Mitchell Green
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3591904 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Mitchell Green |
| PRENOMES | Mitchell |
| SOBRENOME | Green |
| ASSINATURA | GREEN M |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Connecticut |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9113-3455 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 6 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 31 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1994 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
The cultural evolution of speech act norms
After characterizing the notions of information, signal, and verbal signal, we note that since its inception in the mid-twentieth century, speech act theory has been carried on with little attention to how speech acts might have come about in the evolution of communication. We then explain some of the central ideas of cultural evolutionary theory. In that light we sketch a cultural-evolutionary account of the modern practice of assertions, and of…
Fiction and Epistemic Value
We critically survey prominent recent scholarship on the question of whether fiction can be a source of epistemic value for those who engage with it fully and appropriately. Such epistemic value might take the form of knowledge (for 'cognitivists') or understanding (for 'neo-cognitivists'). Both camps may be sorted according to a further distinction between views explaining fiction's epistemic value either in terms of the author's engaging in a f…
Assertion
In a series of articles (Pagin 2004, 2009), Peter Pagin has argued that assertion is not a social speech act, introducing a method (which we baptize 'the P-test') designed to refute any account that defines assertion in terms of its social effects. This paper contends that Pagin's method fails to rebut the thesis that assertion is social. We show that the P-test is both unreliable (because it overgenerates counterexamples) and counterproductive (…
Think twice before paving illocutionary paradise
Extreme Intentionalism Modestly Modified
1. On at least one usage of ‘mean’, performing an action that leads someone else to think that P, is not, on its own, sufficient for meaning that P. Nor is performing an action that is intended to get someone to think this. Instead one must make one’s intention overt. Grice’s way of developing this overtness requirement requires audience-directed intentions: for an agent, on this approach, to mean that P, she must perform a publicly accessible ac…
Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line
Central to the idea of indeterminism is this: At a given moment in the history of the world there are a variety of ways in which affairs might carry on. Before the toss of the coin there are two things that could happen, either Heads up or Tails up. This possibility is not merely epistemic, but in re., In spite of this it seems clear that the outcomes Heads and Tails could not be temporally related. Although Heads, if it happened, would be subseq…
Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line
Central to the idea of indeterminism is this: At a given moment in the history of the world there are a variety of ways in which affairs might carry on. Before the toss of the coin there are two things that could happen, either Heads up or Tails up. This possibility is not merely epistemic, but in re., In spite of this it seems clear that the outcomes Heads and Tails could not be temporally related. Although Heads, if it happened, would be subseq…
Assertion
In a series of articles (Pagin 2004, 2009), Peter Pagin has argued that assertion is not a social speech act, introducing a method (which we baptize 'the P-test') designed to refute any account that defines assertion in terms of its social effects. This paper contends that Pagin's method fails to rebut the thesis that assertion is social. We show that the P-test is both unreliable (because it overgenerates counterexamples) and counterproductive (…
Fiction and Epistemic Value
We critically survey prominent recent scholarship on the question of whether fiction can be a source of epistemic value for those who engage with it fully and appropriately. Such epistemic value might take the form of knowledge (for 'cognitivists') or understanding (for 'neo-cognitivists'). Both camps may be sorted according to a further distinction between views explaining fiction's epistemic value either in terms of the author's engaging in a f…
Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line
Central to the idea of indeterminism is this: At a given moment in the history of the world there are a variety of ways in which affairs might carry on. Before the toss of the coin there are two things that could happen, either Heads up or Tails up. This possibility is not merely epistemic, but in re., In spite of this it seems clear that the outcomes Heads and Tails could not be temporally related. Although Heads, if it happened, would be subseq…
Think twice before paving illocutionary paradise
Extreme Intentionalism Modestly Modified
1. On at least one usage of ‘mean’, performing an action that leads someone else to think that P, is not, on its own, sufficient for meaning that P. Nor is performing an action that is intended to get someone to think this. Instead one must make one’s intention overt. Grice’s way of developing this overtness requirement requires audience-directed intentions: for an agent, on this approach, to mean that P, she must perform a publicly accessible ac…
Assertion
In a series of articles (Pagin 2004, 2009), Peter Pagin has argued that assertion is not a social speech act, introducing a method (which we baptize 'the P-test') designed to refute any account that defines assertion in terms of its social effects. This paper contends that Pagin's method fails to rebut the thesis that assertion is social. We show that the P-test is both unreliable (because it overgenerates counterexamples) and counterproductive (…
Fiction and Epistemic Value
We critically survey prominent recent scholarship on the question of whether fiction can be a source of epistemic value for those who engage with it fully and appropriately. Such epistemic value might take the form of knowledge (for 'cognitivists') or understanding (for 'neo-cognitivists'). Both camps may be sorted according to a further distinction between views explaining fiction's epistemic value either in terms of the author's engaging in a f…
The cultural evolution of speech act norms
After characterizing the notions of information, signal, and verbal signal, we note that since its inception in the mid-twentieth century, speech act theory has been carried on with little attention to how speech acts might have come about in the evolution of communication. We then explain some of the central ideas of cultural evolutionary theory. In that light we sketch a cultural-evolutionary account of the modern practice of assertions, and of…
Philosophy (5 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras) · Philosophy (4 obras) · Psychology (4 obras) · Social Psychology (4 obras) · Social Psychology (4 obras) · Linguistics (3 obras) · Assertion (2 obras) · Epistemology (2 obras) · Language, Discourse, Communication Strategies (2 obras)