Daniel Verdier
Biographic Data
| ID | 329712 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel Verdier |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel |
| FAMILY NAME | Verdier |
| SIGNATURE | VERDIER D |
| AFFILIATIONS | European University Institute |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8281-032X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 19 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 193 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 19 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1979 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| H-INDEX | 9 |
The dilemma of informal governance with outside option as solution
The efficiency-oriented part of the literature on informal governance points to institutional costs as a reason for governments to prefer to cooperate with each other through commitments that are not binding. Left unexplained is what I call the dilemma of informal governance: how informal governance copes with the problem of cheating, to which formal governance has traditionally provided the solution. I show that like-mindedness, the current solu…
Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Regime Design
Different international regimes are built from legal instruments that vary in terms of whether they are multilateral, bilateral, or a combination thereof. We investigate the reasons for such variation. The choice between multilateralism and bilateralism is a function of the tradeoff between each instrument's relative flaw. Multilateralism is wasteful in incentives, as the same agreement is offered to all states regardless of their compliance cost…
Successful and Failed Screening Mechanisms in the Two Gulf Wars
The article addresses the question of how status-quo states can identify revisionist threats. After recasting the question within the collective security and social learning literatures, the article presents and models a new mechanism for the collective identification of threats — screening. It then identifies several conditions for the existence of screening mechanisms, among which states' mutual dependence on one another's support to enforce th…
Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime
I use the nuclear proliferation regime to show that dyadic diplomacy is not necessarily incompatible with the building of a multilateral regime; bilateralism is not the opposite of multilateralism, but an efficient component thereof. Although this point will not be new to most students of institutions, no general rationale has so far been offered on the complementarity of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Starting from a characterization of p…
European Integration as a Solution to War
We seek to establish the conditions in which binding international institutions can serve as a solution to preventive war. Scholars of international integration portray institutions as a response to problems of incomplete information, transaction costs and other barriers to welfare improvement for their members. In contrast, we show that international institutions can have binding properties that solve credible commitment problems among member st…
Introduction
Institutional reforms have up to now always preceded or immediately followed any major enlargement round of the European Union, fueling functionalist hopes that the organization will ultimately become a nation-state. Yet the prolonged failure to redistribute power effectively between member states, the Commission, the Parliament, and the European Court of Justice means that these past successes have also stretched the size and the institutions of…
Capital Mobility and the Origins of Stock Markets
I illustrate the accepted, though hardly researched, idea that political institutions play a role in locking in factor specificity across sectors, space, and borders. I use the emergence of modern capital markets in the nineteenth century, a process that threatened to redeploy financial resources away from land and traditional sectors to heavy industry, as a test case to ascertain the degree of domestic financial capital mobility in nine advanced…
Europeanization and Globalization
The authors attempt to sort out three exogenous factors affecting the domestic societies of European Union (EU) member countries: market globalization, the European single market, and European supranational institutions. They offer a research design to separate the respective manifestations of each factor and apply it to four domestic dimensions: labor market, capital market, electoral competition, and center-local government relations. Although …
The Rise and Fall of State Banking in OECD Countries
State banking is the intervention of the state in the allocation of credit. State banking became important during the course of this century in some Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries but not in others and then declined in the 1980s. Why? State banking was demanded by sectors that were pressed to invest but that could not find access to long-term credit because of the marginal importance of small and local bank…
State and Finance in the OECD
How are financial systems ordered in OECD countries? How is that order changing in the face of globalization? These two questions form the rationale for the present essay. The standard literature points to the rise of markets and the relative decline of states in the ordering of financial markets. I show that this proposition is partially correct at best and that behind the retreat of states from the active allocation of credit, the structure of …
Domestic Responses to Capital Market Internationalization Under the Gold Standard, 1870–1914
The internationalization of capital markets that occurred during the era of the classical gold standard (1870-1914) was part of a broader set of trends that threatened to drain local markets from capital and channel that capital to the national financial center and, from there, toward other national financial centers. Still, internationalization was neither inevitable, uniform, nor irreversible but was a political choice informed by redistributio…
