Erkan Yalcin
Biographic Data
| ID | 345466 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Erkan Yalcin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Erkan |
| FAMILY NAME | Yalcin |
| SIGNATURE | YALCIN E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Flinders University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9241-8874 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Endogenous Expropriation with Non-strategic Lobbying
This paper develops a theoretical model of political competition in which a lobby group provides financial support to candidates running for election in return for favorable policy outcomes. The lack of a legally binding contract may lead politicians to use campaign funds for their own personal benefit. However, this expropriation occurs entirely unexpected to the lobby group, which is non-strategic in nature. We find that there is a utility-maxi…
Money in Politics
We study how campaign funding influences winning chances of candidates using the US House of Representatives elections in all 50 states and Washington D.C. from 2000 to 2018. We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between campaign expenditure, campaign contributions and winning probability. However, incumbent spending is less effective than contender spending due to diminishing returns for the former. We also scrutinize the…
Lobbying, political competition and the welfare effect of campaign contribution tax
This paper develops a probabilistic voting model in which a single lobby group commits campaign contributions to parties, contingent on the policy position the party adopts. Parties may have different propensities for diverting campaign funds towards rents. We show that a party that skims more from contributions mobilises fewer uninformed voters but places more value on receiving greater contributions. Further, the contributions and vote share of…
The arbitrage pricing theorem with incomplete preferences
The arbitrage pricing theorem with incomplete preferences
Lobbying, political competition and the welfare effect of campaign contribution tax
This paper develops a probabilistic voting model in which a single lobby group commits campaign contributions to parties, contingent on the policy position the party adopts. Parties may have different propensities for diverting campaign funds towards rents. We show that a party that skims more from contributions mobilises fewer uninformed voters but places more value on receiving greater contributions. Further, the contributions and vote share of…
The arbitrage pricing theorem with incomplete preferences
Lobbying, political competition and the welfare effect of campaign contribution tax
This paper develops a probabilistic voting model in which a single lobby group commits campaign contributions to parties, contingent on the policy position the party adopts. Parties may have different propensities for diverting campaign funds towards rents. We show that a party that skims more from contributions mobilises fewer uninformed voters but places more value on receiving greater contributions. Further, the contributions and vote share of…
Money in Politics
We study how campaign funding influences winning chances of candidates using the US House of Representatives elections in all 50 states and Washington D.C. from 2000 to 2018. We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between campaign expenditure, campaign contributions and winning probability. However, incumbent spending is less effective than contender spending due to diminishing returns for the former. We also scrutinize the…
Endogenous Expropriation with Non-strategic Lobbying
This paper develops a theoretical model of political competition in which a lobby group provides financial support to candidates running for election in return for favorable policy outcomes. The lack of a legally binding contract may lead politicians to use campaign funds for their own personal benefit. However, this expropriation occurs entirely unexpected to the lobby group, which is non-strategic in nature. We find that there is a utility-maxi…
Economics (4 works) · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Market economy (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Public economics (2 works)