Joëlle Proust
Biographic Data
| ID | 3592492 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Joëlle Proust |
| GIVEN NAMES | Joëlle |
| FAMILY NAME | Proust |
| SIGNATURE | PROUST J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Institut Jean Nicod |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8466-0548 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 41 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 20 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 39 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1987 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Affordances from a control viewpoint
Perceiving an armchair prepares us to sit. Reading the first line in a text prepares us to read it. This article proposes that the affordance construct used to explain reactive potentiation of behavior similarly applies to reactive potentiation of cognitive actions. It defends furthermore that, in both cases, affordance-sensings do not only apply to selective (dis)engagement, but also to the revision and the termination of actions. In the first s…
Curiosity as a metacognitive feeling
The Cultural Evolution of Information Seeking
The mechanisms of selection, assimilation and transmission at work in cultural accumulation need to include evaluative processes for detecting informational lacunae and repair mechanisms. Novelty, interest, learnability of alternative concepts and practices need to be permanently monitored at the individual and at the group level. It is proposed that the evaluative mechanisms that control cultural accumulation are themselves subject to cultural e…
Le naturalisme philosophique et les sciences
Are Children Sensitive to What They Know: An Insight from Yucatec Mayan Children
Metacognitive abilities are considered as a hallmark of advanced human cognition. Existing empirical studies have exclusively focused on populations from Western and industrialized societies. Little is known about young children’s metacognitive abilities in other societal and cultural contexts. Here we tested 4-year-old Yucatec Mayan (a rural native population from Mexico) by adopting a metacognitive task in which children’s explicit assessment o…
Metacognition and mindreading in young children: A cross-cultural study
Prior studies document cross cultural variation in the developmental onset of mindreading. In particular, Japanese children are reported to pass a standard false belief task later than children from Western countries. By contrast, we know little about cross-cultural variation in young children's metacognitive abilities. Moreover, one prominent theoretical discussion in developmental psychology focuses on the relation between metacognition and min…
Metacognitive Diversity
This book focuses on the variability of metacognitive skills across cultures. Metacognition refers to the processes that enable agents to contextually control their first-order cognitive activity (e.g. perceiving, remembering, learning, or problem-solving) by monitoring them, i.e. assessing their likely success. It is involved in our daily observations, such as “I don’t remember where my keys are,” or “I understand your point.” These assessments …
Making the most of individual differences in joint decisions: An Interdisciplinary Approach
Evidence for and against the idea that “two heads are better than one” is abundant. This chapter considers the contextual conditions and social norms that predict madness or wisdom of crowds to identify the adaptive value of collective decision-making beyond increased accuracy. Similarity of competence among members of a collective impacts collective accuracy, but interacting individuals often seem to operate under the assumption that they are eq…
Selective learning and teaching among Japanese and German children
Despite an increasing number of studies demonstrating that young children selectively learn from others, and a few studies of children's selective teaching, the evidence almost exclusively comes from Western cultures, and cross-cultural comparison in this line of work is very rare. In the present research, we investigated Japanese and German children's selective learning and teaching abilities. We found clear cultural differences. Japanese childr…
Précis of The Philosophy of Metacognition
Replies to Langland‐Hassan, Nagel, and Smith
Redéfinir l'humain: Pour une convergence des sciences de l'homme
The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness
Does metacognition - the capacity to self-evaluate one's cognitive performance - derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely on informational processes? Joëelle Proust draws on psychology and neuroscience to defend the second claim. She argues that metacognition need not involve metarepresentations and is essentially related to mental agency.
