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Marc T Law

Biographic Data

ID3097479
NAMEMarc T Law
GIVEN NAMESMarc T
FAMILY NAMELaw
SIGNATURELAW M T
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Vermont
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS10
TOTAL CITATIONS43
WORKS AS AUTHOR10
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2003
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX3
  • Creators as firms

    Open Access•Karol Jan Borowiecki, Marc T Law•ARTICLE•Journal of Cultural Economics•2026

    Why do creators sometimes act as firms, internalizing the realization of their work, while in other settings they delegate realization to market intermediaries or operate under hierarchical employment? We develop an analytical framework in which creators choose how to organize realization when contracts are imperfectly enforceable and limits on contractual payments constrain transfers to creators. Delegation can reduce coordination burdens by shi…

  • Psychological capital, effort costs, and creativity

    Open Access•Karol Jan Borowiecki, Marc T Law•ARTICLE•Journal of Cultural Economics•2025

    Why do some artists maintain a high level of productivity throughout their careers, while others experience bursts of creativity followed by burnout or stagnation? Existing explanations emphasize economic incentives and human capital but often overlook an artist’s ability to sustain effort over time. We introduce a conceptual framework centered on psychological capital—a stock of confidence, motivation, and resilience that accumulates in response…

  • Industry size and regulation

    Open Access•Marc T Law, Patrick A Mclaughlin•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2022•Cited by: 1•References: 16

  • Coercion, Obnoxious Tasks, and Economic Efficiency

    Soham Baksi, Pinaki Bose et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Institutional and…•2021

    Incomplete contracts and inadequate enforcement of labor rights, together with the asymmetry of power between a worker and her employer, create an environment where the employer can forcibly extract additional services (e.g., unpaid overtime or sexual favors) from the worker beyond the mutually agreed terms of exchange. We show that coercive impositions can coexist with voluntary transactions in the labor market, and that a positive incidence of …

  • Political Centralization, Federalism, and Urban Development

    Open Access•Sukkoo Kim, Marc T Law•ARTICLE•Social Science History•2016•Cited by: 3•References: 37

    A growing empirical literature links political centralization with urban development. In this paper we present evidence showing how different patterns of political centralization in the United States and Canada affected urban agglomeration during the twentieth century, with a specific focus on the impact on the population of capital cities. Using data on Canadian and US cities and metropolitan areas, we find that the national capital effect on po…

  • The Rise of the American Regulatory State

    Marc T Law, Sukkoo Kim•CHAPTER•Handbook on the Politics of…•2011

  • Revolving door laws and state public utility commissioners

    Open Access•Marc T Law, Cheryl Long et al.•ARTICLE•Regulation & Governance•2011•Cited by: 7•References: 21

    This paper investigates the effects of revolving door regulations – laws that restrict the post‐government employment opportunities of public sector workers – on the characteristics of state public utility commissioners. We find that commissioners from states with revolving door regulations have less expertise, serve shorter terms, and are less likely to be subsequently employed by the private sector, compared with their counterparts from states …

  • Specialization and Regulation

    Marc T Law, Sukkoo Kim•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic History•2005•Cited by: 18•References: 1

    During the Progressive Era, advances in knowledge and specialization led to the emergence of modern-day professions. This growth in professions was accompanied by the adoption of occupational licensing regulation. In this article we explore the origins and effects of occupational licensing regulation during this period. Although most studies argue that occupational licensing regulation is adopted to restrict entry and reduce competition, the evid…

  • Specialization, Information, and Regulation in American Economic History

    Open Access•Marc T Law•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic History•2004•Cited by: 1•References: 3

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • The Origins of State Pure Food Regulation

    Open Access•Marc T Law•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic History•2003•Cited by: 13•References: 8

    Why did state governments begin to regulate the food industry in the late nineteenth century? One possible explanation is that pure food regulation was the result of rent seeking on the part of traditional food producers who wanted to limit the availability of new substitutes. Another potential hypothesis is that regulation was desired because it helped solve an asymmetric information problem in the market for food products. I find the evidence t…

  • Specialization and Regulation

    Marc T Law, Sukkoo Kim•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic History•2005•Cited by: 18•References: 1

    During the Progressive Era, advances in knowledge and specialization led to the emergence of modern-day professions. This growth in professions was accompanied by the adoption of occupational licensing regulation. In this article we explore the origins and effects of occupational licensing regulation during this period. Although most studies argue that occupational licensing regulation is adopted to restrict entry and reduce competition, the evid…

  • The Origins of State Pure Food Regulation

    Open Access•Marc T Law•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic History•2003•Cited by: 13•References: 8

    Why did state governments begin to regulate the food industry in the late nineteenth century? One possible explanation is that pure food regulation was the result of rent seeking on the part of traditional food producers who wanted to limit the availability of new substitutes. Another potential hypothesis is that regulation was desired because it helped solve an asymmetric information problem in the market for food products. I find the evidence t…

  • Revolving door laws and state public utility commissioners

    Open Access•Marc T Law, Cheryl Long et al.•ARTICLE•Regulation & Governance•2011•Cited by: 7•References: 21

