Eitan Shamir
Biographic Data
| ID | 305690 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Eitan Shamir |
| GIVEN NAMES | Eitan |
| FAMILY NAME | Shamir |
| SIGNATURE | SHAMIR E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Bar-Ilan University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9645-8507 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 34 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 13 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Asymmetric war at sea
How leaders exercise emergent strategy? Lessons from Moshe Dayan
This paper to uncovers how leaders practice emergent strategy as a core strategic philosophy. The article uses the case of general and statesman Moshe Dayan as a principal case study to uncover leadership and management practices of emergent strategy. Following a discussion on the emergent versus deliberate strategy schools, I show why Moshe Dayan as a leader can be considered as an archetype of the emergent approach worth studying. I then presen…
Neither a Conscript Army nor an All-Volunteer Force
This article develops an analytical model of force composition that combines the advantages of conscription with those of an all-volunteer force. Using Israel as a hypothesis-generating case study, it argues that mandatory military service has undergone changes centered on five key organizing principles: selective conscription, early discharges, elongated lengths of service, forms of voluntary service and differing pay-scales, and other material …
Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War
The purpose of this paper is to reassess the widespread accepted criticism of Moshe Dayan’s functioning as defense minister towards and during the 5 Yom Kippur War. Now that most of the archival documents have been opened to public view, we can better assess his performance during the war. This reassessment changes the picture: Dayan did not collapse, and the professional opinions he expressed were generally sound when accounting for the informat…
Israel’s post-heroic wars
This article examines the role of American military influence on Israel’s transition to post-heroic warfare. The main factors identified in the existing literature that have been identified to explain Israel’s transition to post-heroic warfare had to do with the changes in Israel’s strategic environment, changes in society and development of new military technology. This article sheds light on an intervening factor that further enables and shapes…
The Rise of Special Operations Forces
The special operations forces (SOF) of the industrial democracies have suddenly and rapidly grown in numbers and resources during the past decades. Most explanations for this growth focus on factors external to the armed forces. We argue that the enlargement of SOF is also the result of internal organizational dynamics. First, we compare SOF to other units and military appendages that have grown over the past 30 years in order to delineate what i…
The rise and decline of ‘optional control’ in the IDF
Mission command is a command philosophy that denotes decentralized leadership; it is a philosophy of command that requires and facilitates initiative in all levels of command and encourages subordinates to exploit opportunities by empowering them to demonstrate initiative and exercise personal judgement. In its first decades of existence, military analysts portrayed the Israeli command system as such and termed it ‘optional control’. The primary …
The Case for Israeli Ground Forces
Past and planned reductions in ground-force units are imperilling the Israel Defense Forces’ ability to provide for Israel's security
What after counter-insurgency? Raiding in zones of turmoil
This article argues that the option of a military raid is becoming more relevant in the contemporary strategic environment. Two developments lead to this conclusion: the increase in the number of so-called failed states and subsequently ungoverned areas; and the western inadequate response in the attempts to create zones of stability with clear strategic addresses. The efforts for statebuilding in Iraq and Afghanistan have failed, and the US and …
Gaza 2014
While Hamas adopted a strategy of psychological exhaustion of Israel's civilians, Israel employed physical attrition of Hamas' military capabilities. This article examines how these strategies interacted with each other, assesses the strategic gains and losses on each side, and suggests some lessons relevant for American strategists
Mowing the Grass’
‘Mowing the Grass’, Israel’s strategy in the twenty-first century against hostile non-state groups, reflects the assumption that Israel finds itself in a protracted intractable conflict. The use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but a strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities. Only after showing much restraint in its military responses does Israel act forcefully t…
From Retaliation to Open Bridges
Moshe Dayan was Israel's most influential and original soldier. He shaped the Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF's) culture first as chief of staff in the 1956 campaign and later as defense minister during both the conventional wars of 1967 and 1973. However, before, between, and during these large conventional engagements, the IDF conducted ‘Current Security Operations,’ small military operations against Arab insurgency. After 1967, the IDF faced the …