Foundations Of Metacognition
La sociologie peut-elle ignorer la phylogenèse de l'esprit 1
Cet article examine les raisons avancées par Albert Ogien et Louis Quéré pour rejeter le naturalisme social, c'est-à-dire le projet métathéorique consistant à intégrer les savoirs sur le social issus de la biologie évolutionnaire et des sciences cognitives aux travaux menés en sciences sociales. Face aux arguments d'Albert Ogien portant sur l'irréductibilité de fait et de droit du social relativement au cognitif, il est objecté que les travaux pe…
Exploring the informational sources of metaperception: The case of Change Blindness Blindness
Entretien avec Joëlle Proust
Metacognition: Metacognition
Given disagreement about the architecture of the mind, the nature of self‐knowledge, and its epistemology, the question of how to understand the function and the scope of metacognition – the control of one’s cognition – is still a matter of hot debate. A dominant view, the self‐ascriptive view, has been that metacognition necessarily requires representing one’s own mental states as mental states, and, therefore, necessarily involves an ability to…
Le contrôle de soi: Vers Un Homme Nouveau
Précis de La nature de la volonté
Réponses à mes critiques
XIII-Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View
Controlling one's mental agency encompasses two forms of metacognitive operations, self-probing and post-evaluating. Metacognition so defined might seem to fuel an internalist view of epistemic norms, where rational feelings are available to instruct a thinker of what she can do, and allow her to be responsible for her mental agency. Such a view, however, ignores the dynamics of the mind–world interactions that calibrate the epistemic sentiments …
Metacognition and metarepresentation: Is a self-directed theory of mind a precondition for metacognition
Le langage forme-t-il une condition nécessaire de la rationalité
A propos de "Evolution et Rationalité" de Ronald de Sousa (2004)
Les mécanismes de la volonté
Des recherches recentes sur les mecanismes psychologiques de la decision montrent que la volonte d'agir n'est pas ce qui donne l'impulsion a une action, mais qu'elle intervient au niveau de son controle, de son orientation et de sa correction
Metacognition and metarepresentation: Is a self-directed theory of mind a precondition for metacognition
L'animal intentionnel
Les animaux forment des représentations mentales dès qu'ils ont la capacité d'extraire de l'information sur les corrélations environnementales, de la fixer dans certains états internes mémorisés et d'identifier des objets et des événements indépendants de la perception qu'ils en ont. Un dispositif de calibration entre les modalités sensorielles est indispensable pour que les représentations soient appliquées à des objets perçus comme extérieurs. …
A Plea For Mental Acts
Selective learning and teaching among Japanese and German children
Despite an increasing number of studies demonstrating that young children selectively learn from others, and a few studies of children's selective teaching, the evidence almost exclusively comes from Western cultures, and cross-cultural comparison in this line of work is very rare. In the present research, we investigated Japanese and German children's selective learning and teaching abilities. We found clear cultural differences. Japanese childr…
Précis of The Philosophy of Metacognition
Entretien avec Joëlle Proust
Metacognition: Metacognition
Given disagreement about the architecture of the mind, the nature of self‐knowledge, and its epistemology, the question of how to understand the function and the scope of metacognition – the control of one’s cognition – is still a matter of hot debate. A dominant view, the self‐ascriptive view, has been that metacognition necessarily requires representing one’s own mental states as mental states, and, therefore, necessarily involves an ability to…
La cognition animale et l'éthique
Joëlle Proust --------------------Les primates non humains font-ils partie de la communauté morale, c'est-à-dire des individus à l'égard desquels se pose la question de l'obligation morale : s'ils ne sont pas agents moraux, peuvent-ils du moins être reconnus comme patients moraux, c'est-à-dire comme cibles d'un comportement moralement évaluable ?La tradition avait une réponse à cette question : la raison et la conscience de soi constituent les co…
De la difficulté d'être naturaliste en matière d'intentionalité
Ce qu'on appelle les « sciences cognitives » constitue aujourd"hui une nebuleuse de disciplines et de methodologies differentes, dans laquelle toutefois emergent certaines hypotheses generales communes ala majorite des chercheurs.L'une d'entre elles consiste apostuler que connaitre
L'intelligence artificielle comme philosophie
L'intelligence artificielle comme philosophie
De la difficulté d'être naturaliste en matière d'intentionalité
Ce qu'on appelle les « sciences cognitives » constitue aujourd"hui une nebuleuse de disciplines et de methodologies differentes, dans laquelle toutefois emergent certaines hypotheses generales communes ala majorite des chercheurs.L'une d'entre elles consiste apostuler que connaitre
L'intensionnalisme sans le réel: De Bolzano à Katz