Democratic Convergence and Free Trade
Even if a democracy were more likely to pursue free trade than an autocracy (an unproven generalization), the simultaneous spread of democracy in the world would not necessarily yield a reduction in protection, but might in fact cause an increase. The reason for this paradoxical outcome is the fact that democratic convergence creates power profiles identical across nations. Similar regimes tend to empower the same classes of producers, with the r…
Democratization and Trade Liberalization in Industrial Capitalist Countries, 1830s to 1930s
Are democracies more likely to pursue free trade than autocracies? Turn-of-the-last-century liberals believed that democracies were more likely to engage in trade than absolutist monarchies (Doyle 1986:1161; Thomson 1966:462). “The majority consists of bread eaters,” wrote the French economist Frédéric Bastiat (1862: 102–3). The argument according to which democracy is less bellicose than autocracy does sometimes rest on the assumption that democ…
Are All Politics Domestic? Perspectives on the Integration of Comparative Politics and International Relations Theories
Democracy and International Trade
Journal Article Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France, and the United States, 1860-1990. Get access Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France, and the United States, 1860-1990. By Verdier (Daniel). (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pp. xx + 387. £35.00 hardback, US $45.00 hardback. ISBN 0 691 03224 6.) Kevin O'Rourke Kevin O'Rourke University College, Dublin Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Ac…
Reply to Gilligan and Garrett
The Politics of Public Aid to Private Industry
Firms lobby for subsidies along geographic, sector, or factor lines and, as a result, receive subsidies with a local, sectoral, or factorwide scope. This article investigates what determines the line of cleavage and thereby the scope of the subsidy. The factor mobility hypothesis, according to which an economic prior—the degree of factor mobility—determines the geometry of lobbying coalitions, misses the fact that factor mobility is as much the p…
The Politics of Trade Preference Formation
L'A. interroge la pertinence theorique et empirique de l'hypothese selon laquelle les preferences commerciales sont un reflet de la position du producteur dans l'economie. Il soutient que pour la plupart des producteurs, les preferences commerciales ne sont pas fixees et exogenes au processus democratique, mais sont choisies en reponse aux contraintes electorales. L'A. presente un modele d'objectif de l'industriel et l'applique au « big business …
Current Africana No.19
Paris 2
Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime
I use the nuclear proliferation regime to show that dyadic diplomacy is not necessarily incompatible with the building of a multilateral regime; bilateralism is not the opposite of multilateralism, but an efficient component thereof. Although this point will not be new to most students of institutions, no general rationale has so far been offered on the complementarity of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Starting from a characterization of p…
Europeanization and Globalization
The authors attempt to sort out three exogenous factors affecting the domestic societies of European Union (EU) member countries: market globalization, the European single market, and European supranational institutions. They offer a research design to separate the respective manifestations of each factor and apply it to four domestic dimensions: labor market, capital market, electoral competition, and center-local government relations. Although …
Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Regime Design
Different international regimes are built from legal instruments that vary in terms of whether they are multilateral, bilateral, or a combination thereof. We investigate the reasons for such variation. The choice between multilateralism and bilateralism is a function of the tradeoff between each instrument's relative flaw. Multilateralism is wasteful in incentives, as the same agreement is offered to all states regardless of their compliance cost…
Democratic Convergence and Free Trade
Even if a democracy were more likely to pursue free trade than an autocracy (an unproven generalization), the simultaneous spread of democracy in the world would not necessarily yield a reduction in protection, but might in fact cause an increase. The reason for this paradoxical outcome is the fact that democratic convergence creates power profiles identical across nations. Similar regimes tend to empower the same classes of producers, with the r…
Democracy and International Trade
Journal Article Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France, and the United States, 1860-1990. Get access Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France, and the United States, 1860-1990. By Verdier (Daniel). (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pp. xx + 387. £35.00 hardback, US $45.00 hardback. ISBN 0 691 03224 6.) Kevin O'Rourke Kevin O'Rourke University College, Dublin Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Ac…
The Politics of Public Aid to Private Industry
Firms lobby for subsidies along geographic, sector, or factor lines and, as a result, receive subsidies with a local, sectoral, or factorwide scope. This article investigates what determines the line of cleavage and thereby the scope of the subsidy. The factor mobility hypothesis, according to which an economic prior—the degree of factor mobility—determines the geometry of lobbying coalitions, misses the fact that factor mobility is as much the p…
Domestic Responses to Capital Market Internationalization Under the Gold Standard, 1870–1914
The internationalization of capital markets that occurred during the era of the classical gold standard (1870-1914) was part of a broader set of trends that threatened to drain local markets from capital and channel that capital to the national financial center and, from there, toward other national financial centers. Still, internationalization was neither inevitable, uniform, nor irreversible but was a political choice informed by redistributio…
