Francis J Gavin
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3088924 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Francis J Gavin |
| NOMBRES | Francis J |
| APELLIDO | Gavin |
| FIRMA | GAVIN F J |
| AFILIACIONES | The University of Texas at Austin |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 28 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 87 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 28 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1996 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
LBJ's America
In innumerable ways, we still live in LBJ's America. More than half a century after his death, Lyndon Baines Johnson continues to exert profound influence on American life. This collection skillfully explores his seminal accomplishments—protecting civil rights, fighting poverty, expanding access to medical care, lowering barriers to immigration—as well as his struggles in Vietnam and his difficulty responding to other challenges in an era of decl…
IV. Unspoken assumptions, time lags and historical anamnesis
The underlying structure, incentives and costs shaping international relations, state behaviour and the nature of power are profoundly different today to how they were in the past, in ways that are scarcely recognised and widely misunderstood. For much of history, world politics was marked by profound scarcity in resources, information and security. A series of historical revolutions has largely tamed this scarcity in ways few could have imagined…
III. The problems of plenty
The underlying structure, incentives and costs shaping international relations, state behaviour and the nature of power are profoundly different today to how they were in the past, in ways that are scarcely recognised and widely misunderstood. For much of history, world politics was marked by profound scarcity in resources, information and security. A series of historical revolutions has largely tamed this scarcity in ways few could have imagined…
II. The taming of scarcity and the end of empire
The underlying structure, incentives and costs shaping international relations, state behaviour and the nature of power are profoundly different today to how they were in the past, in ways that are scarcely recognised and widely misunderstood. For much of history, world politics was marked by profound scarcity in resources, information and security. A series of historical revolutions has largely tamed this scarcity in ways few could have imagined…
Conclusion
The underlying structure, incentives and costs shaping international relations, state behaviour and the nature of power are profoundly different today to how they were in the past, in ways that are scarcely recognised and widely misunderstood. For much of history, world politics was marked by profound scarcity in resources, information and security. A series of historical revolutions has largely tamed this scarcity in ways few could have imagined…
I. War and conquest in the age of scarcity
The underlying structure, incentives and costs shaping international relations, state behaviour and the nature of power are profoundly different today to how they were in the past, in ways that are scarcely recognised and widely misunderstood. For much of history, world politics was marked by profound scarcity in resources, information and security. A series of historical revolutions has largely tamed this scarcity in ways few could have imagined…
V. American grand strategy in a world of plenty
The underlying structure, incentives and costs shaping international relations, state behaviour and the nature of power are profoundly different today to how they were in the past, in ways that are scarcely recognised and widely misunderstood. For much of history, world politics was marked by profound scarcity in resources, information and security. A series of historical revolutions has largely tamed this scarcity in ways few could have imagined…
Response to W. Jeffrey Taliaferro’s Review of Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Policy and the Publicly Minded Professor
In recent years, there has been a vigorous effort within the disciplines of political science and strategic studies to encourage scholars to become what is termed ‘policy relevant.’ These initiativ
Strategies of Inhibition
The United States has gone to extraordinary lengths since the beginning of the nuclear age to inhibit—that is, to slow, halt, and reverse—the spread of nuclear weapons and, when unsuccessful, to mitigate the consequences. To accomplish this end, the United States has developed and implemented a wide range of tools, applied in a variety of combinations. These “strategies of inhibition” employ different policies rarely seen as connected to one anot…
David James Gill. Britain and the Bomb
Journal Article David James Gill. Britain and the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy, 1964–1970. Get access David James Gill. Britain and the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy, 1964–1970. (Stanford Nuclear Age Series.) Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2014. Pp. xii, 304. $65.00. Francis J. Gavin Francis J. Gavin Massachusetts Institute of Technology [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Histor…
What If? The Historian and the Counterfactual