This paper deals with the semantic approach which makes a strict opposition between real definitions, having to do with objects and their properties, and nominal ones (which analyse representations or meanings into their constituent parts). In defense of this approach, Bolzano shows that paradoxes arise when one tries to fuse together < real » interpretation and nominal combination. Putnam however argues in a collection of well-known papers that …
De l'histoire de la logique à la philosophie de l'esprit
Essais sur le langage et l'intentionalitéDaniel Laurier et François Lepage, directeurs de la publication Collection «Analytiques», vol. 4 Montréal, Bellarmin; Paris, Vrin, 1992, 368 p
Essais sur le langage et l'intentionalitéDaniel Laurier et François Lepage, directeurs de la publication Collection «Analytiques», vol. 4 Montréal, Bellarmin; Paris, Vrin, 1992, 368 p. - Volume 33 Issue 3
Fonction et causalité
Function and causality The present work discusses the part causality should play in the definition of functions. A proper emphasis on the role of causal determinants allowing a given structure -tool, organ, cerebral state -to have a certain function should help solving a number of problems associated with functionalism, in particular in the psychological realm. The thesis of multirealizability implied by functionalism holds that a mental state ca…
Raisonnement, argumentation et rationalité chez le psychotique
A series of papers published in the 50's claimed that schizophrenics suffer from altered reasoning capacities and current psychiatric classifications still emphasise logical and argumentative difficulties in the delusional subject. Such approaches tend to ignore the mediocre results obtained by subjects in many reasoning tasks, and to side-step the deviant and highly salient sensory experiences characteristic of acute psychotic episodes. Despite …
Looking for the agent: An investigation into consciousness of action and self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients
Perception et intermodalité. Approches actuelles de la question de Molyneux
Self Model and Schizophrenia
L'animal intentionnel
Les animaux forment des représentations mentales dès qu'ils ont la capacité d'extraire de l'information sur les corrélations environnementales, de la fixer dans certains états internes mémorisés et d'identifier des objets et des événements indépendants de la perception qu'ils en ont. Un dispositif de calibration entre les modalités sensorielles est indispensable pour que les représentations soient appliquées à des objets perçus comme extérieurs. …
La cognition animale et l'éthique
Joëlle Proust --------------------Les primates non humains font-ils partie de la communauté morale, c'est-à-dire des individus à l'égard desquels se pose la question de l'obligation morale : s'ils ne sont pas agents moraux, peuvent-ils du moins être reconnus comme patients moraux, c'est-à-dire comme cibles d'un comportement moralement évaluable ?La tradition avait une réponse à cette question : la raison et la conscience de soi constituent les co…
A Plea For Mental Acts
Thinking of oneself as the same
Response to Phil Gerrans
Réponse à Édouard Machery. Pour une pensée évolutionniste des représentations: Le cas de l'objectivité
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Les mécanismes de la volonté
Des recherches recentes sur les mecanismes psychologiques de la decision montrent que la volonte d'agir n'est pas ce qui donne l'impulsion a une action, mais qu'elle intervient au niveau de son controle, de son orientation et de sa correction
Metacognition and metarepresentation: Is a self-directed theory of mind a precondition for metacognition
Le langage forme-t-il une condition nécessaire de la rationalité
A propos de "Evolution et Rationalité" de Ronald de Sousa (2004)
Précis de La nature de la volonté
Réponses à mes critiques
XIII-Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View
Controlling one's mental agency encompasses two forms of metacognitive operations, self-probing and post-evaluating. Metacognition so defined might seem to fuel an internalist view of epistemic norms, where rational feelings are available to instruct a thinker of what she can do, and allow her to be responsible for her mental agency. Such a view, however, ignores the dynamics of the mind–world interactions that calibrate the epistemic sentiments …
Le contrôle de soi: Vers Un Homme Nouveau
Metacognition: Metacognition
Given disagreement about the architecture of the mind, the nature of self‐knowledge, and its epistemology, the question of how to understand the function and the scope of metacognition – the control of one’s cognition – is still a matter of hot debate. A dominant view, the self‐ascriptive view, has been that metacognition necessarily requires representing one’s own mental states as mental states, and, therefore, necessarily involves an ability to…
Exploring the informational sources of metaperception: The case of Change Blindness Blindness
Psychology (27 works) · Philosophy (21 works) · Cognitive psychology (14 works) · Cognition (12 works) · Humanities (12 works) · Metacognition (10 works) · Computer Science (9 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Cognitive science (8 works) · Political science (8 works)