Are All Politics Domestic? Perspectives on the Integration of Comparative Politics and International Relations Theories
The Rise and Fall of State Banking in OECD Countries
State banking is the intervention of the state in the allocation of credit. State banking became important during the course of this century in some Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries but not in others and then declined in the 1980s. Why? State banking was demanded by sectors that were pressed to invest but that could not find access to long-term credit because of the marginal importance of small and local bank…
European Integration as a Solution to War
We seek to establish the conditions in which binding international institutions can serve as a solution to preventive war. Scholars of international integration portray institutions as a response to problems of incomplete information, transaction costs and other barriers to welfare improvement for their members. In contrast, we show that international institutions can have binding properties that solve credible commitment problems among member st…
Capital Mobility and the Origins of Stock Markets
I illustrate the accepted, though hardly researched, idea that political institutions play a role in locking in factor specificity across sectors, space, and borders. I use the emergence of modern capital markets in the nineteenth century, a process that threatened to redeploy financial resources away from land and traditional sectors to heavy industry, as a test case to ascertain the degree of domestic financial capital mobility in nine advanced…
State and Finance in the OECD
How are financial systems ordered in OECD countries? How is that order changing in the face of globalization? These two questions form the rationale for the present essay. The standard literature points to the rise of markets and the relative decline of states in the ordering of financial markets. I show that this proposition is partially correct at best and that behind the retreat of states from the active allocation of credit, the structure of …
Democratization and Trade Liberalization in Industrial Capitalist Countries, 1830s to 1930s
Are democracies more likely to pursue free trade than autocracies? Turn-of-the-last-century liberals believed that democracies were more likely to engage in trade than absolutist monarchies (Doyle 1986:1161; Thomson 1966:462). “The majority consists of bread eaters,” wrote the French economist Frédéric Bastiat (1862: 102–3). The argument according to which democracy is less bellicose than autocracy does sometimes rest on the assumption that democ…
The Politics of Trade Preference Formation
L'A. interroge la pertinence theorique et empirique de l'hypothese selon laquelle les preferences commerciales sont un reflet de la position du producteur dans l'economie. Il soutient que pour la plupart des producteurs, les preferences commerciales ne sont pas fixees et exogenes au processus democratique, mais sont choisies en reponse aux contraintes electorales. L'A. presente un modele d'objectif de l'industriel et l'applique au « big business …
The dilemma of informal governance with outside option as solution
The efficiency-oriented part of the literature on informal governance points to institutional costs as a reason for governments to prefer to cooperate with each other through commitments that are not binding. Left unexplained is what I call the dilemma of informal governance: how informal governance copes with the problem of cheating, to which formal governance has traditionally provided the solution. I show that like-mindedness, the current solu…
Current Africana No.19
Paris 2
The Politics of Trade Preference Formation
L'A. interroge la pertinence theorique et empirique de l'hypothese selon laquelle les preferences commerciales sont un reflet de la position du producteur dans l'economie. Il soutient que pour la plupart des producteurs, les preferences commerciales ne sont pas fixees et exogenes au processus democratique, mais sont choisies en reponse aux contraintes electorales. L'A. presente un modele d'objectif de l'industriel et l'applique au « big business …
Democracy and International Trade
Journal Article Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France, and the United States, 1860-1990. Get access Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France, and the United States, 1860-1990. By Verdier (Daniel). (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pp. xx + 387. £35.00 hardback, US $45.00 hardback. ISBN 0 691 03224 6.) Kevin O'Rourke Kevin O'Rourke University College, Dublin Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Ac…
Reply to Gilligan and Garrett
The Politics of Public Aid to Private Industry
Firms lobby for subsidies along geographic, sector, or factor lines and, as a result, receive subsidies with a local, sectoral, or factorwide scope. This article investigates what determines the line of cleavage and thereby the scope of the subsidy. The factor mobility hypothesis, according to which an economic prior—the degree of factor mobility—determines the geometry of lobbying coalitions, misses the fact that factor mobility is as much the p…
Are All Politics Domestic? Perspectives on the Integration of Comparative Politics and International Relations Theories
Domestic Responses to Capital Market Internationalization Under the Gold Standard, 1870–1914
The internationalization of capital markets that occurred during the era of the classical gold standard (1870-1914) was part of a broader set of trends that threatened to drain local markets from capital and channel that capital to the national financial center and, from there, toward other national financial centers. Still, internationalization was neither inevitable, uniform, nor irreversible but was a political choice informed by redistributio…
Democratic Convergence and Free Trade