This essay lays out why many scholars, particularly historians, are inherently skeptical of counterfactuals. It highlights several of the most obvious errors that are often made by those undertaking counterfactual reasoning. It also highlights how these articles go a long way toward developing effective rules for the appropriate and most effective use of counterfactuals
History, Security Studies, and the July Crisis
Notes1 Robert Zaretsky, 'Struggling with destiny: Barbara Tuchman's legacy as an historian'. Times Literary Supplement, 24 Feb. 2012.2 Not reviewed here – since it is not a general account of the war's origins – but well worth reading is Nicholas Lambert's Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2012). Lambert offers a sharp and quite radical challenge to the conventional wisdom surrounding…
Politics, History and the Ivory Tower-Policy Gap in the Nuclear Proliferation Debate
Same As It Ever Was
A widely held and largely unchallenged view among many scholars and policymakers is that nuclear proliferation is the gravest threat facing the United States today, that it is more dangerous than ever, and that few meaningful lessons can be drawn from the nuclear history of a supposed simpler and more predictable period, the Cold War. This view, labeled “nuclear alarmism,” is based on four myths about the history of the nuclear age. First, today'…
History and Policy
What are the benefits, if any, to rigorously applying historical knowledge and methodology to the making of US foreign policy? Are there advantages for policymakers in thinking about the past in a serious way, and should historians consider these decision-makers part of their audience?The answer to all these questions would seem to be obvious. Most would agree that, yes, a deep and sophisticated understanding of the past is desirable for those ma…
Cold, Dollars, and Power
How are we to understand the politics of international monetary relations since the end of World War II? Exploiting declassified documents from both the United States and Europe and employing economic analysis and international relations theory, Francis Gavin offers a reassessment of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and dollar-gold convertibility. Gavin demonstrates that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, Bretton Woods was a hi…
Blasts from the Past
January 01 2005 Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s Francis J. Gavin Francis J. Gavin Assistant Professor at the Lyndon B.Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Francis J. Gavin Assistant Professor at the Lyndon B.Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. Online ISSN:…
Both Sticks and Carrots
The United States has displayed a schizophrenic attitude toward economic statecraft during its history. On the one hand, America fought two costly wars in order to maintain its right as a neutral to conduct unimpeded commerce with any belligerent without restriction. This stance emerged from the American mythology that the “open door,” or liberal trading order, was not only morally superior to realpolitik, but would eliminate the Hobbesian compet…
The Gold Battles within the Cold War
President John F. Kennedy often told his advisers that “the two things which scared him most were nuclear weapons and the payments deficit.”1 Kennedy's sensitivity to the nuclear danger is well documented and completely understandable. But why was he so afraid of the U.S. balance of payments deficit? Why did he compare a technical problem of international monetary economics to the dangers of a nuclear war? These two problems – one involving monet…
The Myth of Flexible Response
up any book on post-war United States foreign relations and you will almost certainly be told that US national security policy changed dramatically on 20 January 1961, when the incoming John F. Kennedy administration began to replace Dwight D. Eisenhower's 'massive retaliation' with a new military strategy of 'flexible response'. The strategy, which focused largely on the Soviet threat to Western Europe, was, and is, seen as a radical change whic…
Choosing tragedy in Vietnam
Economists to the rescue
Acheson, Nixon, and the politics of deception
Bill Burns and the lost art of diplomacy
What role does professional diplomacy play in shaping outcomes that matter to the United States in the world? One would think the answer is obvious – quite a lot. Effective statecraft is critical t
Strategies of Inhibition
The United States has gone to extraordinary lengths since the beginning of the nuclear age to inhibit—that is, to slow, halt, and reverse—the spread of nuclear weapons and, when unsuccessful, to mitigate the consequences. To accomplish this end, the United States has developed and implemented a wide range of tools, applied in a variety of combinations. These “strategies of inhibition” employ different policies rarely seen as connected to one anot…
Blasts from the Past
January 01 2005 Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s Francis J. Gavin Francis J. Gavin Assistant Professor at the Lyndon B.Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Francis J. Gavin Assistant Professor at the Lyndon B.Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. Online ISSN:…
The Myth of Flexible Response
