Justin Garson
Biographic Data
| ID | 3595422 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Justin Garson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Justin |
| FAMILY NAME | Garson |
| SIGNATURE | GARSON J |
| AFFILIATIONS | City University of New York |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0210-2989 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 27 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 82 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 27 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
An ambiguity in the notion of a “biomedical” approach to mental health
Over the past 50 years, psychological research has examined the stigma associated with “biomedical” models of mental illness. Credited with reducing blameworthiness, such models are also linked to negative outcomes such as prognostic pessimism and the desire for social distance. We argue that this research is hindered by an ambiguity in the notion of a “biomedical” framing, which conflates two ideas: a dysfunction-centered framing and a biogenic …
What Do Drugs Do? Rethinking Psychiatric Medications Outside of Biomedical Narratives
Historians of psychiatry conventionally describe its history as a clash between biological and psychological perspectives. Recently, Garson proposed an alternative framework, viewing psychiatry’s history as a tension between “madness-as-dysfunction” and “madness-as-strategy.” Madness-as-dysfunction interprets mental health issues, like extremely low mood or panic attacks, as symptoms of underlying diseases or disorders. Madness-as-strategy, by co…
Brain Disorders, Dysfunctions, and Natural Selection
I argue that despite the merits of Jefferson’s account of a brain disorder, which are many, the notion of function she deploys is unsuitable to the overall goals of that account. In particular, Jefferson accepts Cummins’ causal role theory of function and dysfunction. As the causal role view, in its standard elaborations, is wedded to human interests, goals, and values, it cannot serve as a value-neutral anchor for her hybrid “harm-dysfunction” a…
Functions and Populations
The generalized selected effects theory of function (GSE) holds that a trait’s proper function is an activity that historically caused its differential persistence or differential reproduction within a population, construed as a collection of individuals that impact each other’s persistence or reproduction chances. Several critics have taken aim at GSE on the grounds that its appeal to populations is either unfit for purpose or arbitrary. Here I …
Proper Functions are Proximal Functions
This paper argues that proper functions are proximal functions. In other words, it rejects the notion that there are distal biological functions – strictly speaking, distal functions are not functions at all, but simply beneficial effects normally associated with a trait performing its function. Once we rule out distal functions, two further positions become available: dysfunctions are simply failures of proper function, and pathological conditio…
Putting History Back into Mechanisms
Mechanisms, in the prominent biological sense of the term, are historical entities. That is, whether something is a mechanism for something depends on its history. Put differently, while your spontaneously generated molecule-for-molecule double has a heart, and its heart pumps blood around its body, its heart does not have a mechanism for pumping, since it does not have the right history. My argument for this claim is that mechanisms have proper …
Précis of Karen Neander's A Mark of the Mental
Response to Neander's Critics
The Biological Mind
For some, biology explains all there is to know about the mind. Yet many big questions remain: Is the mind shaped by genes or the environment? If mental traits are the result of adaptations built up over thousands of years, as evolutionary psychologists claim, how can such claims be tested? If the mind is a machine, as biologists argue, how does it allow for something as complex as human thought? Revised and updated to take account of new develop…
Madness
Since the time of Hippocrates, madness has typically been viewed through the lens of disease, dysfunction, and defect. Madness, like all other disease, happens when something in the mind or brain does not operate the way that it should, or as nature intended. In this paradigm, the role of the healer is simply to find the dysfunction and fix it. This remains the dominant perspective in global psychiatry today. This book presents a different paradi…
Ageing and the goal of evolution
Edmond Goblot’s (1858–1935) Selected Effects Theory of Function
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the French philosopher of science Edmond Goblot wrote three prescient papers on function and teleology. He advanced the remarkable thesis that functions are, as a matter of conceptual analysis, selected effects. He also argued that “selection” must be understood broadly to include both evolutionary natural selection and intelligent design. Here, I do three things. First, I give an overview of Goblot’s th…
What Biological Functions Are and Why They Matter
The biological functions debate is a perennial topic in the philosophy of science. In the first full-length account of the nature and importance of biological functions for many years, Justin Garson presents an innovative new theory, the 'generalized selected effects theory of function', which seamlessly integrates evolutionary and developmental perspectives on biological functions. He develops the implications of the theory for contemporary deba…
There Are No Ahistorical Theories of Function
Theories of function are conventionally divided up into historical and ahistorical ones. Proponents of ahistorical theories often cite the ahistoricity of their accounts as a major virtue. Here, I argue that none of the mainstream “ahistorical” accounts are actually ahistorical. All of them refer, implicitly or explicitly, to history. In Boorse’s goal-contribution account, history is latent in the idea of statistical typicality. In the propensity…
Do Constancy Mechanisms Save Distal Content
In this journal, Schulte develops a novel solution to the problem of distal content: by virtue of what is a mental representation about a distal object (say, a snake) rather than a more proximal cause of that representation (say, a snake-shaped retinal impression)? Schulte maintains that in order for a (sensory-perceptual) representation to have a distal content, it must be produced by a constancy mechanism, along with two other conditions. I rai…
How to Be a Function Pluralist
I distinguish two forms of pluralism about biological functions, between-discipline pluralism and within-discipline pluralism. Between-discipline pluralism holds that different theories of function are appropriate for different subdisciplines of biology and psychology (for example, that the selected effects theory of function is appropriate for some branches of evolutionary biology, and the causal role theory is appropriate for disciplines such a…
