Marco Battaglini
Biographic Data
| ID | 3591419 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Marco Battaglini |
| GIVEN NAMES | Marco |
| FAMILY NAME | Battaglini |
| SIGNATURE | BATTAGLINI M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Istituto Nazionale di Statistica |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9690-0721 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 73 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 17 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Organizing for Collective Action
Interactions with Powerful Female Colleagues Promote Diversity in Hiring
We study the effect of hearing cases alongside female judicial colleagues on the probability that a federal judge hires a female law clerk. Federal judges are assigned to judicial panels at random and have few limitations on their choices of clerks. Using a unique dataset of federal case records merged with judicial hiring information, we find a significant effect of the fraction of copanelists who are female on a male judge’s likelihood of hirin…
Abstentions and Social Networks in Congress
We study the extent to which personal connections among legislators influence abstentions in the U.S. Congress. Our analysis is conducted by observing representatives' abstention for the universe of roll call votes held on bills in the 109th-113th Congresses. Our results show that a legislator's propensity to abstain increases when the majority of his or her alumni connections abstains, even after controlling for other well-known predictors of ab…
Assessing Covid-19-Related Excess Mortality Using Multiple Approaches—Italy, 2020–2021
Presently, an unambiguous explanation of EM in Italy is not possible. We provide a range that we consider sound, given the high variability associated with the use of different models. However, all three models accurately represented the spatiotemporal trends of the pandemic waves in Italy
Excess Mortality in Italy During the Covid-19 Pandemic
COVID-19 dramatically influenced mortality worldwide, in Italy as well, the first European country to experience the Sars-Cov2 epidemic. Many countries reported a two-wave pattern of COVID-19 deaths; however, studies comparing the two waves are limited. The objective of the study was to compare all-cause excess mortality between the two waves that occurred during the year 2020 using nationwide data. All-cause excess mortalities were estimated usi…
Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining
We propose a new model of legislative bargaining in which coalitions have different values, reflecting the fact that the policies they can pursue are constrained by the identity of the coalition members. In the model, a formateur picks a coalition and negotiates for the allocation of the surplus it is expected to generate. The formateur is free to change coalitions to seek better deals with other coalitions, but she may lose her status if bargain…
Magnitude, demographics and dynamics of the effect of the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic on all-cause mortality in 21 industrialized countries
Social Groups and the Effectiveness of Protests
We present an informational theory of public protests, according to which public protests allow citizens to aggregate privately dispersed information and signal it to the policy maker. The model predicts that information sharing of signals within social groups can facilitate information aggregation when the social groups are sufficiently large even when it is not predicted with individual signals. We use experiments in the laboratory and on Amazo…
Effectiveness of Connected Legislators
Important work has been done to measure legislative effectiveness in the U.S. Congress and to explain the individual characteristics that drive it. Much less attention, however, has been devoted to study the extent to which legislative effectiveness depends on the legislators' social connections. We address this issue with a new model of legislative effectiveness that formalizes the role of social connections, and we test its predictions using th…
The Political Economy of Weak Treaties
In recent decades, democratic countries have negotiated hundreds of international treaties and agreements. This paper analyzes the equilibrium design of treaties negotiated by political incumbents seeking reelections. We show that incumbents are prone to negotiate treaties that are "weak" in that they may or may not be complied with: this makes it possible to differentiate the alternative candidates in a way that favors the incumbent. We also sho…
The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees
We experimentally investigate the informational theory of legislative committees (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989). Two committee members provide policy-relevant information to a legislature under alternative legislative rules. Under the open rule, the legislature is free to make any decision; under the closed rule, the legislature chooses between a member's proposal and a status quo. We find that even in the presence of biases, the committee members …
Beyond One Hundred
Although the increase in the number of centenarians is well documented today in countries with advanced demographic data, the same is not true for those aged 105 years and over. The first aim of this paper was to analyze the demographic characteristics of the 4,626 validated semisuper and 102 supercentenarians for the cohorts born between 1896 and 1910, referring to Italian Semi-Supercentenarians Survey. Then, starting from this data and from the…
Influencing Connected Legislators
This paper studies how interest groups allocate campaign contributions when congressmen are connected by social ties. We establish conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the contribution game and characterize the associated allocation of the interest groups’ moneys. While the allocations are generally complex functions of the environment (the voting function, the legislators’ preferences, and the social n…
Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements
We analyze participation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic game in which countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible, participants eliminate the holdup problem associated with their investments; however, most countries prefer to free ride rather than participate. If investments are noncontractible, countries face a holdup problem every time they negotiate; but the free-rider problem …
