Kil Joo Ban
Biographic Data
| ID | 3086495 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kil Joo Ban |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kil Joo |
| FAMILY NAME | Ban |
| SIGNATURE | BAN K J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Korea Maritime Institute |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1195-0664 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
An Invisible Strategy with Visible Gains
Gray zone strategy garners growing attention as China's indirect approach against the U.S., her great power competitor. Unlike the conventional wisdom, the gray zone mechanism is not new historically but rather has been widely at play in many areas in the international arena, particularly in Northeast Asia. South Korea has been under the gray zone offensive of China and North Korea. Typical examples are Beijing's THAAD retaliation and Pyongyang's…
Arms Control Dialogue or Gray Zone Talks? Pitfalls of the Discourses of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and Nuclear Arms Control
What makes the schemes to address Pyongyang's nuclear program so ineffective? Aside from conventional explanations, two gray zone discourses are at play. First, the gray zone discourse of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has been viable since 1991. Second, another gray zone discourse of nuclear arms control with North Korea has been gathering pace recently. Gray zone discourses blur the line between North Korea and the United States regar…
Lopsided Security on the Korean Peninsula
North Korea’s asymmetric provocations over the last decades can be classified into two periods: tactical provocations at sea in 1970–1990 and strategic (nuclear) provocations in 2000–2020. What is the logic underlying the North Korean imbroglio? And how does the former period differ from the latter? The first set of provocations was intended to shift the threat imbalance caused by a widening gap in conventional military capabilities into a balanc…
Just War and Just Battle
In March 2010, a North Korean submarine fired a torpedo against the South Korean ship Cheonan, which resulted in the deaths of 46 sailors. Is its surprise attack justified? The academic examination has rarely been made over whether North Korea’s use of military force is justified in this battle. As the just war theory to date has dealt mostly with major wars, it also can guide us to judge whether this limited warfare is just or not. The just war …
Two-Level Silence and Nuclearization of Small Powers
The North Korean nuclear issue serves as a failure of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the sense that Pyongyang has, at present, nearly achieved its program. Why do some states like North Korea succeed in nuclear armament, while others fail? Two-level silence at both intranational and international levels served as a sufficient condition for North Korea to become nuclear-armed. Under a brutal dictatorial regime, the domestic audience c…
The Clash of Security and Sovereignty in Quasi-Alliance
Which is needed more: sovereignty or security? The autonomy–security trade-off model sees this as a trade-off between a client and a patron. A client surrenders some measure of autonomy to a patron and, in turn, receives security. This paper explores whether the underlying logic is applicable to quasi-alliances between a state and a multinational regime, such as the United Nations Command ( UNC ). South Korea has maintained a quasi-alliance with …
The two-for-one entity and a ‘for whom’ puzzle
Does the US-led UNC (United Nations Command) have enough clout to misapply its original function, thereby making those assets available to hegemonic rivalry? Is this clout likely to be seen as equally important by all members? The UNC was established as an integrated warfighting organization during the Korean War and continues to this day as the peace driver on the Korean Peninsula. In the meantime, the UNC helps the US hegemony sustain the regio…
The power of cultural weapons in counterinsurgency
Cultural assets are equally important for COIN effectiveness. Despite the significant impact of culture on COIN outcomes, the extant literature pays too much attention only to strategic culture, not the inherent roles for culture to play. This paper examines what made South Korean COIN forces successful in Vietnam. First, they benefitted from cultural harmony driven by the shared belief in communalism culture, a common ground between both societi…
Making Neutrality Credibly Work
Maritime CBMs as Soft Deterrence in Northeast Asia
Sources of conflict exist in Northeast Asian waters, ranging from maritime territorial disputes, such as the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, to friction over maritime airspace within air defense identification zones (ADIZs), and in the great power competition between the United States and China. Sources of cooperation, such as anti‐piracy coordination, also exist in these waters. These two seas coexist despite their incompatible nature. How to guarante…
Jammed Allies
What drives alliances to tremble? Even longstanding alliances could be frustrated by the jamming mechanism by a gray actor. When an enemy pretends to take a friendlier posture, a state under alliances seems likely to regard its posture as a window of opportunity towards better relationship and wishfully permanent peace. Too much emphasis on this window prevents a state from recognizing how four characteristics of a gray actor – resourceful, ambig…
The ROK as a Middle Power
A power transition period in North Korea, following the hypothetical collapse of the regime of Kim Jong Il, is very likely to promote sudden insurgencies in a similar way as the Iraq and Afghanistan insurgencies. In such a scenario, how should the Republic of Korea's (ROK) counterinsurgency (COIN) forces deal with the inevitable mission ahead? Historically, the ROK's COIN forces achieved remarkable successes in Vietnam and Iraq, using “hard” and …
The Clash of David and Goliath at Sea
On October 12, 2000, the USSColewas attacked by a small band of Islamic (global) insurgents. Why would sea insurgents attack a professional warship that did not appear to be related to counterinsurgency? When are such attacks successful, and when are they not successful? Three dimensions—value, vulnerability, and learning—give convincing answers to this puzzle. I trace two cases: the USSColebombing and the USSAshlandandKearsargemissile attack. I …
Lopsided Security on the Korean Peninsula
North Korea’s asymmetric provocations over the last decades can be classified into two periods: tactical provocations at sea in 1970–1990 and strategic (nuclear) provocations in 2000–2020. What is the logic underlying the North Korean imbroglio? And how does the former period differ from the latter? The first set of provocations was intended to shift the threat imbalance caused by a widening gap in conventional military capabilities into a balanc…
The two-for-one entity and a ‘for whom’ puzzle
