Hamid Taieb

Biographic Data

ID334309
NAMEHamid Taieb
GIVEN NAMESHamid
FAMILY NAMETaieb
SIGNATURETAIEB H
AFFILIATIONSUniversität Hamburg
ORCID0000-0003-3066-0387
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS10
TOTAL CITATIONS5
WORKS AS AUTHOR9
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2014
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX1

  • Hervaeus Natalis on the Cognition of Particulars

    Hamid TaiebARTICLEVivarium2025

    The aim of this article is to present Hervaeus Natalis’s account of the cognition of particulars by the intellect. Hervaeus develops the view commonly found in the early scholastic period that the intellect grasps particulars by looking at a sensory image of them, or what medieval thinkers call a “phantasm.” In developing this view, he describes in detail how the intellection in question occurs, and defends the view against some objections. Herva…

  • Brentano on the individuation of mental acts

    Open AccessHamid TaiebARTICLEEuropean Journal of Philosophy2023

    This paper aims to present and evaluate Brentano's account of the individuation of mental acts. In his early works, Brentano assimilated mental acts to tropes; however, he encountered difficulties in explaining their individuation, since the usual solutions for the individuation of tropes were not readily applicable to his theory of mental acts. In a later period, Brentano introduced into his psychology what he called the “soul,” and this allowed…

  • Descriptive psychology

    Open AccessGuillaume Fréchette, Hamid TaiebARTICLEEuropean Journal of Philosophy2023

    What does it mean for a thought, idea, belief, or wish to be about something? And what do we mean when we say that we are aware of thinking, presenting, believing, or wishing when we do? Much of the philosophy of mind of the 20th and 21st centuries has focused on these two questions. Perhaps due to a certain dominant way of doing the history of philosophy in England and the United States after the Second World War, the history of these two questi…

  • How to divide a(n individual) mind

    Hamid TaiebARTICLEInquiry2023

    This paper addresses the issue of how to best account for the diversity of our (synchronic) mental activities. The discussion starts with Mark Textor’s mental monism. According to mental monism, our mental life is constituted by just one simple mental act, in which different sub-acts can be conceptually distinguished. Textor grounds this view in the work of the early Brentano and contrasts it with the theory of the later Brentano, who introduces …

  • Reinach on the essence of colours

    Open AccessHamid TaiebARTICLESynthese2023References: 21

    This paper aims to present and evaluate the (unduly neglected) account of the essence of colours developed by the early phenomenologist Adolf Reinach. Reinach claims that colours, as regards their nature or essence, are physical entities. He is opposed to the idea that colours are “subjective” or “psychic”. It might be the case that the colours we see in the world do not exist but are mere appearances. However, their non-existence would not entai…

  • The Structure and Extension of (Proto)Type Concepts

    Hamid TaiebARTICLEHistory and Philosophy of Logic2022

    This paper aims to reassess a notion in the works of the later Husserl that is both historically important and philosophically insightful, but remains understudied, namely, that of type. In opposition to a standard reading which treats Husserl’s type presentations as pre-conceptual habits, this paper argues that these representations are a specific kind of concept. More precisely, it shows that Husserl’s account of type presentations is akin to t…

  • A Paleo-Criticism of Modes of Being

    Open AccessHamid TaiebARTICLEErgo an Open Access Journal of…2021

    Brentanians defend the view that there are distinct types of object, but that this does not entail the admission of different modes of being. The most general distinction among objects is the one between realia, which are causally efficacious, and irrealia, which are causally inert. As for being, which is equated with existence, it is understood in terms of “correct acknowledgeability.” This view was defended for some time by Brentano himself and…

  • Acts of the State and Representation in Edith Stein

    Open AccessHamid TaiebARTICLEJournal of Social Ontology2020Cited by: 4References: 17

    This paper discusses the thesis defended by Edith Stein that certain acts can be attributed to the State. According to Stein, the State is a social structure characterized by sovereignty. As such, it is responsible for the production, interpretation, and application of law. These tasks require the performance of acts, most of which are what Stein calls 'social acts' like enactments and orders. For Stein, the acts in question are made by the organ…

  • Relational Intentionality

    Open AccessHamid TaiebBOOKRelational Intentionality2018

  • Auguste Comte et la philosophie positive

    Open AccessFranz Brentano, Denis Fisette et al.TRANSLATORARTICLELes Cahiers philosophiques de…2014Cited by: 1

    Dans cet article de 1869, il s'agit pour le jeune Brentano (1838-1917) de convaincre ses lecteurs de la viabilité de la philosophie positive et de montrer qu'elle ne représente pas une menace pour le théisme. C'est ce qui explique, en partie du moins, l'attitude conciliante que Brentano adopte à l'endroit du positivisme de Comte même là où ce dernier défendait des positions sensiblement différentes des siennes sur la religion. Brentano réinterprè…