When Do Conflicting Parties Share Political Power
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study the incentives of a privileged group (the “yellows”) to share political power with another group (the “blues”). The yellows collectively choose the voting rule for a general election: a simple-majority rule that favors them, or a proportional rule. In two treatments, the blues can use a costly punishment option. We find that the yellows share power voluntarily only to a small extent, but they are more i…
Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment
We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizon. In each period, there is a societal endowment that can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the optimal public policy, defined by the time path of investment and consumption. In a legislature representatives of each ofndistricts bargain over the current period's endowment for investment in the public good and…
Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms
We compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters. For a stylized model, we generate a variety of predictions about the relative efficiency and participation equity of these two systems, which we test…
Effectiveness of Connected Legislators
Important work has been done to measure legislative effectiveness in the U.S. Congress and to explain the individual characteristics that drive it. Much less attention, however, has been devoted to study the extent to which legislative effectiveness depends on the legislators' social connections. We address this issue with a new model of legislative effectiveness that formalizes the role of social connections, and we test its predictions using th…
Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms
We compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters. For a stylized model, we generate a variety of predictions about the relative efficiency and participation equity of these two systems, which we test…
Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment
We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizon. In each period, there is a societal endowment that can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the optimal public policy, defined by the time path of investment and consumption. In a legislature representatives of each ofndistricts bargain over the current period's endowment for investment in the public good and…
The Political Economy of Weak Treaties
In recent decades, democratic countries have negotiated hundreds of international treaties and agreements. This paper analyzes the equilibrium design of treaties negotiated by political incumbents seeking reelections. We show that incumbents are prone to negotiate treaties that are "weak" in that they may or may not be complied with: this makes it possible to differentiate the alternative candidates in a way that favors the incumbent. We also sho…
Influencing Connected Legislators
This paper studies how interest groups allocate campaign contributions when congressmen are connected by social ties. We establish conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the contribution game and characterize the associated allocation of the interest groups’ moneys. While the allocations are generally complex functions of the environment (the voting function, the legislators’ preferences, and the social n…
Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements
We analyze participation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic game in which countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible, participants eliminate the holdup problem associated with their investments; however, most countries prefer to free ride rather than participate. If investments are noncontractible, countries face a holdup problem every time they negotiate; but the free-rider problem …
The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees
We experimentally investigate the informational theory of legislative committees (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989). Two committee members provide policy-relevant information to a legislature under alternative legislative rules. Under the open rule, the legislature is free to make any decision; under the closed rule, the legislature chooses between a member's proposal and a status quo. We find that even in the presence of biases, the committee members …
Beyond One Hundred
Although the increase in the number of centenarians is well documented today in countries with advanced demographic data, the same is not true for those aged 105 years and over. The first aim of this paper was to analyze the demographic characteristics of the 4,626 validated semisuper and 102 supercentenarians for the cohorts born between 1896 and 1910, referring to Italian Semi-Supercentenarians Survey. Then, starting from this data and from the…
When Do Conflicting Parties Share Political Power
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study the incentives of a privileged group (the “yellows”) to share political power with another group (the “blues”). The yellows collectively choose the voting rule for a general election: a simple-majority rule that favors them, or a proportional rule. In two treatments, the blues can use a costly punishment option. We find that the yellows share power voluntarily only to a small extent, but they are more i…
Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms
We compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters. For a stylized model, we generate a variety of predictions about the relative efficiency and participation equity of these two systems, which we test…
Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment
We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizon. In each period, there is a societal endowment that can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the optimal public policy, defined by the time path of investment and consumption. In a legislature representatives of each ofndistricts bargain over the current period's endowment for investment in the public good and…
When Do Conflicting Parties Share Political Power
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study the incentives of a privileged group (the “yellows”) to share political power with another group (the “blues”). The yellows collectively choose the voting rule for a general election: a simple-majority rule that favors them, or a proportional rule. In two treatments, the blues can use a costly punishment option. We find that the yellows share power voluntarily only to a small extent, but they are more i…
Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements
We analyze participation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic game in which countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible, participants eliminate the holdup problem associated with their investments; however, most countries prefer to free ride rather than participate. If investments are noncontractible, countries face a holdup problem every time they negotiate; but the free-rider problem …
Beyond One Hundred
Although the increase in the number of centenarians is well documented today in countries with advanced demographic data, the same is not true for those aged 105 years and over. The first aim of this paper was to analyze the demographic characteristics of the 4,626 validated semisuper and 102 supercentenarians for the cohorts born between 1896 and 1910, referring to Italian Semi-Supercentenarians Survey. Then, starting from this data and from the…
Influencing Connected Legislators
This paper studies how interest groups allocate campaign contributions when congressmen are connected by social ties. We establish conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the contribution game and characterize the associated allocation of the interest groups’ moneys. While the allocations are generally complex functions of the environment (the voting function, the legislators’ preferences, and the social n…
The Political Economy of Weak Treaties
In recent decades, democratic countries have negotiated hundreds of international treaties and agreements. This paper analyzes the equilibrium design of treaties negotiated by political incumbents seeking reelections. We show that incumbents are prone to negotiate treaties that are "weak" in that they may or may not be complied with: this makes it possible to differentiate the alternative candidates in a way that favors the incumbent. We also sho…
The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees
We experimentally investigate the informational theory of legislative committees (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989). Two committee members provide policy-relevant information to a legislature under alternative legislative rules. Under the open rule, the legislature is free to make any decision; under the closed rule, the legislature chooses between a member's proposal and a status quo. We find that even in the presence of biases, the committee members …
Magnitude, demographics and dynamics of the effect of the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic on all-cause mortality in 21 industrialized countries
Social Groups and the Effectiveness of Protests
We present an informational theory of public protests, according to which public protests allow citizens to aggregate privately dispersed information and signal it to the policy maker. The model predicts that information sharing of signals within social groups can facilitate information aggregation when the social groups are sufficiently large even when it is not predicted with individual signals. We use experiments in the laboratory and on Amazo…
Effectiveness of Connected Legislators
Important work has been done to measure legislative effectiveness in the U.S. Congress and to explain the individual characteristics that drive it. Much less attention, however, has been devoted to study the extent to which legislative effectiveness depends on the legislators' social connections. We address this issue with a new model of legislative effectiveness that formalizes the role of social connections, and we test its predictions using th…
Excess Mortality in Italy During the Covid-19 Pandemic
COVID-19 dramatically influenced mortality worldwide, in Italy as well, the first European country to experience the Sars-Cov2 epidemic. Many countries reported a two-wave pattern of COVID-19 deaths; however, studies comparing the two waves are limited. The objective of the study was to compare all-cause excess mortality between the two waves that occurred during the year 2020 using nationwide data. All-cause excess mortalities were estimated usi…
Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining
We propose a new model of legislative bargaining in which coalitions have different values, reflecting the fact that the policies they can pursue are constrained by the identity of the coalition members. In the model, a formateur picks a coalition and negotiates for the allocation of the surplus it is expected to generate. The formateur is free to change coalitions to seek better deals with other coalitions, but she may lose her status if bargain…
Assessing Covid-19-Related Excess Mortality Using Multiple Approaches—Italy, 2020–2021
Presently, an unambiguous explanation of EM in Italy is not possible. We provide a range that we consider sound, given the high variability associated with the use of different models. However, all three models accurately represented the spatiotemporal trends of the pandemic waves in Italy
Interactions with Powerful Female Colleagues Promote Diversity in Hiring
We study the effect of hearing cases alongside female judicial colleagues on the probability that a federal judge hires a female law clerk. Federal judges are assigned to judicial panels at random and have few limitations on their choices of clerks. Using a unique dataset of federal case records merged with judicial hiring information, we find a significant effect of the fraction of copanelists who are female on a male judge’s likelihood of hirin…
Abstentions and Social Networks in Congress
We study the extent to which personal connections among legislators influence abstentions in the U.S. Congress. Our analysis is conducted by observing representatives' abstention for the universe of roll call votes held on bills in the 109th-113th Congresses. Our results show that a legislator's propensity to abstain increases when the majority of his or her alumni connections abstains, even after controlling for other well-known predictors of ab…
Organizing for Collective Action
Political science (13 works) · Economics (11 works) · Law (11 works) · Law (9 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Microeconomics (7 works) · Politics (7 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (5 works) · Law and economics (5 works) · Voting (5 works)