Robin S Lee
Biographic Data
| ID | 3591448 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Robin S Lee |
| GIVEN NAMES | Robin S |
| FAMILY NAME | Lee |
| SIGNATURE | LEE R S |
| AFFILIATIONS | New York University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation
Will stock exchanges innovate to address latency arbitrage and the arms race for speed? This paper models how exchanges compete in the modern electronic era and how this shapes incentives for market-design innovation. In the status quo, exchange trading fees are competitive, but exchanges earn economic rents from selling speed. These rents create a wedge between private and social incentives to innovate and support the persistence of an inefficie…
Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining
A "Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains" has become a workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly. This paper proposes a noncooperative foundation for "Nash-in-Nash" bargaining that extends Rubinstein's alternating offers model to multiple upstream and downstream firms. We provide conditions on firms' marginal contributions under which there exists, for sufficiently short time between offers, an equilibrium with agreement a…
Empirical Models of Bilateral Contracting
This essay briefly surveys the empirical literature on bilateral contracting. The focus is on contracting between firms in vertical markets, and I discuss recent approaches to modeling their determination and the impact of contractual restrictions on competition, industry structure, and welfare. I also highlight challenges facing future research in this area.
Subsidizing Creativity through Network Design
This paper focuses on the pricing aspect of the "net neutrality" debate-in particular, the de facto ban on fees levied by Internet service providers on content providers to reach users. This "zero-price" rule may prove desirable for several reasons. Using a two-sided market analysis, we suggest that it subsidizes creativity and innovation in new content creation-goals shared by copyright and patent laws. The rule also helps to solve a coordinatio…
Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining
A "Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains" has become a workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly. This paper proposes a noncooperative foundation for "Nash-in-Nash" bargaining that extends Rubinstein's alternating offers model to multiple upstream and downstream firms. We provide conditions on firms' marginal contributions under which there exists, for sufficiently short time between offers, an equilibrium with agreement a…
Subsidizing Creativity through Network Design
This paper focuses on the pricing aspect of the "net neutrality" debate-in particular, the de facto ban on fees levied by Internet service providers on content providers to reach users. This "zero-price" rule may prove desirable for several reasons. Using a two-sided market analysis, we suggest that it subsidizes creativity and innovation in new content creation-goals shared by copyright and patent laws. The rule also helps to solve a coordinatio…
A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation
Will stock exchanges innovate to address latency arbitrage and the arms race for speed? This paper models how exchanges compete in the modern electronic era and how this shapes incentives for market-design innovation. In the status quo, exchange trading fees are competitive, but exchanges earn economic rents from selling speed. These rents create a wedge between private and social incentives to innovate and support the persistence of an inefficie…
Subsidizing Creativity through Network Design
This paper focuses on the pricing aspect of the "net neutrality" debate-in particular, the de facto ban on fees levied by Internet service providers on content providers to reach users. This "zero-price" rule may prove desirable for several reasons. Using a two-sided market analysis, we suggest that it subsidizes creativity and innovation in new content creation-goals shared by copyright and patent laws. The rule also helps to solve a coordinatio…
Empirical Models of Bilateral Contracting
This essay briefly surveys the empirical literature on bilateral contracting. The focus is on contracting between firms in vertical markets, and I discuss recent approaches to modeling their determination and the impact of contractual restrictions on competition, industry structure, and welfare. I also highlight challenges facing future research in this area.
Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining
A "Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains" has become a workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly. This paper proposes a noncooperative foundation for "Nash-in-Nash" bargaining that extends Rubinstein's alternating offers model to multiple upstream and downstream firms. We provide conditions on firms' marginal contributions under which there exists, for sufficiently short time between offers, an equilibrium with agreement a…
A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation
Will stock exchanges innovate to address latency arbitrage and the arms race for speed? This paper models how exchanges compete in the modern electronic era and how this shapes incentives for market-design innovation. In the status quo, exchange trading fees are competitive, but exchanges earn economic rents from selling speed. These rents create a wedge between private and social incentives to innovate and support the persistence of an inefficie…
Economics (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Industrial organization (3 works) · Market economy (3 works) · Corporate Finance and Governance (2 works) · Digital Platforms and Economics (2 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 works) · Bargaining problem (1 works)