The Long and Winding Road
The purpose of the current paper is to examine the adoption and adaptation process of mission command (Auftragstaktik) in the US Army. This concept, developed by the Prussians, denotes a decentralized command approach wherein superiors dictate their intent and allow subordinates to formulate their operational plans independently and change it according to the emerging situation. The paper examines the US command approach prior to the adoption of …
Mowing the Grass’
‘Mowing the Grass’, Israel’s strategy in the twenty-first century against hostile non-state groups, reflects the assumption that Israel finds itself in a protracted intractable conflict. The use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but a strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities. Only after showing much restraint in its military responses does Israel act forcefully t…
Neither a Conscript Army nor an All-Volunteer Force
This article develops an analytical model of force composition that combines the advantages of conscription with those of an all-volunteer force. Using Israel as a hypothesis-generating case study, it argues that mandatory military service has undergone changes centered on five key organizing principles: selective conscription, early discharges, elongated lengths of service, forms of voluntary service and differing pay-scales, and other material …
The Rise of Special Operations Forces
The special operations forces (SOF) of the industrial democracies have suddenly and rapidly grown in numbers and resources during the past decades. Most explanations for this growth focus on factors external to the armed forces. We argue that the enlargement of SOF is also the result of internal organizational dynamics. First, we compare SOF to other units and military appendages that have grown over the past 30 years in order to delineate what i…
The Long and Winding Road
The purpose of the current paper is to examine the adoption and adaptation process of mission command (Auftragstaktik) in the US Army. This concept, developed by the Prussians, denotes a decentralized command approach wherein superiors dictate their intent and allow subordinates to formulate their operational plans independently and change it according to the emerging situation. The paper examines the US command approach prior to the adoption of …
Israel’s post-heroic wars
This article examines the role of American military influence on Israel’s transition to post-heroic warfare. The main factors identified in the existing literature that have been identified to explain Israel’s transition to post-heroic warfare had to do with the changes in Israel’s strategic environment, changes in society and development of new military technology. This article sheds light on an intervening factor that further enables and shapes…
What after counter-insurgency? Raiding in zones of turmoil
This article argues that the option of a military raid is becoming more relevant in the contemporary strategic environment. Two developments lead to this conclusion: the increase in the number of so-called failed states and subsequently ungoverned areas; and the western inadequate response in the attempts to create zones of stability with clear strategic addresses. The efforts for statebuilding in Iraq and Afghanistan have failed, and the US and …
From Retaliation to Open Bridges
Moshe Dayan was Israel's most influential and original soldier. He shaped the Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF's) culture first as chief of staff in the 1956 campaign and later as defense minister during both the conventional wars of 1967 and 1973. However, before, between, and during these large conventional engagements, the IDF conducted ‘Current Security Operations,’ small military operations against Arab insurgency. After 1967, the IDF faced the …
The rise and decline of ‘optional control’ in the IDF
Mission command is a command philosophy that denotes decentralized leadership; it is a philosophy of command that requires and facilitates initiative in all levels of command and encourages subordinates to exploit opportunities by empowering them to demonstrate initiative and exercise personal judgement. In its first decades of existence, military analysts portrayed the Israeli command system as such and termed it ‘optional control’. The primary …
The Case for Israeli Ground Forces
Past and planned reductions in ground-force units are imperilling the Israel Defense Forces’ ability to provide for Israel's security
The Long and Winding Road
The purpose of the current paper is to examine the adoption and adaptation process of mission command (Auftragstaktik) in the US Army. This concept, developed by the Prussians, denotes a decentralized command approach wherein superiors dictate their intent and allow subordinates to formulate their operational plans independently and change it according to the emerging situation. The paper examines the US command approach prior to the adoption of …
