Michael Soref
Biographic Data
| ID | 310017 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael Soref |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael |
| FAMILY NAME | Soref |
| SIGNATURE | SOREF M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Wisconsin–Madison |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 29 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1976 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1989 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The Structure of Power in America
Finance capital and the internal structure of the capitalist class in the United States
A handful of immense banks, concentrating within their coffers the bulk of the assets and deposits of the entire banking system and providing much of the loans and credits for industry, are the decisive units in the circulation of capital in contemporary capitalist economies. With this consolidation of oligopoly in banking itself, the amount of loans and credits granted by the leading banks actually determines the amount of money deposited with t…
Intercorporate Relations
Within the last decade, researchers studying business organizations have come to realize that corporate behaviour cannot be explained in terms of the actions of individual firms alone, and that in order to understand how businesses operate it is necessary to explore the relationships among them. This volume constitutes the first compilation of work by leading international scholars who have adopted a structural approach to the study of business, …
Profit Constraints on Managerial Autonomy
The key assumption of managerial revolution theory-that ownership is separated from control in large corporations-has important consequences for theories of class structure and economic development. If managers do not act in the interest of proprietors, theories based on property ownership are obsolete. Furthermore, the growth patterns of capitalist societies would be altered if large corporations protect managerial interests rather than owner in…
The Structure of Illegal Drug Markets
Social Class and a Division of Labor within the Corporate Elite
Upper-class directors of major industrial companies are directors of more corporations than are the non-upper-class directors, but they are less likely to serve on executive committees of corporate boards. This may indicate that there is a class-based division of labor in which the upper-class directors are more concerned with inter-organizational relationships and with the functioning of the economy as a whole, and that non-upper-class directors…
Profit Constraints on Managerial Autonomy
The key assumption of managerial revolution theory-that ownership is separated from control in large corporations-has important consequences for theories of class structure and economic development. If managers do not act in the interest of proprietors, theories based on property ownership are obsolete. Furthermore, the growth patterns of capitalist societies would be altered if large corporations protect managerial interests rather than owner in…
Social Class and a Division of Labor within the Corporate Elite
Upper-class directors of major industrial companies are directors of more corporations than are the non-upper-class directors, but they are less likely to serve on executive committees of corporate boards. This may indicate that there is a class-based division of labor in which the upper-class directors are more concerned with inter-organizational relationships and with the functioning of the economy as a whole, and that non-upper-class directors…
Social Class and a Division of Labor within the Corporate Elite
Upper-class directors of major industrial companies are directors of more corporations than are the non-upper-class directors, but they are less likely to serve on executive committees of corporate boards. This may indicate that there is a class-based division of labor in which the upper-class directors are more concerned with inter-organizational relationships and with the functioning of the economy as a whole, and that non-upper-class directors…
Profit Constraints on Managerial Autonomy
The key assumption of managerial revolution theory-that ownership is separated from control in large corporations-has important consequences for theories of class structure and economic development. If managers do not act in the interest of proprietors, theories based on property ownership are obsolete. Furthermore, the growth patterns of capitalist societies would be altered if large corporations protect managerial interests rather than owner in…
The Structure of Illegal Drug Markets
Finance capital and the internal structure of the capitalist class in the United States
A handful of immense banks, concentrating within their coffers the bulk of the assets and deposits of the entire banking system and providing much of the loans and credits for industry, are the decisive units in the circulation of capital in contemporary capitalist economies. With this consolidation of oligopoly in banking itself, the amount of loans and credits granted by the leading banks actually determines the amount of money deposited with t…
Intercorporate Relations
Within the last decade, researchers studying business organizations have come to realize that corporate behaviour cannot be explained in terms of the actions of individual firms alone, and that in order to understand how businesses operate it is necessary to explore the relationships among them. This volume constitutes the first compilation of work by leading international scholars who have adopted a structural approach to the study of business, …
The Structure of Power in America
Economics (6 works) · Business (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Management (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Elite Sociology and Global Capitalism (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Accounting (2 works) · Accounting (2 works)