Giovanni Ponti
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3543182 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Giovanni Ponti |
| PRENOMES | Giovanni |
| SOBRENOME | Ponti |
| ASSINATURA | PONTI G |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Alicante |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1680-3580 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 4 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 5 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 4 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1999 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2018 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Ultimatum Concession Bargaining
We collect experimental evidence on a modified version of the standard ultimatum game in which the responder states an acceptance threshold below which the offer is rejected and both players, proposer and responder, are allowed several attempts to reach an agreement by conceding. Proposers concede by increasing offers and responders concede by decreasing acceptance thresholds. Treatments differ in whether a further attempt requires that at least …
Interacción estratégica y convenciones
El objetivo de este artículo es presentar la literatura que emplea los juegos de coordinación para el estudio de normas y convenciones sociales, que se han analizado tanto desde el punto de vista de la teoría de juegos como de la psicología cognitiva. Argumentamos en este trabajo que estos dos enfoques alternativos son en realidad complementarios, dado que ambos contribuyen al entendimiento de los procesos mediante los cuales las personas llegan …
Social Capital or Economic Rents? An Experimental Study
This paper presents the first experimental test of a new view on Social Capital. By contrast with the usual interpretations as a term describing trust, social norms, networks and/or social preferences, we define Social Capital as agents' willingness to share economic rents. To investigate on the influence of economic rents on cooperative behavior, we set up and test experimentally a simple theoretical model in which agents, facing different sets …
Evolutionary Stability of Inequality Structures
This paper studies the evolution of a population whose members compare their relative income to coordinate actions in a simple bargaining game. Two alternative customs are considered: one in which difference in income (i.e. difference in social class) is large enough to justify difference in behavior, and another in which difference in income is perceived as not sufficient to justify a difference in behavior. Although we constrain agents to these…
Ultimatum Concession Bargaining
We collect experimental evidence on a modified version of the standard ultimatum game in which the responder states an acceptance threshold below which the offer is rejected and both players, proposer and responder, are allowed several attempts to reach an agreement by conceding. Proposers concede by increasing offers and responders concede by decreasing acceptance thresholds. Treatments differ in whether a further attempt requires that at least …
Interacción estratégica y convenciones
El objetivo de este artículo es presentar la literatura que emplea los juegos de coordinación para el estudio de normas y convenciones sociales, que se han analizado tanto desde el punto de vista de la teoría de juegos como de la psicología cognitiva. Argumentamos en este trabajo que estos dos enfoques alternativos son en realidad complementarios, dado que ambos contribuyen al entendimiento de los procesos mediante los cuales las personas llegan …
Evolutionary Stability of Inequality Structures
This paper studies the evolution of a population whose members compare their relative income to coordinate actions in a simple bargaining game. Two alternative customs are considered: one in which difference in income (i.e. difference in social class) is large enough to justify difference in behavior, and another in which difference in income is perceived as not sufficient to justify a difference in behavior. Although we constrain agents to these…
Social Capital or Economic Rents? An Experimental Study
This paper presents the first experimental test of a new view on Social Capital. By contrast with the usual interpretations as a term describing trust, social norms, networks and/or social preferences, we define Social Capital as agents' willingness to share economic rents. To investigate on the influence of economic rents on cooperative behavior, we set up and test experimentally a simple theoretical model in which agents, facing different sets …
Interacción estratégica y convenciones
El objetivo de este artículo es presentar la literatura que emplea los juegos de coordinación para el estudio de normas y convenciones sociales, que se han analizado tanto desde el punto de vista de la teoría de juegos como de la psicología cognitiva. Argumentamos en este trabajo que estos dos enfoques alternativos son en realidad complementarios, dado que ambos contribuyen al entendimiento de los procesos mediante los cuales las personas llegan …
Ultimatum Concession Bargaining
We collect experimental evidence on a modified version of the standard ultimatum game in which the responder states an acceptance threshold below which the offer is rejected and both players, proposer and responder, are allowed several attempts to reach an agreement by conceding. Proposers concede by increasing offers and responders concede by decreasing acceptance thresholds. Treatments differ in whether a further attempt requires that at least …
Economics (4 obras) · Microeconomics (4 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 obras) · Sociology (2 obras) · Ask price (1 obras) · Business (1 obras) · Complex Systems and Decision Making (1 obras) · Computer Science (1 obras) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (1 obras) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (1 obras)