Charles G Morgan
Biographic Data
| ID | 338556 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Charles G Morgan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Charles G |
| FAMILY NAME | Morgan |
| SIGNATURE | MORGAN C G |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Alberta |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 58 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1970 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1984 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Probability functions and their assumption sets ? The binary case
Descriptive Statements, Covering Laws, and Theories in Archaeology [and Comments and Reply]
The paradigm for explanation in archaeology presented by the "new archaeologists" is reviewed and shown to need further elaboration. It is argued that that presentation has overemphasized the form of explanatory arguments and insufficiently considered their content. Not all explanatory arguments provide intuitively satisfactory explanations of particular observations. Instead, intuitively satisfactory explanations require general theories which s…
Liberated Brouwerian Modal Logic
In an attempt to “purify” logic of existential presuppositions, attention has recently focused on modal logics, where one usually assumes that at least one possible world exists. Systems very analogous to some of the standard modal systems have been developed which drop this presupposition. We will here treat the removal of the existential assumption from Brouwerian modal logic and discuss the relationship of the system so derived to other modal …
Explanation and scientific archaeology
In this brief note an attempt is made to point out some of the errors and confusions in the reply by Watson, LeBlanc and Redman to the author's previous critique
Omer on Scientific Explanation
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Archaeology and explanation
Recently archaeologists have been paying a great deal of attention to a particular philosophical analysis of explanation. A summary of this analysis and the problems associated with it are first given. A critique of recent attempts by archaeologists to incorporate this analysis follows. Finally, it is argued that rather than an end in itself, concern with explanation is a heuristic means to the end of acquiring information and knowledge
On Two Proposed Models of Explanation
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Kim on Deductive Explanation
In [2] Hempel and Oppenheim give a definition of “explanation” for a certain formal language. In [1] Eberle, Kaplan, and Montague prove five theorems demonstrating that the Hempel and Oppenheim definition is not restrictive enough. In [3] Kim proposes two further conditions to supplement the Hempel and Oppenheim definition in order to avoid the objections posed in [1]. In this paper it is shown that the definition of Hempel and Oppenheim suppleme…
Archaeology and explanation
Recently archaeologists have been paying a great deal of attention to a particular philosophical analysis of explanation. A summary of this analysis and the problems associated with it are first given. A critique of recent attempts by archaeologists to incorporate this analysis follows. Finally, it is argued that rather than an end in itself, concern with explanation is a heuristic means to the end of acquiring information and knowledge
Explanation and scientific archaeology
In this brief note an attempt is made to point out some of the errors and confusions in the reply by Watson, LeBlanc and Redman to the author's previous critique
Descriptive Statements, Covering Laws, and Theories in Archaeology [and Comments and Reply]
The paradigm for explanation in archaeology presented by the "new archaeologists" is reviewed and shown to need further elaboration. It is argued that that presentation has overemphasized the form of explanatory arguments and insufficiently considered their content. Not all explanatory arguments provide intuitively satisfactory explanations of particular observations. Instead, intuitively satisfactory explanations require general theories which s…
Kim on Deductive Explanation
In [2] Hempel and Oppenheim give a definition of “explanation” for a certain formal language. In [1] Eberle, Kaplan, and Montague prove five theorems demonstrating that the Hempel and Oppenheim definition is not restrictive enough. In [3] Kim proposes two further conditions to supplement the Hempel and Oppenheim definition in order to avoid the objections posed in [1]. In this paper it is shown that the definition of Hempel and Oppenheim suppleme…
On Two Proposed Models of Explanation
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Probability functions and their assumption sets ? The binary case
Omer on Scientific Explanation
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Kim on Deductive Explanation
In [2] Hempel and Oppenheim give a definition of “explanation” for a certain formal language. In [1] Eberle, Kaplan, and Montague prove five theorems demonstrating that the Hempel and Oppenheim definition is not restrictive enough. In [3] Kim proposes two further conditions to supplement the Hempel and Oppenheim definition in order to avoid the objections posed in [1]. In this paper it is shown that the definition of Hempel and Oppenheim suppleme…
On Two Proposed Models of Explanation
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Omer on Scientific Explanation
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Archaeology and explanation
Recently archaeologists have been paying a great deal of attention to a particular philosophical analysis of explanation. A summary of this analysis and the problems associated with it are first given. A critique of recent attempts by archaeologists to incorporate this analysis follows. Finally, it is argued that rather than an end in itself, concern with explanation is a heuristic means to the end of acquiring information and knowledge
Liberated Brouwerian Modal Logic
In an attempt to “purify” logic of existential presuppositions, attention has recently focused on modal logics, where one usually assumes that at least one possible world exists. Systems very analogous to some of the standard modal systems have been developed which drop this presupposition. We will here treat the removal of the existential assumption from Brouwerian modal logic and discuss the relationship of the system so derived to other modal …
Explanation and scientific archaeology
In this brief note an attempt is made to point out some of the errors and confusions in the reply by Watson, LeBlanc and Redman to the author's previous critique
Descriptive Statements, Covering Laws, and Theories in Archaeology [and Comments and Reply]
The paradigm for explanation in archaeology presented by the "new archaeologists" is reviewed and shown to need further elaboration. It is argued that that presentation has overemphasized the form of explanatory arguments and insufficiently considered their content. Not all explanatory arguments provide intuitively satisfactory explanations of particular observations. Instead, intuitively satisfactory explanations require general theories which s…
Probability functions and their assumption sets ? The binary case
Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Archaeology (3 works) · History (3 works) · History (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Archaeology and ancient environmental studies (2 works)