Desiree Desierto
Biographic Data
| ID | 3097464 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Desiree Desierto |
| GIVEN NAMES | Desiree |
| FAMILY NAME | Desierto |
| SIGNATURE | DESIERTO D |
| AFFILIATIONS | George Mason University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9256-5698 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
A model of theft and bribery
Two of the most pervasive kinds of public corruption are theft and bribery. I show how a simple common agency model can simultaneously depict both. In one setting, a public official (agent) who has discretion over government revenues can steal some of it and allocate the rest to public spending towards various sectors (principals), some of whom can pay bribes in exchange. I find that there is a threshold level of revenues at and below which the o…
The Political Economy of Status Competition: Sumptuary Laws in Preindustrial Europe
Sumptuary laws that regulated clothing based on social status were an important part of the political economy of premodern states. We introduce a model that captures the notion that consumption by ordinary citizens poses a status threat to ruling elites. Our model predicts a non-monotonic effect of income—sumptuary legislation initially increases with income, but then falls as income increases further. The initial rise is more likely for states w…
Shipwrecked by Rents
Shipwrecked by Rents
What resource curse? The null effect of remittances on public good provision
Existing formal models show that remittances generate a resource curse by allowing the government to appropriate its revenues toward rents, rather than public good provision. Households spend their remittance income on public-good substitutes, thereby alleviating the pressure on the government to provide public goods. However, the process by which the government survives the implicit threat of political challengers remains unspecified. By explici…
Prohibition versus Taxation in Corrupt Environments
If corruption is rife and tolerated by society, prohibiting the production of a good with negative social costs may be more efficient at limiting quantity than legalizing and taxing producers. It becomes incentive-compatible for a corrupt government to enforce prohibition and credibly limit supply in order to extract bribes from illegal producers. In equilibrium, total quantity is low. In contrast, when the good is legal and taxed, a corrupt gove…
When do Formal Rules and Informal Norms Converge?
We propose evolutionary dynamics to show how rules converge into norms. Individuals play a game of upholding or rejecting a rule, and the more they uphold the rule, the more it becomes established as a norm. We find that when individuals are rational, the initial state determines whether the rule converges into a norm; when individuals are boundedly rational, convergence occurs only if upholding rules is a risk-dominant strategy. This suggests wh…
The Political Economy of Status Competition: Sumptuary Laws in Preindustrial Europe
Sumptuary laws that regulated clothing based on social status were an important part of the political economy of premodern states. We introduce a model that captures the notion that consumption by ordinary citizens poses a status threat to ruling elites. Our model predicts a non-monotonic effect of income—sumptuary legislation initially increases with income, but then falls as income increases further. The initial rise is more likely for states w…
Shipwrecked by Rents
Shipwrecked by Rents
What resource curse? The null effect of remittances on public good provision
Existing formal models show that remittances generate a resource curse by allowing the government to appropriate its revenues toward rents, rather than public good provision. Households spend their remittance income on public-good substitutes, thereby alleviating the pressure on the government to provide public goods. However, the process by which the government survives the implicit threat of political challengers remains unspecified. By explici…
When do Formal Rules and Informal Norms Converge?
We propose evolutionary dynamics to show how rules converge into norms. Individuals play a game of upholding or rejecting a rule, and the more they uphold the rule, the more it becomes established as a norm. We find that when individuals are rational, the initial state determines whether the rule converges into a norm; when individuals are boundedly rational, convergence occurs only if upholding rules is a risk-dominant strategy. This suggests wh…
Prohibition versus Taxation in Corrupt Environments
If corruption is rife and tolerated by society, prohibiting the production of a good with negative social costs may be more efficient at limiting quantity than legalizing and taxing producers. It becomes incentive-compatible for a corrupt government to enforce prohibition and credibly limit supply in order to extract bribes from illegal producers. In equilibrium, total quantity is low. In contrast, when the good is legal and taxed, a corrupt gove…
What resource curse? The null effect of remittances on public good provision
Existing formal models show that remittances generate a resource curse by allowing the government to appropriate its revenues toward rents, rather than public good provision. Households spend their remittance income on public-good substitutes, thereby alleviating the pressure on the government to provide public goods. However, the process by which the government survives the implicit threat of political challengers remains unspecified. By explici…
Shipwrecked by Rents
Shipwrecked by Rents
The Political Economy of Status Competition: Sumptuary Laws in Preindustrial Europe
Sumptuary laws that regulated clothing based on social status were an important part of the political economy of premodern states. We introduce a model that captures the notion that consumption by ordinary citizens poses a status threat to ruling elites. Our model predicts a non-monotonic effect of income—sumptuary legislation initially increases with income, but then falls as income increases further. The initial rise is more likely for states w…
A model of theft and bribery
Two of the most pervasive kinds of public corruption are theft and bribery. I show how a simple common agency model can simultaneously depict both. In one setting, a public official (agent) who has discretion over government revenues can steal some of it and allocate the rest to public spending towards various sectors (principals), some of whom can pay bribes in exchange. I find that there is a threshold level of revenues at and below which the o…
Economics (7 works) · Business (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Economic rent (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Colonialism, slavery, and trade (2 works) · Competition (biology (2 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (2 works) · Economy (2 works)