Danny Buckley
Biographic Data
| ID | 334877 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Danny Buckley |
| GIVEN NAMES | Danny |
| FAMILY NAME | Buckley |
| SIGNATURE | BUCKLEY D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Leicester Castle Business School, UK |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7399-1381 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
On the Relevance of Self-Disclosure for Epistemic Responsibility
A number of authors have argued that, in order for S to be appropriately held morally responsible for some action or attitude (say, via moral blame), that action or attitude must somehow reflect or express a negative aspect of S’s (“true,” “deep,” or “real”) self. Recently, theorists of “epistemic blame” and “epistemic accountability” have also incorporated certain “self-disclosure” conditions into their accounts of these phenomena. In this paper…
Exploring Informal Work: Gaining Legitimation through Nudging
This article develops a micro-level understanding of informal work (IW) by exploring the legitimising factors which business owners exercise to provide the rationale for engaging in IW. Using the lens of nudge theory, originating from behavioural economics, we show how IW becomes legitimised through nudging . Empirically, we explore the lived experience of service sector business owners who engage in IW practices in the East Midlands, UK. The fin…
Against Evidential Minimalism: Reply to Hofmann
In this paper, I respond to Frank Hofmann's reply to my (2022) argument against “evidential minimalism” (EM). According to defenders of EM, there is a close connection between evidence and normative reasons for belief: evidence is either itself, or (under certain “minimal” conditions) gives rise to, a normative reason for belief. In my (2022), I argued against EM by showing that there are cases where: (i) S possesses strong evidence E for the tru…
Varieties of epistemic instrumentalism
Varieties of epistemic instrumentalism
Against Evidential Minimalism: Reply to Hofmann
In this paper, I respond to Frank Hofmann's reply to my (2022) argument against “evidential minimalism” (EM). According to defenders of EM, there is a close connection between evidence and normative reasons for belief: evidence is either itself, or (under certain “minimal” conditions) gives rise to, a normative reason for belief. In my (2022), I argued against EM by showing that there are cases where: (i) S possesses strong evidence E for the tru…
On the Relevance of Self-Disclosure for Epistemic Responsibility
A number of authors have argued that, in order for S to be appropriately held morally responsible for some action or attitude (say, via moral blame), that action or attitude must somehow reflect or express a negative aspect of S’s (“true,” “deep,” or “real”) self. Recently, theorists of “epistemic blame” and “epistemic accountability” have also incorporated certain “self-disclosure” conditions into their accounts of these phenomena. In this paper…
Exploring Informal Work: Gaining Legitimation through Nudging
This article develops a micro-level understanding of informal work (IW) by exploring the legitimising factors which business owners exercise to provide the rationale for engaging in IW. Using the lens of nudge theory, originating from behavioural economics, we show how IW becomes legitimised through nudging . Empirically, we explore the lived experience of service sector business owners who engage in IW practices in the East Midlands, UK. The fin…
Philosophy (3 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · Digital Economy and Work Transformation (1 works)