    This paper investigates the effects of revolving door regulations – laws that restrict the post‐government employment opportunities of public sector workers – on the characteristics of state public utility commissioners. We find that commissioners from states with revolving door regulations have less expertise, serve shorter terms, and are less likely to be subsequently employed by the private sector, compared with their counterparts from states …

  • Political Centralization, Federalism, and Urban Development

    Open Access•Sukkoo Kim, Marc T Law•ARTICLE•Social Science History•2016•Cited by: 3•References: 37

    A growing empirical literature links political centralization with urban development. In this paper we present evidence showing how different patterns of political centralization in the United States and Canada affected urban agglomeration during the twentieth century, with a specific focus on the impact on the population of capital cities. Using data on Canadian and US cities and metropolitan areas, we find that the national capital effect on po…

  • Industry size and regulation

    Open Access•Marc T Law, Patrick A Mclaughlin•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2022•Cited by: 1•References: 16

  • Specialization, Information, and Regulation in American Economic History

    Open Access•Marc T Law•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic History•2004•Cited by: 1•References: 3

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • The Origins of State Pure Food Regulation

    Open Access•Marc T Law•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic History•2003•Cited by: 13•References: 8

    Why did state governments begin to regulate the food industry in the late nineteenth century? One possible explanation is that pure food regulation was the result of rent seeking on the part of traditional food producers who wanted to limit the availability of new substitutes. Another potential hypothesis is that regulation was desired because it helped solve an asymmetric information problem in the market for food products. I find the evidence t…

  • Specialization, Information, and Regulation in American Economic History

    Open Access•Marc T Law•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic History•2004•Cited by: 1•References: 3

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • Specialization and Regulation

    Marc T Law, Sukkoo Kim•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic History•2005•Cited by: 18•References: 1

    During the Progressive Era, advances in knowledge and specialization led to the emergence of modern-day professions. This growth in professions was accompanied by the adoption of occupational licensing regulation. In this article we explore the origins and effects of occupational licensing regulation during this period. Although most studies argue that occupational licensing regulation is adopted to restrict entry and reduce competition, the evid…

  • The Rise of the American Regulatory State

    Marc T Law, Sukkoo Kim•CHAPTER•Handbook on the Politics of…•2011

  • Revolving door laws and state public utility commissioners

    Open Access•Marc T Law, Cheryl Long et al.•ARTICLE•Regulation & Governance•2011•Cited by: 7•References: 21

    This paper investigates the effects of revolving door regulations – laws that restrict the post‐government employment opportunities of public sector workers – on the characteristics of state public utility commissioners. We find that commissioners from states with revolving door regulations have less expertise, serve shorter terms, and are less likely to be subsequently employed by the private sector, compared with their counterparts from states …

  • Political Centralization, Federalism, and Urban Development

    Open Access•Sukkoo Kim, Marc T Law•ARTICLE•Social Science History•2016•Cited by: 3•References: 37

    A growing empirical literature links political centralization with urban development. In this paper we present evidence showing how different patterns of political centralization in the United States and Canada affected urban agglomeration during the twentieth century, with a specific focus on the impact on the population of capital cities. Using data on Canadian and US cities and metropolitan areas, we find that the national capital effect on po…

  • Coercion, Obnoxious Tasks, and Economic Efficiency

    Soham Baksi, Pinaki Bose et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Institutional and…•2021

    Incomplete contracts and inadequate enforcement of labor rights, together with the asymmetry of power between a worker and her employer, create an environment where the employer can forcibly extract additional services (e.g., unpaid overtime or sexual favors) from the worker beyond the mutually agreed terms of exchange. We show that coercive impositions can coexist with voluntary transactions in the labor market, and that a positive incidence of …

  • Industry size and regulation

    Open Access•Marc T Law, Patrick A Mclaughlin•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2022•Cited by: 1•References: 16

  • Psychological capital, effort costs, and creativity

    Open Access•Karol Jan Borowiecki, Marc T Law•ARTICLE•Journal of Cultural Economics•2025

    Why do some artists maintain a high level of productivity throughout their careers, while others experience bursts of creativity followed by burnout or stagnation? Existing explanations emphasize economic incentives and human capital but often overlook an artist’s ability to sustain effort over time. We introduce a conceptual framework centered on psychological capital—a stock of confidence, motivation, and resilience that accumulates in response…

  • Creators as firms

    Open Access•Karol Jan Borowiecki, Marc T Law•ARTICLE•Journal of Cultural Economics•2026

    Why do creators sometimes act as firms, internalizing the realization of their work, while in other settings they delegate realization to market intermediaries or operate under hierarchical employment? We develop an analytical framework in which creators choose how to organize realization when contracts are imperfectly enforceable and limits on contractual payments constrain transfers to creators. Delegation can reduce coordination burdens by shi…

Economics (7 works) · Law (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Business (5 works) · Law (4 works) · State (computer science (4 works) · Geography (3 works) · Labour economics (3 works) · Public economics (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works)

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