From Retaliation to Open Bridges
Moshe Dayan was Israel's most influential and original soldier. He shaped the Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF's) culture first as chief of staff in the 1956 campaign and later as defense minister during both the conventional wars of 1967 and 1973. However, before, between, and during these large conventional engagements, the IDF conducted ‘Current Security Operations,’ small military operations against Arab insurgency. After 1967, the IDF faced the …
Gaza 2014
While Hamas adopted a strategy of psychological exhaustion of Israel's civilians, Israel employed physical attrition of Hamas' military capabilities. This article examines how these strategies interacted with each other, assesses the strategic gains and losses on each side, and suggests some lessons relevant for American strategists
Mowing the Grass’
‘Mowing the Grass’, Israel’s strategy in the twenty-first century against hostile non-state groups, reflects the assumption that Israel finds itself in a protracted intractable conflict. The use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but a strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities. Only after showing much restraint in its military responses does Israel act forcefully t…
The Case for Israeli Ground Forces
Past and planned reductions in ground-force units are imperilling the Israel Defense Forces’ ability to provide for Israel's security
What after counter-insurgency? Raiding in zones of turmoil
This article argues that the option of a military raid is becoming more relevant in the contemporary strategic environment. Two developments lead to this conclusion: the increase in the number of so-called failed states and subsequently ungoverned areas; and the western inadequate response in the attempts to create zones of stability with clear strategic addresses. The efforts for statebuilding in Iraq and Afghanistan have failed, and the US and …
The rise and decline of ‘optional control’ in the IDF
Mission command is a command philosophy that denotes decentralized leadership; it is a philosophy of command that requires and facilitates initiative in all levels of command and encourages subordinates to exploit opportunities by empowering them to demonstrate initiative and exercise personal judgement. In its first decades of existence, military analysts portrayed the Israeli command system as such and termed it ‘optional control’. The primary …
Israel’s post-heroic wars
This article examines the role of American military influence on Israel’s transition to post-heroic warfare. The main factors identified in the existing literature that have been identified to explain Israel’s transition to post-heroic warfare had to do with the changes in Israel’s strategic environment, changes in society and development of new military technology. This article sheds light on an intervening factor that further enables and shapes…
The Rise of Special Operations Forces
The special operations forces (SOF) of the industrial democracies have suddenly and rapidly grown in numbers and resources during the past decades. Most explanations for this growth focus on factors external to the armed forces. We argue that the enlargement of SOF is also the result of internal organizational dynamics. First, we compare SOF to other units and military appendages that have grown over the past 30 years in order to delineate what i…
Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War
The purpose of this paper is to reassess the widespread accepted criticism of Moshe Dayan’s functioning as defense minister towards and during the 5 Yom Kippur War. Now that most of the archival documents have been opened to public view, we can better assess his performance during the war. This reassessment changes the picture: Dayan did not collapse, and the professional opinions he expressed were generally sound when accounting for the informat…
How leaders exercise emergent strategy? Lessons from Moshe Dayan
This paper to uncovers how leaders practice emergent strategy as a core strategic philosophy. The article uses the case of general and statesman Moshe Dayan as a principal case study to uncover leadership and management practices of emergent strategy. Following a discussion on the emergent versus deliberate strategy schools, I show why Moshe Dayan as a leader can be considered as an archetype of the emergent approach worth studying. I then presen…
Neither a Conscript Army nor an All-Volunteer Force
This article develops an analytical model of force composition that combines the advantages of conscription with those of an all-volunteer force. Using Israel as a hypothesis-generating case study, it argues that mandatory military service has undergone changes centered on five key organizing principles: selective conscription, early discharges, elongated lengths of service, forms of voluntary service and differing pay-scales, and other material …
Asymmetric war at sea
Political science (12 works) · Law (10 works) · Law (7 works) · Jewish and Middle Eastern Studies (6 works) · Military History and Strategy (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Engineering (5 works) · Political economy (5 works) · Business (4 works)