Lisa Bortolotti
Biographic Data
| ID | 331056 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lisa Bortolotti |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lisa |
| FAMILY NAME | Bortolotti |
| SIGNATURE | BORTOLOTTI L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Birmingham |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0507-4650 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 33 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 14 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 33 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
I'm still here and my opinion matters
Epistemic injustice refers to wrongs done to individuals in their capacity as knowers, often due to prejudice or stereotypes. People living with dementia (PLWD) are particularly vulnerable to epistemic injustice due to the cognitive, emotional and social aspects of their condition and this could negatively affect their quality of life. This scoping review aims to map the available evidence on how epistemic injustice can influence the experience o…
Is all talk about the mind metaphorical
In his influential and provocative book, Mind as Metaphor, Adam Toon defends mental fictionalism, the view according to which there is no mind, but when we talk about the mental world of others we
Dennett’s powerful ideas
Daniel Dennett’s work has been incredibly influential. This influence is reflected in proposed theoretical solutions to long-standing philosophical problems, such as the nature of consciousness and
Philosophy for and by Everyone
Dans cet article, nous soutenons que la pratique de la philosophie est bénéfique au public. En engageant leurs connaissances et leurs méthodes philosophiques, les agents épistémiques développent leur capacité à acquérir, produire, partager et utiliser des connaissances à la poursuite de leurs fins. Pour préciser ce que peut impliquer « faire de la philosophie », nous nous appuyons sur la littérature pédagogique et philosophique récente et présent…
Philosophy for and by Everyone
On evidential vulnerability and compartmentalization
In the Twisted Fairytale of Human Agency, Irrational Beliefs Are the Unlikely Heroes
Agency is our capacity to intervene in the world to pursue our goals. It is commonly assumed that we need to be rational in order to be effective agents, and that rational agency is also something that contributes to our mental health. Indeed, several medical interventions aimed at improving functioning are interpreted as a way to restore rational capacities that had been previously compromised. However, research in cognitive and social psycholog…
The Ant and the Grasshopper
This paper starts from an observation of our practices: when people are ascribed delusional beliefs or conspiracy beliefs, they tend to be excluded from shared epistemic projects relevant to the content of their beliefs. What might motivate this exclusion? One possibility is that delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs are considered as evidence of irrationality and pathology, and thus endorsing them suggests that one’s epistemic agency is comp…
Is it pathological to believe conspiracy theories
According to a naturalist conception of what counts as a disorder, conspiracy beliefs are pathological beliefs if they are the outcome of a cognitive dysfunction. In this article, I take issue with the view that it is pathological to believe a conspiracy theory. After reviewing several approaches to the aetiology of conspiracy beliefs, I find that no approach compels us to view conspiracy beliefs as the outcome of a dysfunction: a speaker's consp…
Why We Should Be Curious about Each Other
Is curiosity a virtue or a vice? Curiosity, as a disposition to attain new, worthwhile information, can manifest as an epistemic virtue. When the disposition to attain new information is not manifested virtuously, this is either because the agent lacks the appropriate motivation to attain the information or because the agent has poor judgement, seeking information that is not worthwhile or seeking information by inappropriate means. In the right …
Challenges and achievements for Philosophical Psychology
A Journey into the Mind
In this issue, we present two symposia on recent, influential books which have already sparked important research in philosophy and psychology. A common characteristic of these two very different b
Are Conspiracy Beliefs Epistemically Innocent
When people share a nonmainstream explanation of a significant event and the explanation involves a plot, that explanation is often called a conspiracy theory. As Karen Douglas and her collaborators have persuasively argued, conspiracy theories respond to people’s need for a causal explanation of the significant event, and also address their needs for closure, control, and uniqueness. Conspiracy theories do not always lead to social exclusion and…
Implying implausibility and undermining versus accepting peoples’ experiences of suicidal ideation and self-harm in Emergency Department psychosocial assessments
These findings advance our understanding of how peoples' experiences of suicidality or self-harm are undermined or accepted in mental health encounters in the ED. They have important clinical implications: patients report that when their experiences are not accepted or undermined, this makes them more distressed, less hopeful about the future and discourages future help-seeking when in crisis. Conversely, acknowledging, accepting and validating s…
Communication in youth mental health clinical encounters
