Thomas Metzinger
Biographic Data
| ID | 3431428 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Thomas Metzinger |
| GIVEN NAMES | Thomas |
| FAMILY NAME | Metzinger |
| SIGNATURE | METZINGER T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2514-7191 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 13 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Elephant and the Blind
Enlightment 2.0. An interview with Tomas Metzinger
2.0
The No‐Self Alternative
Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood
Video Ergo Sum
Humans normally experience the conscious self as localized within their bodily borders. This spatial unity may break down in certain neurological conditions such as out-of-body experiences, leading to a striking disturbance of bodily self-consciousness. On the basis of these clinical data, we designed an experiment that uses conflicting visual-somatosensory input in virtual reality to disrupt the spatial unity between the self and the body. We fo…
Being No One
According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analy…
Grounding the self in action
The emergence of a shared action ontology
Of course they do
Vicissitudes of Consciousness, Varieties of Correlates
Commentary on Jakab's “Ineffability of Qualia”
Neural Correlates of Consciousness
Subjekt und Selbstmodell
This book contains a representationalist theory of self-consciousness and of the phenomenal first-person perspective. It draws on empirical data from the cognitive and neurosciences
No prominent works on this page.
Subjekt und Selbstmodell
This book contains a representationalist theory of self-consciousness and of the phenomenal first-person perspective. It draws on empirical data from the cognitive and neurosciences
Commentary on Jakab's “Ineffability of Qualia”
Neural Correlates of Consciousness
Being No One
According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analy…
Grounding the self in action
The emergence of a shared action ontology
Of course they do
Vicissitudes of Consciousness, Varieties of Correlates
Video Ergo Sum
Humans normally experience the conscious self as localized within their bodily borders. This spatial unity may break down in certain neurological conditions such as out-of-body experiences, leading to a striking disturbance of bodily self-consciousness. On the basis of these clinical data, we designed an experiment that uses conflicting visual-somatosensory input in virtual reality to disrupt the spatial unity between the self and the body. We fo…
Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood
The No‐Self Alternative
Enlightment 2.0. An interview with Tomas Metzinger
2.0
Elephant and the Blind
Psychology (11 works) · Cognitive psychology (6 works) · Cognitive science (6 works) · Action Observation and Synchronization (5 works) · Consciousness (5 works) · Neuroscience (5 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (3 works) · Cognition (2 works) · Consciousness (2 works)