up any book on post-war United States foreign relations and you will almost certainly be told that US national security policy changed dramatically on 20 January 1961, when the incoming John F. Kennedy administration began to replace Dwight D. Eisenhower's 'massive retaliation' with a new military strategy of 'flexible response'. The strategy, which focused largely on the Soviet threat to Western Europe, was, and is, seen as a radical change whic…
Cold, Dollars, and Power
How are we to understand the politics of international monetary relations since the end of World War II? Exploiting declassified documents from both the United States and Europe and employing economic analysis and international relations theory, Francis Gavin offers a reassessment of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and dollar-gold convertibility. Gavin demonstrates that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, Bretton Woods was a hi…
Same As It Ever Was
A widely held and largely unchallenged view among many scholars and policymakers is that nuclear proliferation is the gravest threat facing the United States today, that it is more dangerous than ever, and that few meaningful lessons can be drawn from the nuclear history of a supposed simpler and more predictable period, the Cold War. This view, labeled “nuclear alarmism,” is based on four myths about the history of the nuclear age. First, today'…
Politics, History and the Ivory Tower-Policy Gap in the Nuclear Proliferation Debate
What If? The Historian and the Counterfactual
This essay lays out why many scholars, particularly historians, are inherently skeptical of counterfactuals. It highlights several of the most obvious errors that are often made by those undertaking counterfactual reasoning. It also highlights how these articles go a long way toward developing effective rules for the appropriate and most effective use of counterfactuals
Policy and the Publicly Minded Professor
In recent years, there has been a vigorous effort within the disciplines of political science and strategic studies to encourage scholars to become what is termed ‘policy relevant.’ These initiativ
History, Security Studies, and the July Crisis
Notes1 Robert Zaretsky, 'Struggling with destiny: Barbara Tuchman's legacy as an historian'. Times Literary Supplement, 24 Feb. 2012.2 Not reviewed here – since it is not a general account of the war's origins – but well worth reading is Nicholas Lambert's Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2012). Lambert offers a sharp and quite radical challenge to the conventional wisdom surrounding…
Choosing tragedy in Vietnam
The legends of Bretton Woods
The Wilsonian legacy in the twentieth century
Africa, Asia, and Latin America
Acheson, Nixon, and the politics of deception
Economists to the rescue
The Myth of Flexible Response
up any book on post-war United States foreign relations and you will almost certainly be told that US national security policy changed dramatically on 20 January 1961, when the incoming John F. Kennedy administration began to replace Dwight D. Eisenhower's 'massive retaliation' with a new military strategy of 'flexible response'. The strategy, which focused largely on the Soviet threat to Western Europe, was, and is, seen as a radical change whic…
Choosing tragedy in Vietnam
The Gold Battles within the Cold War
President John F. Kennedy often told his advisers that “the two things which scared him most were nuclear weapons and the payments deficit.”1 Kennedy's sensitivity to the nuclear danger is well documented and completely understandable. But why was he so afraid of the U.S. balance of payments deficit? Why did he compare a technical problem of international monetary economics to the dangers of a nuclear war? These two problems – one involving monet…
Both Sticks and Carrots
The United States has displayed a schizophrenic attitude toward economic statecraft during its history. On the one hand, America fought two costly wars in order to maintain its right as a neutral to conduct unimpeded commerce with any belligerent without restriction. This stance emerged from the American mythology that the “open door,” or liberal trading order, was not only morally superior to realpolitik, but would eliminate the Hobbesian compet…
Blasts from the Past
January 01 2005 Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s Francis J. Gavin Francis J. Gavin Assistant Professor at the Lyndon B.Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Francis J. Gavin Assistant Professor at the Lyndon B.Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. Online ISSN:…
Cold, Dollars, and Power
How are we to understand the politics of international monetary relations since the end of World War II? Exploiting declassified documents from both the United States and Europe and employing economic analysis and international relations theory, Francis Gavin offers a reassessment of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and dollar-gold convertibility. Gavin demonstrates that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, Bretton Woods was a hi…
History and Policy
What are the benefits, if any, to rigorously applying historical knowledge and methodology to the making of US foreign policy? Are there advantages for policymakers in thinking about the past in a serious way, and should historians consider these decision-makers part of their audience?The answer to all these questions would seem to be obvious. Most would agree that, yes, a deep and sophisticated understanding of the past is desirable for those ma…
Same As It Ever Was
