Huw Dylan
Biographic Data
| ID | 3096459 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Huw Dylan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Huw |
| FAMILY NAME | Dylan |
| SIGNATURE | DYLAN H |
| AFFILIATIONS | King's College London |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4154-2300 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Emerging technologies and national security intelligence
Intelligence work shapes and is shaped in turn by emerging technologies. This article is concerned with the current iteration of this dynamic, with the questions of which emerging technologies are likely to impact intelligence work most significantly over the medium-term, and how this impact will manifest. It identifies artificial intelligence and quantum technologies as being the most significant, and claims that their impact will be catalysed b…
Unveiling Russian intelligence failures in the Ukraine conflict
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was accompanied by a major intelligence failure. Russia’s intelligence machinery failed strategically and tactically, leaving leaders surprised and forces lost. Why? This article argues that to understand the failures of 2022 we should consider the strategic culture of Russian intelligence. It explores elements of this culture, particularly the maintenance of a ‘besieged fortress’ mindset. It argues t…
International lulz
This article examines trolling in international diplomacy. It explores a developing trend in diplomatic communications: encounters which have historically been characterised by formality and politeness have increasingly been used by political leaders to troll their targets. While the second Trump administration embodies this ‘trolling turn’ in diplomacy, it extends beyond MAGA. Many leaders, particularly authoritarians and those with authoritaria…
The War on Open-Source Intelligence
Between the secret state and the public sphere
This essay explores the unique roles played by writers as intermediaries between the secret state and the public sphere, providing an introduction to the special issue Writers in Intelligence. Though frequently remarked upon, the history, nature, and politics of this relationship remains under-studied. Some spies-turned-writers write in the hope of legitimizing a problematic role, others to own their own identities in a police state. For some, wr…
The intelligence lobby before the intelligence lobby
In 1991 John Major’s government broke with precedent and named the incoming head of MI5, Stella Rimington. In so doing, Major gave Rimington a public profile, and a platform. She used both to establish a new narrative concerning MI5 its work and its importance in a post-Soviet world, in effect seeking renewed legitimacy. Rimington’s significance, mirroring that of women in intelligence in general, remains under-studied. This article examines her …
The Autocrat’s Indispensable Service
Russian intelligence failed President Vladimir Putin in supporting the most consequential decision of statecraft – war – before Russia’s 2022 (re)invasion of Ukraine but has since somewhat recovered, possibly redeeming itself in Putin’s estimation by securing his regime nearly two and a half years since his shambolic invasion. This article complements our previous article in this journal, The Autocrat’s Intelligence Paradox: Vladimir Putin’s (mis…
‘An anarchy of treason’
John le Carré is credited with re-defining spy fiction into something widely considered as more ‘authentic’. His work emerged during a period replete with spy scandals and public investigations. This article considers the intersection of the public history of intelligence with le Carré’s early novels, particularly The Spy Who Came in from the Cold. It reveals how the author drew creatively on that public history to shape his narratives and underp…
The autocrat’s intelligence paradox
Autocratic leaders rely on intelligence machineries for regime and personal security. They often manage large, powerful, unaccountable organisations, which they hold close. But, despite their close relationship with - and reliance upon - intelligence, autocrats also frequently struggle to use it to enhance decision-making and foreign policy, and consequently suffer avoidable intelligence failures. This article argues that Russia’s invasion of Ukr…
Secret Intelligence and Public Diplomacy in the Ukraine War
Intelligence is generally collected and used in secret to inform internal audiences. Before and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, the UK and US governments have deployed intelligence extensively to influence external audiences, both publicly and privately, regarding Russian intentions, capabilities and practices, and the consequences of Russian actions. While the scale, manner and initially pre-emptive nature of these disclosures repre…
California Dreaming of Better Days
Charles Manson died in November 2017, having been imprisoned since 1972, but the shocking murders committed by the followers of his cult—the so-called Manson Family—continue to generate morbid fasc
The Special Operations Executive in Malaya