When young people seek support from mental health care practitioners, the encounters may affect the young people’s sense of self, and in particular undermine their sense of agency. For this study, an interdisciplinary team of academics and young people collaboratively analysed video-recorded encounters between young people and mental healthcare practitioners in emergency services. They identified five communication techniques that practitioners c…
Sharing responsibility for conspiracy beliefs
In this paper, I borrow Neil Levy’s account of bad beliefs as a starting point to discuss how the social turn in epistemology affects our understanding of the formation, persistence, and spreading of conspiracy beliefs. Despite the recent convergence of philosophers and psychologists on the importance of studying the social dimensions of cognition, current models of conspiracy beliefs differ substantially as to the role that agents have in adopti…
Do delusions have and give meaning
Delusions are often portrayed as paradigmatic instances of incomprehensibility and meaninglessness. Here we investigate the relationship between delusions and meaning from a philosophical perspective, integrating arguments and evidence from cognitive psychology and phenomenological psychopathology. We review some of the empirical and philosophical literature relevant to two claims about delusions and meaning: (1) delusions are meaningful, despite…
A new Philosophical Psychology
Through the years, Philosophical Psychology has played an important role in supporting both philosophers who do interdisciplinary research and cognitive scientists who care about the philosophical
Putting scientific realism into perspective
In this paper, we offer a brief overview of the debate between realism and anti-realism in the philosophy of science. On the background of that debate, we consider two recently developed approaches aimed at vindicating realist intuitions while acknowledging the limitations of scientific knowledge. Perspectivalists explain disagreement in science without giving up the idea that currently accepted scientific theories describe reality largely accura…
Stories as evidence
People often use personal stories to support and defend their views. But can a personal story be evidence? A story tells us that a certain event can happen and has already happened to someone, but it may not always help us understand what caused the event or predict how likely that event is to happen again in the future. Moreover, people confabulate. That is, when they tell stories about their past, they are likely to distort reality in some way.…
Is choice blindness a case of self-ignorance
When subject to the choice-blindness effect, an agent gives reasons for making choice B, moments after making the alternative choice A. Choice blindness has been studied in a variety of contexts, from consumer choice and aesthetic judgement to moral and political attitudes. The pervasiveness and robustness of the effect is regarded as powerful evidence of self-ignorance. Here we compare two interpretations of choice blindness. On the choice error…
Threats to epistemic agency in young people with unusual experiences and beliefs
A good therapeutic relationship in mental health services is a predictor of positive clinical outcomes for people who seek help for distressing experiences, such as voice hearing and paranoia. One factor that may affect the quality of the therapeutic relationship and raises further ethical issues is the impact of the clinical encounter on users’ sense of self, and in particular on their sense of agency. In the paper, we discuss some of the reason…
Unrealistic optimism – Its nature, causes and effects
What is unrealistic optimism
Here we consider the nature of unrealistic optimism and other related positive illusions. We are interested in whether cognitive states that are unrealistically optimistic are belief states, whether they are false, and whether they are epistemically irrational. We also ask to what extent unrealistically optimistic cognitive states are fixed. Based on the classic and recent empirical literature on unrealistic optimism, we offer some preliminary an…
Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia
In this article I ask whether elaborated and systematized delusions emerging in the context of schizophrenia have the potential for epistemic innocence. Cognitions are epistemically innocent if they have significant epistemic benefits that could not be attained otherwise. In particular, I propose that a cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some significant epistemic benefit to a given agent at a given time, and if alternative cognit…
Is it pathological to believe conspiracy theories
According to a naturalist conception of what counts as a disorder, conspiracy beliefs are pathological beliefs if they are the outcome of a cognitive dysfunction. In this article, I take issue with the view that it is pathological to believe a conspiracy theory. After reviewing several approaches to the aetiology of conspiracy beliefs, I find that no approach compels us to view conspiracy beliefs as the outcome of a dysfunction: a speaker's consp…
Threats to epistemic agency in young people with unusual experiences and beliefs
A good therapeutic relationship in mental health services is a predictor of positive clinical outcomes for people who seek help for distressing experiences, such as voice hearing and paranoia. One factor that may affect the quality of the therapeutic relationship and raises further ethical issues is the impact of the clinical encounter on users’ sense of self, and in particular on their sense of agency. In the paper, we discuss some of the reason…
Recent Work on the Nature and Development of Delusions