A widely held and largely unchallenged view among many scholars and policymakers is that nuclear proliferation is the gravest threat facing the United States today, that it is more dangerous than ever, and that few meaningful lessons can be drawn from the nuclear history of a supposed simpler and more predictable period, the Cold War. This view, labeled “nuclear alarmism,” is based on four myths about the history of the nuclear age. First, today'…
Politics, History and the Ivory Tower-Policy Gap in the Nuclear Proliferation Debate
History, Security Studies, and the July Crisis
Notes1 Robert Zaretsky, 'Struggling with destiny: Barbara Tuchman's legacy as an historian'. Times Literary Supplement, 24 Feb. 2012.2 Not reviewed here – since it is not a general account of the war's origins – but well worth reading is Nicholas Lambert's Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2012). Lambert offers a sharp and quite radical challenge to the conventional wisdom surrounding…
Strategies of Inhibition
The United States has gone to extraordinary lengths since the beginning of the nuclear age to inhibit—that is, to slow, halt, and reverse—the spread of nuclear weapons and, when unsuccessful, to mitigate the consequences. To accomplish this end, the United States has developed and implemented a wide range of tools, applied in a variety of combinations. These “strategies of inhibition” employ different policies rarely seen as connected to one anot…
David James Gill. Britain and the Bomb
Journal Article David James Gill. Britain and the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy, 1964–1970. Get access David James Gill. Britain and the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy, 1964–1970. (Stanford Nuclear Age Series.) Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2014. Pp. xii, 304. $65.00. Francis J. Gavin Francis J. Gavin Massachusetts Institute of Technology [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Histor…
What If? The Historian and the Counterfactual
This essay lays out why many scholars, particularly historians, are inherently skeptical of counterfactuals. It highlights several of the most obvious errors that are often made by those undertaking counterfactual reasoning. It also highlights how these articles go a long way toward developing effective rules for the appropriate and most effective use of counterfactuals
Policy and the Publicly Minded Professor
In recent years, there has been a vigorous effort within the disciplines of political science and strategic studies to encourage scholars to become what is termed ‘policy relevant.’ These initiativ
Response to W. Jeffrey Taliaferro’s Review of Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
LBJ's America
In innumerable ways, we still live in LBJ's America. More than half a century after his death, Lyndon Baines Johnson continues to exert profound influence on American life. This collection skillfully explores his seminal accomplishments—protecting civil rights, fighting poverty, expanding access to medical care, lowering barriers to immigration—as well as his struggles in Vietnam and his difficulty responding to other challenges in an era of decl…
IV. Unspoken assumptions, time lags and historical anamnesis
The underlying structure, incentives and costs shaping international relations, state behaviour and the nature of power are profoundly different today to how they were in the past, in ways that are scarcely recognised and widely misunderstood. For much of history, world politics was marked by profound scarcity in resources, information and security. A series of historical revolutions has largely tamed this scarcity in ways few could have imagined…
III. The problems of plenty
The underlying structure, incentives and costs shaping international relations, state behaviour and the nature of power are profoundly different today to how they were in the past, in ways that are scarcely recognised and widely misunderstood. For much of history, world politics was marked by profound scarcity in resources, information and security. A series of historical revolutions has largely tamed this scarcity in ways few could have imagined…
II. The taming of scarcity and the end of empire
The underlying structure, incentives and costs shaping international relations, state behaviour and the nature of power are profoundly different today to how they were in the past, in ways that are scarcely recognised and widely misunderstood. For much of history, world politics was marked by profound scarcity in resources, information and security. A series of historical revolutions has largely tamed this scarcity in ways few could have imagined…
Conclusion
The underlying structure, incentives and costs shaping international relations, state behaviour and the nature of power are profoundly different today to how they were in the past, in ways that are scarcely recognised and widely misunderstood. For much of history, world politics was marked by profound scarcity in resources, information and security. A series of historical revolutions has largely tamed this scarcity in ways few could have imagined…
Political science (21 obras) · Law (14 obras) · Law (13 obras) · Politics (12 obras) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (11 obras) · Economics (10 obras) · History (10 obras) · Political economy (10 obras) · Computer Science (9 obras) · History (7 obras)