Does the US-led UNC (United Nations Command) have enough clout to misapply its original function, thereby making those assets available to hegemonic rivalry? Is this clout likely to be seen as equally important by all members? The UNC was established as an integrated warfighting organization during the Korean War and continues to this day as the peace driver on the Korean Peninsula. In the meantime, the UNC helps the US hegemony sustain the regio…
Jammed Allies
What drives alliances to tremble? Even longstanding alliances could be frustrated by the jamming mechanism by a gray actor. When an enemy pretends to take a friendlier posture, a state under alliances seems likely to regard its posture as a window of opportunity towards better relationship and wishfully permanent peace. Too much emphasis on this window prevents a state from recognizing how four characteristics of a gray actor – resourceful, ambig…
The Clash of David and Goliath at Sea
On October 12, 2000, the USSColewas attacked by a small band of Islamic (global) insurgents. Why would sea insurgents attack a professional warship that did not appear to be related to counterinsurgency? When are such attacks successful, and when are they not successful? Three dimensions—value, vulnerability, and learning—give convincing answers to this puzzle. I trace two cases: the USSColebombing and the USSAshlandandKearsargemissile attack. I …
The ROK as a Middle Power
A power transition period in North Korea, following the hypothetical collapse of the regime of Kim Jong Il, is very likely to promote sudden insurgencies in a similar way as the Iraq and Afghanistan insurgencies. In such a scenario, how should the Republic of Korea's (ROK) counterinsurgency (COIN) forces deal with the inevitable mission ahead? Historically, the ROK's COIN forces achieved remarkable successes in Vietnam and Iraq, using “hard” and …
Making Neutrality Credibly Work
Maritime CBMs as Soft Deterrence in Northeast Asia
Sources of conflict exist in Northeast Asian waters, ranging from maritime territorial disputes, such as the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, to friction over maritime airspace within air defense identification zones (ADIZs), and in the great power competition between the United States and China. Sources of cooperation, such as anti‐piracy coordination, also exist in these waters. These two seas coexist despite their incompatible nature. How to guarante…
Jammed Allies
What drives alliances to tremble? Even longstanding alliances could be frustrated by the jamming mechanism by a gray actor. When an enemy pretends to take a friendlier posture, a state under alliances seems likely to regard its posture as a window of opportunity towards better relationship and wishfully permanent peace. Too much emphasis on this window prevents a state from recognizing how four characteristics of a gray actor – resourceful, ambig…
Just War and Just Battle
In March 2010, a North Korean submarine fired a torpedo against the South Korean ship Cheonan, which resulted in the deaths of 46 sailors. Is its surprise attack justified? The academic examination has rarely been made over whether North Korea’s use of military force is justified in this battle. As the just war theory to date has dealt mostly with major wars, it also can guide us to judge whether this limited warfare is just or not. The just war …
Two-Level Silence and Nuclearization of Small Powers
The North Korean nuclear issue serves as a failure of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the sense that Pyongyang has, at present, nearly achieved its program. Why do some states like North Korea succeed in nuclear armament, while others fail? Two-level silence at both intranational and international levels served as a sufficient condition for North Korea to become nuclear-armed. Under a brutal dictatorial regime, the domestic audience c…
The Clash of Security and Sovereignty in Quasi-Alliance
Which is needed more: sovereignty or security? The autonomy–security trade-off model sees this as a trade-off between a client and a patron. A client surrenders some measure of autonomy to a patron and, in turn, receives security. This paper explores whether the underlying logic is applicable to quasi-alliances between a state and a multinational regime, such as the United Nations Command ( UNC ). South Korea has maintained a quasi-alliance with …
The two-for-one entity and a ‘for whom’ puzzle
Does the US-led UNC (United Nations Command) have enough clout to misapply its original function, thereby making those assets available to hegemonic rivalry? Is this clout likely to be seen as equally important by all members? The UNC was established as an integrated warfighting organization during the Korean War and continues to this day as the peace driver on the Korean Peninsula. In the meantime, the UNC helps the US hegemony sustain the regio…
The power of cultural weapons in counterinsurgency
Cultural assets are equally important for COIN effectiveness. Despite the significant impact of culture on COIN outcomes, the extant literature pays too much attention only to strategic culture, not the inherent roles for culture to play. This paper examines what made South Korean COIN forces successful in Vietnam. First, they benefitted from cultural harmony driven by the shared belief in communalism culture, a common ground between both societi…
Arms Control Dialogue or Gray Zone Talks? Pitfalls of the Discourses of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and Nuclear Arms Control
What makes the schemes to address Pyongyang's nuclear program so ineffective? Aside from conventional explanations, two gray zone discourses are at play. First, the gray zone discourse of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has been viable since 1991. Second, another gray zone discourse of nuclear arms control with North Korea has been gathering pace recently. Gray zone discourses blur the line between North Korea and the United States regar…
Lopsided Security on the Korean Peninsula
North Korea’s asymmetric provocations over the last decades can be classified into two periods: tactical provocations at sea in 1970–1990 and strategic (nuclear) provocations in 2000–2020. What is the logic underlying the North Korean imbroglio? And how does the former period differ from the latter? The first set of provocations was intended to shift the threat imbalance caused by a widening gap in conventional military capabilities into a balanc…
An Invisible Strategy with Visible Gains
Gray zone strategy garners growing attention as China's indirect approach against the U.S., her great power competitor. Unlike the conventional wisdom, the gray zone mechanism is not new historically but rather has been widely at play in many areas in the international arena, particularly in Northeast Asia. South Korea has been under the gray zone offensive of China and North Korea. Typical examples are Beijing's THAAD retaliation and Pyongyang's…
Political science (13 works) · Law (12 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (10 works) · Law (9 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Korean Peninsula Historical and Political Studies (6 works) · Political economy (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · International trade (5 works)