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Jorge E Delgado

Biographic Data

ID3086735
NAMEJorge E Delgado
GIVEN NAMESJorge E
FAMILY NAMEDelgado
SIGNATUREDELGADO J E
AFFILIATIONSKing's College London
ORCID0000-0002-5092-336X
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS5
TOTAL CITATIONS11
AUTHOR COUNT5
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2010
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX2
  • Perpetual Counterinsurgency: Continuities in Armed State-Building in Colombia’s Post-Peace Agreement Era

    Open Access•Jorge E Delgado•ARTICLE•Latin American Perspectives•2026

    A decade ago, for government negotiators with the FARC-EP insurgency, the Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict marked the transition from an armed state-building logic of “Territorial Control” to one of “Territorial Peace.” Paraphrasing President Santos’ leading strategist and Chief Peace Negotiator in Havana: after the peace agreement, state institutions would stop disembarking from spaceships in Colombia’s violent-ridden peripheries. Peace…

  • Colombia’s Pro-military Narratives in the Post-peace Agreement

    Open Access•Jorge E Delgado, María Emilia Lleras Ronderos•ARTICLE•Alternatives Global Local Political•2023•Cited by: 1

    A decade after the start of the peace talks between the Colombian state and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) insurgency, the country’s military has not been immune to the polarised debates surrounding the final 2016 peace agreement, particularly as today the country experiences a significant rise in polarisation, social discontent and organised armed violence that is blamed by multiple sectors of Colombian society on the peace…

  • Colombian Military Thinking and the Fight against the Farc-EP Insurgency, 2002–2014

    Jorge E Delgado•ARTICLE•Journal of Strategic Studies•2015•References: 6

    This article attempts to place in historical perspective the latest effort by Colombia’s military (Colmil) to defeat the now half century old insurgency of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP). It argues that the ‘surge’ initiated under President Álvaro Uribe in 2002 with the assistance of the United States can only be fully analyzed in the context of the Colmil’s intellectual framework for counter-insur…

  • Counterinsurgency and the limits of state-building: An analysis of Colombia's policy of territorial consolidation, 2006-2012

    Jorge E Delgado•ARTICLE•Small Wars and Insurgencies•2015•Cited by: 6•References: 12

    Since 2002 the Colombian government has been implementing a series of policy initiatives that have sought to coordinate state resources in a neo-classical counterinsurgency approach to fight the country's main insurgent group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), and recover and consolidate the territory. Despite impressive operational successes against the insurgency and other illegal groups, the government has been unable to …

  • Masters of today: Military intelligence and counterinsurgency in Colombia, 1990-2009

    Douglas Porch, Jorge E Delgado et al.•ARTICLE•Small Wars and Insurgencies•2010•Cited by: 4

    Military intelligence forms a vital element of counter-insurgency operations. When the Colombian military suffered setbacks at the hands of the FARC in the 1990s, military intelligence received much of the blame. It was also accused of human rights violations. With the help of US. financed Plan Colombia, military intelligence has been reorganized, expanded, strengthened with upgraded technical capabilities, constrained to operate within defined l…

  • Counterinsurgency and the limits of state-building: An analysis of Colombia's policy of territorial consolidation, 2006-2012

    Jorge E Delgado•ARTICLE•Small Wars and Insurgencies•2015•Cited by: 6•References: 12

    Since 2002 the Colombian government has been implementing a series of policy initiatives that have sought to coordinate state resources in a neo-classical counterinsurgency approach to fight the country's main insurgent group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), and recover and consolidate the territory. Despite impressive operational successes against the insurgency and other illegal groups, the government has been unable to …

  • Masters of today: Military intelligence and counterinsurgency in Colombia, 1990-2009

    Douglas Porch, Jorge E Delgado et al.•ARTICLE•Small Wars and Insurgencies•2010•Cited by: 4

    Military intelligence forms a vital element of counter-insurgency operations. When the Colombian military suffered setbacks at the hands of the FARC in the 1990s, military intelligence received much of the blame. It was also accused of human rights violations. With the help of US. financed Plan Colombia, military intelligence has been reorganized, expanded, strengthened with upgraded technical capabilities, constrained to operate within defined l…

  • Colombia’s Pro-military Narratives in the Post-peace Agreement

    Open Access•Jorge E Delgado, María Emilia Lleras Ronderos•ARTICLE•Alternatives Global Local Political•2023•Cited by: 1

    A decade after the start of the peace talks between the Colombian state and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) insurgency, the country’s military has not been immune to the polarised debates surrounding the final 2016 peace agreement, particularly as today the country experiences a significant rise in polarisation, social discontent and organised armed violence that is blamed by multiple sectors of Colombian society on the peace…

  • Masters of today: Military intelligence and counterinsurgency in Colombia, 1990-2009

    Douglas Porch, Jorge E Delgado et al.•ARTICLE•Small Wars and Insurgencies•2010•Cited by: 4

    Military intelligence forms a vital element of counter-insurgency operations. When the Colombian military suffered setbacks at the hands of the FARC in the 1990s, military intelligence received much of the blame. It was also accused of human rights violations. With the help of US. financed Plan Colombia, military intelligence has been reorganized, expanded, strengthened with upgraded technical capabilities, constrained to operate within defined l…

  • Colombian Military Thinking and the Fight against the Farc-EP Insurgency, 2002–2014

    Jorge E Delgado•ARTICLE•Journal of Strategic Studies•2015•References: 6

    This article attempts to place in historical perspective the latest effort by Colombia’s military (Colmil) to defeat the now half century old insurgency of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP). It argues that the ‘surge’ initiated under President Álvaro Uribe in 2002 with the assistance of the United States can only be fully analyzed in the context of the Colmil’s intellectual framework for counter-insur…

  • Counterinsurgency and the limits of state-building: An analysis of Colombia's policy of territorial consolidation, 2006-2012

    Jorge E Delgado•ARTICLE•Small Wars and Insurgencies•2015•Cited by: 6•References: 12

    Since 2002 the Colombian government has been implementing a series of policy initiatives that have sought to coordinate state resources in a neo-classical counterinsurgency approach to fight the country's main insurgent group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), and recover and consolidate the territory. Despite impressive operational successes against the insurgency and other illegal groups, the government has been unable to …

  • Colombia’s Pro-military Narratives in the Post-peace Agreement

    Open Access•Jorge E Delgado, María Emilia Lleras Ronderos•ARTICLE•Alternatives Global Local Political•2023•Cited by: 1

    A decade after the start of the peace talks between the Colombian state and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) insurgency, the country’s military has not been immune to the polarised debates surrounding the final 2016 peace agreement, particularly as today the country experiences a significant rise in polarisation, social discontent and organised armed violence that is blamed by multiple sectors of Colombian society on the peace…

  • Perpetual Counterinsurgency: Continuities in Armed State-Building in Colombia’s Post-Peace Agreement Era

    Open Access•Jorge E Delgado•ARTICLE•Latin American Perspectives•2026

    A decade ago, for government negotiators with the FARC-EP insurgency, the Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict marked the transition from an armed state-building logic of “Territorial Control” to one of “Territorial Peace.” Paraphrasing President Santos’ leading strategist and Chief Peace Negotiator in Havana: after the peace agreement, state institutions would stop disembarking from spaceships in Colombia’s violent-ridden peripheries. Peace…

Conflict, Peace, and Violence in Colombia (5 works) · Military History and Strategy (5 works) · Insurgency (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · History and Politics in Latin America (3 works) · Political economy (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Adversary (2 works)

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