In this paper we review two debates in the current literature on clinical delusions. One debate is about what delusions are. If delusions are beliefs, why are they described as failing to play the causal roles that characterise beliefs, such as being responsive to evidence and guiding action? The other debate is about how delusions develop. What processes lead people to form delusions and maintain them in the face of challenges and counter-eviden…
Stories as evidence
People often use personal stories to support and defend their views. But can a personal story be evidence? A story tells us that a certain event can happen and has already happened to someone, but it may not always help us understand what caused the event or predict how likely that event is to happen again in the future. Moreover, people confabulate. That is, when they tell stories about their past, they are likely to distort reality in some way.…
Is choice blindness a case of self-ignorance
When subject to the choice-blindness effect, an agent gives reasons for making choice B, moments after making the alternative choice A. Choice blindness has been studied in a variety of contexts, from consumer choice and aesthetic judgement to moral and political attitudes. The pervasiveness and robustness of the effect is regarded as powerful evidence of self-ignorance. Here we compare two interpretations of choice blindness. On the choice error…
‘Faultless’ ignorance
The Epistemic Benefits of Reason Giving
There is an apparent tension in current accounts of the relationship between reason giving and self-knowledge. Philosophers like Richard Moran (2001) claim that deliberation and justification can give rise to first-person authority over the attitudes that subjects form or defend on the basis of what they take to be their best reasons. On the other hand, the psychological evidence on introspection effects and the literature on elusive reasons sugg…
Natural versus Assisted Reproduction
In this paper, we are concerned with the ethical implications of the distinction between natural reproduction (via sexual intercourse) and reproduction that requires assistance (either medical or social). We argue that the current practice of enforcing regulations on the latter but not on the former means of reproduction is ethically unjustified. It is not defensible to tolerate parental ignorance or abuse in natural reproduction and subsequently…
Psychiatric Classification and Diagnosis
Delusions and confabulations occurring in psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, amnesic syndromes, and dementia, are defined on the basis of their surface features. In particular, they are classified and diagnosed as beliefs that violate norms of rationality. In this paper the author argues that current epistemic accounts fail to provide sufficient conditions for delusions and confabulations. Moreover, the identified epistemic faults canno…
The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions
Delusions are defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. However, in the empirical literature, delusions have been found to have some psychological benefits. One proposal is that some delusions defuse negative emotions and protect one from low self-esteem by allowing motivational influences on belief formation. In this paper I focus on delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function (motivated delusions) an…
Costs and Benefits of Imperfect Cognitions
Introduction to the special issue
Recent Work on the Nature and Development of Delusions
In this paper we review two debates in the current literature on clinical delusions. One debate is about what delusions are. If delusions are beliefs, why are they described as failing to play the causal roles that characterise beliefs, such as being responsive to evidence and guiding action? The other debate is about how delusions develop. What processes lead people to form delusions and maintain them in the face of challenges and counter-eviden…
Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia
In this article I ask whether elaborated and systematized delusions emerging in the context of schizophrenia have the potential for epistemic innocence. Cognitions are epistemically innocent if they have significant epistemic benefits that could not be attained otherwise. In particular, I propose that a cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some significant epistemic benefit to a given agent at a given time, and if alternative cognit…
Moral Preferences
In this brief response to Etzioni's paper we argue that satisfying one's preferences and seeking to live up to one's moral standards are not incompatible ways of living one's life, and that choosing to act morally need not involve self-sacrifice
Unrealistic optimism – Its nature, causes and effects
What is unrealistic optimism
Here we consider the nature of unrealistic optimism and other related positive illusions. We are interested in whether cognitive states that are unrealistically optimistic are belief states, whether they are false, and whether they are epistemically irrational. We also ask to what extent unrealistically optimistic cognitive states are fixed. Based on the classic and recent empirical literature on unrealistic optimism, we offer some preliminary an…
Is choice blindness a case of self-ignorance
When subject to the choice-blindness effect, an agent gives reasons for making choice B, moments after making the alternative choice A. Choice blindness has been studied in a variety of contexts, from consumer choice and aesthetic judgement to moral and political attitudes. The pervasiveness and robustness of the effect is regarded as powerful evidence of self-ignorance. Here we compare two interpretations of choice blindness. On the choice error…
Threats to epistemic agency in young people with unusual experiences and beliefs
