationalisation de l'autorité politique, il met en évidence les dynamiques de dénationalisation de l'autorité politique, qui se trouve de nouveau partiellement assumée par des institutions non étatiques …
Beyond the Regulatory Polity?: The European Integration of Core State Powers
Most EU-scholars conceive of the EU as a multilevel polity with strong powers to regulate economic policy externalities among the member states but little power to intervene in, let alone assume, core functions of sovereign government ('core state powers') such as foreign and defense policy, public finance, public administration, and the maintenance of law and order. This book challenges this view. Based on a systematic comparison of integration …
Beyond the Regulatory Polity
State Transformations in OECD Countries
Is the state still the basic unit of political authority in OECD countries? International relations scholars discuss whether international institutions undermine or buttress state authority. Students of comparative political economy argue about the extent to which political authority has migrated to private market actors. We inventory and compare the main arguments in both debates. Our findings suggest a different pattern of state transformation …
The Competition State
International Organizations as Orchestrators
International Organizations as Orchestrators reveals how IOs leverage their limited authority and resources to increase their effectiveness, power, and autonomy from states. By 'orchestrating' intermediaries – including NGOs – IOs can shape and steer global governance without engaging in hard, direct regulation. This volume is organized around a theoretical model that emphasizes voluntary collaboration and support. An outstanding group of scholar…
Dictators don't compete: Autocracy, democracy, and tax competition
It pays to be a tax haven. Ireland has become rich that way. Why do not all countries cut their capital taxes to get wealthy? One reason is structural. As the standard model of tax competition explains, small countries gain from competitive tax cuts while large countries suffer. Yet not all small (large) countries have low (high) capital taxes. Why? The reason, we argue, is political. While the standard model assumes governments to be democratic,…
Did they learn to tax? Taxation trends outside the OECD
We map trends of tax policy change in developing countries and transition economies since the 1980s, compare them to tax trends in the advanced Western democracies and review some of the explanations offered by the contributions to this volume. We find that non-Western countries follow the lead of Western countries in some important respects but not in others. While non-Western countries brought their general revenues closer to Western levels and…
More integration, less federation: The European integration of core state powers
First published online: 18 Jun 2015
Happy taxation: Increasing Tax Compliance Through Positive Rewards
Can governments increase tax compliance by rewarding honest taxpayers? We conducted a controlled laboratory experiment comparing tax compliance under a “deterrence” baseline with tax compliance under two “reward” treatments: a “donation” treatment giving taxpayers a say in the spending purposes of their payments and a “lucky” treatment giving taxpayers the (highly unlikely) chance of winning a lottery. The reward treatments significantly affected…
Two Logics of Indirect Governance: Delegation and Orchestration
This article introduces the concept of orchestration as the mobilization of an intermediary by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal. Orchestrator-Intermediary theory then provides a model of indirect governance that supplements delegation models premised on principal-agent theory. Under both theories, governors enhance their governance capacity by drawing on the capabilities of third parties. Whereas delegati…
From Market Integration to Core State Powers: The Eurozone Crisis, the Refugee Crisis and Integration Theory
The Eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis are showcases of the problems associated with the EU's shift from market integration to the integration of core state powers. The integration of core state powers responds to similar demand factors as market integration (interdependence, externalities and spillover) but its supply is more tightly constrained by a high propensity for zero‐sum conflict, a functional requirement for centralized fiscal, coer…
Economics (31 works) · Political science (30 works) · Law (22 works) · Politics (21 works) · Law (19 works) · European Union Policy and Governance (15 works) · Political economy (13 works) · State (computer science (13 works) · Business (12 works) · European union (11 works)