A visitor to Gordon Square, a short walk from the British Museum in London, will find in the north-east corner a bust of Noor Inayat Khan. She was an Officer of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), infiltrated into France during the Second World War. Moving from safe house to safe house, she broadcast intelligence and reports from Paris until the she was captured by the Gestapo and brutally interrogated. Barely thirty years old, she was execut…
SIS, Grigori Tokaev, and the London Controlling Section
This article examines British deception during the early years of the Cold War, and how a Soviet defector named Grigori Tokaev contributed to British plans and operations. Tokaev provided valuable insights into the Soviet Union, allowing British intelligence to craft more intricate deception operations, political and military. The manner in which he was used, and the extent to which his idiosyncrasies were tolerated, underline the difficulties th…
Super-Weapons and Subversion
This article examines British deception operations in the early Cold War. It illustrates how, in the years before Britain could threaten atomic retaliation, Britain’s deception organisation, the London Controlling Section (LCS) was tasked with conducting operations to deter the USSR and China from starting a war or threatening British interests. It introduces a number of their ploys – some physical and military, others subversive and political. I…
Modern conditions demand integration and professionalism
This article explores the reforms that occurred in British military and military-related intelligence in 1946 and 1964. It charts the development of the Joint Intelligence Bureau, which was created as a central organisation to provide intelligence on several military-related issues, and how it was eventually merged with the service intelligence agencies in 1964 to form the Defence Intelligence Staff. It argues that the reforms of 1946, although f…
The autocrat’s intelligence paradox
Autocratic leaders rely on intelligence machineries for regime and personal security. They often manage large, powerful, unaccountable organisations, which they hold close. But, despite their close relationship with - and reliance upon - intelligence, autocrats also frequently struggle to use it to enhance decision-making and foreign policy, and consequently suffer avoidable intelligence failures. This article argues that Russia’s invasion of Ukr…
Secret Intelligence and Public Diplomacy in the Ukraine War
Intelligence is generally collected and used in secret to inform internal audiences. Before and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, the UK and US governments have deployed intelligence extensively to influence external audiences, both publicly and privately, regarding Russian intentions, capabilities and practices, and the consequences of Russian actions. While the scale, manner and initially pre-emptive nature of these disclosures repre…
The Autocrat’s Indispensable Service
Russian intelligence failed President Vladimir Putin in supporting the most consequential decision of statecraft – war – before Russia’s 2022 (re)invasion of Ukraine but has since somewhat recovered, possibly redeeming itself in Putin’s estimation by securing his regime nearly two and a half years since his shambolic invasion. This article complements our previous article in this journal, The Autocrat’s Intelligence Paradox: Vladimir Putin’s (mis…
SIS, Grigori Tokaev, and the London Controlling Section
This article examines British deception during the early years of the Cold War, and how a Soviet defector named Grigori Tokaev contributed to British plans and operations. Tokaev provided valuable insights into the Soviet Union, allowing British intelligence to craft more intricate deception operations, political and military. The manner in which he was used, and the extent to which his idiosyncrasies were tolerated, underline the difficulties th…
Modern conditions demand integration and professionalism
This article explores the reforms that occurred in British military and military-related intelligence in 1946 and 1964. It charts the development of the Joint Intelligence Bureau, which was created as a central organisation to provide intelligence on several military-related issues, and how it was eventually merged with the service intelligence agencies in 1964 to form the Defence Intelligence Staff. It argues that the reforms of 1946, although f…
Super-Weapons and Subversion
This article examines British deception operations in the early Cold War. It illustrates how, in the years before Britain could threaten atomic retaliation, Britain’s deception organisation, the London Controlling Section (LCS) was tasked with conducting operations to deter the USSR and China from starting a war or threatening British interests. It introduces a number of their ploys – some physical and military, others subversive and political. I…
SIS, Grigori Tokaev, and the London Controlling Section
This article examines British deception during the early years of the Cold War, and how a Soviet defector named Grigori Tokaev contributed to British plans and operations. Tokaev provided valuable insights into the Soviet Union, allowing British intelligence to craft more intricate deception operations, political and military. The manner in which he was used, and the extent to which his idiosyncrasies were tolerated, underline the difficulties th…
California Dreaming of Better Days
Charles Manson died in November 2017, having been imprisoned since 1972, but the shocking murders committed by the followers of his cult—the so-called Manson Family—continue to generate morbid fasc