Even if a democracy were more likely to pursue free trade than an autocracy (an unproven generalization), the simultaneous spread of democracy in the world would not necessarily yield a reduction in protection, but might in fact cause an increase. The reason for this paradoxical outcome is the fact that democratic convergence creates power profiles identical across nations. Similar regimes tend to empower the same classes of producers, with the r…
Democratization and Trade Liberalization in Industrial Capitalist Countries, 1830s to 1930s
Are democracies more likely to pursue free trade than autocracies? Turn-of-the-last-century liberals believed that democracies were more likely to engage in trade than absolutist monarchies (Doyle 1986:1161; Thomson 1966:462). “The majority consists of bread eaters,” wrote the French economist Frédéric Bastiat (1862: 102–3). The argument according to which democracy is less bellicose than autocracy does sometimes rest on the assumption that democ…
The Rise and Fall of State Banking in OECD Countries
State banking is the intervention of the state in the allocation of credit. State banking became important during the course of this century in some Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries but not in others and then declined in the 1980s. Why? State banking was demanded by sectors that were pressed to invest but that could not find access to long-term credit because of the marginal importance of small and local bank…
State and Finance in the OECD
How are financial systems ordered in OECD countries? How is that order changing in the face of globalization? These two questions form the rationale for the present essay. The standard literature points to the rise of markets and the relative decline of states in the ordering of financial markets. I show that this proposition is partially correct at best and that behind the retreat of states from the active allocation of credit, the structure of …
Capital Mobility and the Origins of Stock Markets
I illustrate the accepted, though hardly researched, idea that political institutions play a role in locking in factor specificity across sectors, space, and borders. I use the emergence of modern capital markets in the nineteenth century, a process that threatened to redeploy financial resources away from land and traditional sectors to heavy industry, as a test case to ascertain the degree of domestic financial capital mobility in nine advanced…
Europeanization and Globalization
The authors attempt to sort out three exogenous factors affecting the domestic societies of European Union (EU) member countries: market globalization, the European single market, and European supranational institutions. They offer a research design to separate the respective manifestations of each factor and apply it to four domestic dimensions: labor market, capital market, electoral competition, and center-local government relations. Although …
Introduction
Institutional reforms have up to now always preceded or immediately followed any major enlargement round of the European Union, fueling functionalist hopes that the organization will ultimately become a nation-state. Yet the prolonged failure to redistribute power effectively between member states, the Commission, the Parliament, and the European Court of Justice means that these past successes have also stretched the size and the institutions of…
European Integration as a Solution to War
We seek to establish the conditions in which binding international institutions can serve as a solution to preventive war. Scholars of international integration portray institutions as a response to problems of incomplete information, transaction costs and other barriers to welfare improvement for their members. In contrast, we show that international institutions can have binding properties that solve credible commitment problems among member st…
Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime
I use the nuclear proliferation regime to show that dyadic diplomacy is not necessarily incompatible with the building of a multilateral regime; bilateralism is not the opposite of multilateralism, but an efficient component thereof. Although this point will not be new to most students of institutions, no general rationale has so far been offered on the complementarity of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Starting from a characterization of p…
Successful and Failed Screening Mechanisms in the Two Gulf Wars
The article addresses the question of how status-quo states can identify revisionist threats. After recasting the question within the collective security and social learning literatures, the article presents and models a new mechanism for the collective identification of threats — screening. It then identifies several conditions for the existence of screening mechanisms, among which states' mutual dependence on one another's support to enforce th…
Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Regime Design
Different international regimes are built from legal instruments that vary in terms of whether they are multilateral, bilateral, or a combination thereof. We investigate the reasons for such variation. The choice between multilateralism and bilateralism is a function of the tradeoff between each instrument's relative flaw. Multilateralism is wasteful in incentives, as the same agreement is offered to all states regardless of their compliance cost…
The dilemma of informal governance with outside option as solution
The efficiency-oriented part of the literature on informal governance points to institutional costs as a reason for governments to prefer to cooperate with each other through commitments that are not binding. Left unexplained is what I call the dilemma of informal governance: how informal governance copes with the problem of cheating, to which formal governance has traditionally provided the solution. I show that like-mindedness, the current solu…
Political science (19 works) · Economics (17 works) · Politics (13 works) · Law (11 works) · Law (9 works) · International trade (8 works) · Market economy (7 works) · Political economy (7 works) · International economics (6 works) · Sociology (6 works)