A good therapeutic relationship in mental health services is a predictor of positive clinical outcomes for people who seek help for distressing experiences, such as voice hearing and paranoia. One factor that may affect the quality of the therapeutic relationship and raises further ethical issues is the impact of the clinical encounter on users’ sense of self, and in particular on their sense of agency. In the paper, we discuss some of the reason…
Communication in youth mental health clinical encounters
When young people seek support from mental health care practitioners, the encounters may affect the young people’s sense of self, and in particular undermine their sense of agency. For this study, an interdisciplinary team of academics and young people collaboratively analysed video-recorded encounters between young people and mental healthcare practitioners in emergency services. They identified five communication techniques that practitioners c…
Sharing responsibility for conspiracy beliefs
In this paper, I borrow Neil Levy’s account of bad beliefs as a starting point to discuss how the social turn in epistemology affects our understanding of the formation, persistence, and spreading of conspiracy beliefs. Despite the recent convergence of philosophers and psychologists on the importance of studying the social dimensions of cognition, current models of conspiracy beliefs differ substantially as to the role that agents have in adopti…
Do delusions have and give meaning
Delusions are often portrayed as paradigmatic instances of incomprehensibility and meaninglessness. Here we investigate the relationship between delusions and meaning from a philosophical perspective, integrating arguments and evidence from cognitive psychology and phenomenological psychopathology. We review some of the empirical and philosophical literature relevant to two claims about delusions and meaning: (1) delusions are meaningful, despite…
A new Philosophical Psychology
Through the years, Philosophical Psychology has played an important role in supporting both philosophers who do interdisciplinary research and cognitive scientists who care about the philosophical
Putting scientific realism into perspective
In this paper, we offer a brief overview of the debate between realism and anti-realism in the philosophy of science. On the background of that debate, we consider two recently developed approaches aimed at vindicating realist intuitions while acknowledging the limitations of scientific knowledge. Perspectivalists explain disagreement in science without giving up the idea that currently accepted scientific theories describe reality largely accura…
Stories as evidence
People often use personal stories to support and defend their views. But can a personal story be evidence? A story tells us that a certain event can happen and has already happened to someone, but it may not always help us understand what caused the event or predict how likely that event is to happen again in the future. Moreover, people confabulate. That is, when they tell stories about their past, they are likely to distort reality in some way.…
Why We Should Be Curious about Each Other
Is curiosity a virtue or a vice? Curiosity, as a disposition to attain new, worthwhile information, can manifest as an epistemic virtue. When the disposition to attain new information is not manifested virtuously, this is either because the agent lacks the appropriate motivation to attain the information or because the agent has poor judgement, seeking information that is not worthwhile or seeking information by inappropriate means. In the right …
Challenges and achievements for Philosophical Psychology
A Journey into the Mind
In this issue, we present two symposia on recent, influential books which have already sparked important research in philosophy and psychology. A common characteristic of these two very different b
Are Conspiracy Beliefs Epistemically Innocent
When people share a nonmainstream explanation of a significant event and the explanation involves a plot, that explanation is often called a conspiracy theory. As Karen Douglas and her collaborators have persuasively argued, conspiracy theories respond to people’s need for a causal explanation of the significant event, and also address their needs for closure, control, and uniqueness. Conspiracy theories do not always lead to social exclusion and…
Implying implausibility and undermining versus accepting peoples’ experiences of suicidal ideation and self-harm in Emergency Department psychosocial assessments
These findings advance our understanding of how peoples' experiences of suicidality or self-harm are undermined or accepted in mental health encounters in the ED. They have important clinical implications: patients report that when their experiences are not accepted or undermined, this makes them more distressed, less hopeful about the future and discourages future help-seeking when in crisis. Conversely, acknowledging, accepting and validating s…
The Ant and the Grasshopper
This paper starts from an observation of our practices: when people are ascribed delusional beliefs or conspiracy beliefs, they tend to be excluded from shared epistemic projects relevant to the content of their beliefs. What might motivate this exclusion? One possibility is that delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs are considered as evidence of irrationality and pathology, and thus endorsing them suggests that one’s epistemic agency is comp…
Psychology (26 works) · Philosophy (20 works) · Epistemology (19 works) · Social Psychology (16 works) · Cognition (9 works) · Cognitive psychology (7 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (7 works) · Cognitive science (6 works) · Psychiatry (6 works) · Sociology (6 works)