The Special Operations Executive in Malaya
A visitor to Gordon Square, a short walk from the British Museum in London, will find in the north-east corner a bust of Noor Inayat Khan. She was an Officer of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), infiltrated into France during the Second World War. Moving from safe house to safe house, she broadcast intelligence and reports from Paris until the she was captured by the Gestapo and brutally interrogated. Barely thirty years old, she was execut…
The autocrat’s intelligence paradox
Autocratic leaders rely on intelligence machineries for regime and personal security. They often manage large, powerful, unaccountable organisations, which they hold close. But, despite their close relationship with - and reliance upon - intelligence, autocrats also frequently struggle to use it to enhance decision-making and foreign policy, and consequently suffer avoidable intelligence failures. This article argues that Russia’s invasion of Ukr…
Secret Intelligence and Public Diplomacy in the Ukraine War
Intelligence is generally collected and used in secret to inform internal audiences. Before and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, the UK and US governments have deployed intelligence extensively to influence external audiences, both publicly and privately, regarding Russian intentions, capabilities and practices, and the consequences of Russian actions. While the scale, manner and initially pre-emptive nature of these disclosures repre…
‘An anarchy of treason’
John le Carré is credited with re-defining spy fiction into something widely considered as more ‘authentic’. His work emerged during a period replete with spy scandals and public investigations. This article considers the intersection of the public history of intelligence with le Carré’s early novels, particularly The Spy Who Came in from the Cold. It reveals how the author drew creatively on that public history to shape his narratives and underp…
Between the secret state and the public sphere
This essay explores the unique roles played by writers as intermediaries between the secret state and the public sphere, providing an introduction to the special issue Writers in Intelligence. Though frequently remarked upon, the history, nature, and politics of this relationship remains under-studied. Some spies-turned-writers write in the hope of legitimizing a problematic role, others to own their own identities in a police state. For some, wr…
The intelligence lobby before the intelligence lobby
In 1991 John Major’s government broke with precedent and named the incoming head of MI5, Stella Rimington. In so doing, Major gave Rimington a public profile, and a platform. She used both to establish a new narrative concerning MI5 its work and its importance in a post-Soviet world, in effect seeking renewed legitimacy. Rimington’s significance, mirroring that of women in intelligence in general, remains under-studied. This article examines her …
The Autocrat’s Indispensable Service
Russian intelligence failed President Vladimir Putin in supporting the most consequential decision of statecraft – war – before Russia’s 2022 (re)invasion of Ukraine but has since somewhat recovered, possibly redeeming itself in Putin’s estimation by securing his regime nearly two and a half years since his shambolic invasion. This article complements our previous article in this journal, The Autocrat’s Intelligence Paradox: Vladimir Putin’s (mis…
Emerging technologies and national security intelligence
Intelligence work shapes and is shaped in turn by emerging technologies. This article is concerned with the current iteration of this dynamic, with the questions of which emerging technologies are likely to impact intelligence work most significantly over the medium-term, and how this impact will manifest. It identifies artificial intelligence and quantum technologies as being the most significant, and claims that their impact will be catalysed b…
Unveiling Russian intelligence failures in the Ukraine conflict
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was accompanied by a major intelligence failure. Russia’s intelligence machinery failed strategically and tactically, leaving leaders surprised and forces lost. Why? This article argues that to understand the failures of 2022 we should consider the strategic culture of Russian intelligence. It explores elements of this culture, particularly the maintenance of a ‘besieged fortress’ mindset. It argues t…
International lulz
This article examines trolling in international diplomacy. It explores a developing trend in diplomatic communications: encounters which have historically been characterised by formality and politeness have increasingly been used by political leaders to troll their targets. While the second Trump administration embodies this ‘trolling turn’ in diplomacy, it extends beyond MAGA. Many leaders, particularly authoritarians and those with authoritaria…
The War on Open-Source Intelligence
Political science (12 works) · Intelligence, Security, War Strategy (11 works) · Law (10 works) · Politics (8 works) · Sociology (8 works) · History (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies (4 works) · Military History and Strategy (4 works)