Petko Kusev
Biographic Data
| ID | 3480491 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Petko Kusev |
| GIVEN NAMES | Petko |
| FAMILY NAME | Kusev |
| SIGNATURE | KUSEV P |
| AFFILIATIONS | London South Bank University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0308-927X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 14 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The first attribute heuristic influences risky choice preferences
Behavioral science research indicates that people appear to construct their risk preferences 'on the fly', informed by decision making context and task (Kusev et al., 2020). However, very little research has explored people's psychological processing during decision-making 'on the fly'. Accordingly, in this article we propose, explore, and establish the First Attribute Heuristic (FAH) in the domain of risky decision-making. FAH is a simple decisi…
Moral decision-making ‘on the fly’
Over a century of research has focused on the consistency and inconsistency of human moral decision preferences. We proposed and found that moral decision preferences are flexible and shift towards newly learned moral rules when their application leads to utilitarian choices. Hence, decision-makers’ psychological concept of morality is continually under construction (on the fly); based on learning, informed by changes in moral rules and specific …
When (and why) absolute decision attribute values influence human preferences
Relative rank models of risky decision-making suggest that human preferences are informed by sampled (and not absolute) values and their relative ranks. According to this proposal, an attribute's absolute value (e.g., money or probability), retrieved from memory or/and available in the context, has a relative rank within the sampled attribute values. Moreover, decision-makers use the relative ranks of sampled absolute values when they choose or e…
How false feedback influences decision‐makers' risk preferences
Recent decision‐making research provides empirical evidence that human risk preferences are constructed “on the fly” during risk elicitation, influenced by the decision‐making context and the method of risk elicitation (Kusev et al., 2020). In this article, we explore the lability of human risk preferences and argue that the most recent choices guide decision‐making. Accordingly, our novel proposal and experimental method provide a psychological …
How decision-makers’ sense and state of power induce propensity to take financial risks
Are Impulsive Decisions Always Irrational? An Experimental Investigation of Impulsive Decisions in the Domains of Gains and Losses
Intertemporal choices are very prevalent in daily life, ranging from simple, mundane decisions to highly consequential decisions. In this context, thinking about the future and making sound decisions are crucial to promoting mental and physical health, as well as a financially sustainable lifestyle. In the present study, we set out to investigate some of the possible underlying mechanisms, such as cognitive factors and emotional states, that prom…
Flexible Emotion Regulation
The number of studies and theoretical contributions on emotion regulation has grown rapidly. In this article we describe the concept of flexible emotion regulation. We argue that the effectiveness of specific emotion regulation strategies depends on the interaction of the features of a situation and personality characteristics of the individual regulating his/her emotions. We review a few recent theoretical contributions and studies that have att…
Flexible Emotion Regulation
The number of studies and theoretical contributions on emotion regulation has grown rapidly. In this article we describe the concept of flexible emotion regulation. We argue that the effectiveness of specific emotion regulation strategies depends on the interaction of the features of a situation and personality characteristics of the individual regulating his/her emotions. We review a few recent theoretical contributions and studies that have att…
How false feedback influences decision‐makers' risk preferences
Recent decision‐making research provides empirical evidence that human risk preferences are constructed “on the fly” during risk elicitation, influenced by the decision‐making context and the method of risk elicitation (Kusev et al., 2020). In this article, we explore the lability of human risk preferences and argue that the most recent choices guide decision‐making. Accordingly, our novel proposal and experimental method provide a psychological …
How decision-makers’ sense and state of power induce propensity to take financial risks
Flexible Emotion Regulation
The number of studies and theoretical contributions on emotion regulation has grown rapidly. In this article we describe the concept of flexible emotion regulation. We argue that the effectiveness of specific emotion regulation strategies depends on the interaction of the features of a situation and personality characteristics of the individual regulating his/her emotions. We review a few recent theoretical contributions and studies that have att…
Are Impulsive Decisions Always Irrational? An Experimental Investigation of Impulsive Decisions in the Domains of Gains and Losses
Intertemporal choices are very prevalent in daily life, ranging from simple, mundane decisions to highly consequential decisions. In this context, thinking about the future and making sound decisions are crucial to promoting mental and physical health, as well as a financially sustainable lifestyle. In the present study, we set out to investigate some of the possible underlying mechanisms, such as cognitive factors and emotional states, that prom…
How false feedback influences decision‐makers' risk preferences
Recent decision‐making research provides empirical evidence that human risk preferences are constructed “on the fly” during risk elicitation, influenced by the decision‐making context and the method of risk elicitation (Kusev et al., 2020). In this article, we explore the lability of human risk preferences and argue that the most recent choices guide decision‐making. Accordingly, our novel proposal and experimental method provide a psychological …
How decision-makers’ sense and state of power induce propensity to take financial risks
When (and why) absolute decision attribute values influence human preferences
Relative rank models of risky decision-making suggest that human preferences are informed by sampled (and not absolute) values and their relative ranks. According to this proposal, an attribute's absolute value (e.g., money or probability), retrieved from memory or/and available in the context, has a relative rank within the sampled attribute values. Moreover, decision-makers use the relative ranks of sampled absolute values when they choose or e…
Moral decision-making ‘on the fly’
Over a century of research has focused on the consistency and inconsistency of human moral decision preferences. We proposed and found that moral decision preferences are flexible and shift towards newly learned moral rules when their application leads to utilitarian choices. Hence, decision-makers’ psychological concept of morality is continually under construction (on the fly); based on learning, informed by changes in moral rules and specific …
The first attribute heuristic influences risky choice preferences
Behavioral science research indicates that people appear to construct their risk preferences 'on the fly', informed by decision making context and task (Kusev et al., 2020). However, very little research has explored people's psychological processing during decision-making 'on the fly'. Accordingly, in this article we propose, explore, and establish the First Attribute Heuristic (FAH) in the domain of risky decision-making. FAH is a simple decisi…
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Social Psychology (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Behavioral Health and Interventions (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Business (2 works) · Context (archaeology (2 works)