Against Organizational Functions
Over the last 20 years, several philosophers have developed a new approach to biological functions, the organizational (or systems-theoretic) approach. This is not a single theory but a family of theories based on the idea that a trait token can acquire a function by virtue of the way it contributes to a complex, organized system and thereby to its own continued persistence as a token. I argue that the organizational approach faces a serious libe…
A Generalized Selected Effects Theory of Function
I present and defend the generalized selected effects (GSE) theory of function. According to GSE, the function of a trait consists in the activity that contributed to its bearer’s differential reproduction, or differential retention, within a population. Unlike the traditional selected effects (SE) theory, it does not require that the functional trait helped its bearer reproduce; differential retention is enough. Although the core theory has been…
A Critical Overview of Biological Functions
Introduction
Two types of psychological hedonism
The Birth of Information in the Brain
ArgumentAs historian Henning Schmidgen notes, the scientific study of the nervous system would have been "unthinkable" without the industrialization of communication in the 1830s. Historians have investigated extensively the way nerve physiologists have borrowed concepts and tools from the field of communications, particularly regarding the nineteenth-century work of figures like Helmholtz and in the American Cold War Era. The following focuses s…
Functions Must Be Performed at Appropriate Rates in Appropriate Situations
We sketch a novel and improved version of Boorse’s biostatistical theory of functions. Roughly, our theory maintains that (i) functions are non-negligible contributions to survival or inclusive fitness (when a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness); (ii) situations appropriate for the performance of a function are typical situations in which a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness; (iii) appropriate rates of functioning …
What is the value of historical fidelity in restoration
The Functional Sense of Mechanism
This article presents a distinct sense of ‘mechanism’, which I call the functional sense of mechanism. According to this sense, mechanisms serve functions, and this fact places substantive restrictions on the kinds of system activities ‘for which’ there can be a mechanism. On this view, there are no mechanisms for pathology; pathologies result from disrupting mechanisms for functions. Second, on this sense, natural selection is probably not a mec…
A Generalized Selected Effects Theory of Function
I present and defend the generalized selected effects (GSE) theory of function. According to GSE, the function of a trait consists in the activity that contributed to its bearer’s differential reproduction, or differential retention, within a population. Unlike the traditional selected effects (SE) theory, it does not require that the functional trait helped its bearer reproduce; differential retention is enough. Although the core theory has been…
The Functional Sense of Mechanism
This article presents a distinct sense of ‘mechanism’, which I call the functional sense of mechanism. According to this sense, mechanisms serve functions, and this fact places substantive restrictions on the kinds of system activities ‘for which’ there can be a mechanism. On this view, there are no mechanisms for pathology; pathologies result from disrupting mechanisms for functions. Second, on this sense, natural selection is probably not a mec…
Functions Must Be Performed at Appropriate Rates in Appropriate Situations
We sketch a novel and improved version of Boorse’s biostatistical theory of functions. Roughly, our theory maintains that (i) functions are non-negligible contributions to survival or inclusive fitness (when a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness); (ii) situations appropriate for the performance of a function are typical situations in which a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness; (iii) appropriate rates of functioning …
Function, selection, and construction in the brain
How to Be a Function Pluralist
I distinguish two forms of pluralism about biological functions, between-discipline pluralism and within-discipline pluralism. Between-discipline pluralism holds that different theories of function are appropriate for different subdisciplines of biology and psychology (for example, that the selected effects theory of function is appropriate for some branches of evolutionary biology, and the causal role theory is appropriate for disciplines such a…
Madness
Since the time of Hippocrates, madness has typically been viewed through the lens of disease, dysfunction, and defect. Madness, like all other disease, happens when something in the mind or brain does not operate the way that it should, or as nature intended. In this paradigm, the role of the healer is simply to find the dysfunction and fix it. This remains the dominant perspective in global psychiatry today. This book presents a different paradi…
There Are No Ahistorical Theories of Function
Theories of function are conventionally divided up into historical and ahistorical ones. Proponents of ahistorical theories often cite the ahistoricity of their accounts as a major virtue. Here, I argue that none of the mainstream “ahistorical” accounts are actually ahistorical. All of them refer, implicitly or explicitly, to history. In Boorse’s goal-contribution account, history is latent in the idea of statistical typicality. In the propensity…
Against Organizational Functions
Over the last 20 years, several philosophers have developed a new approach to biological functions, the organizational (or systems-theoretic) approach. This is not a single theory but a family of theories based on the idea that a trait token can acquire a function by virtue of the way it contributes to a complex, organized system and thereby to its own continued persistence as a token. I argue that the organizational approach faces a serious libe…
The Introduction of Information into Neurobiology
The first use of the term “information” to describe the content of nervous impulse occurs in Edgar Adrian's The Basis of Sensation (1928). What concept of information does Adrian appeal to, and how can it be situated in relation to contemporary philosophical accounts of the notion of information in biology? The answer requires an explication of Adrian's use and an evaluation of its situation in relation to contemporary accounts of semantic inform…
The Birth of Information in the Brain
ArgumentAs historian Henning Schmidgen notes, the scientific study of the nervous system would have been "unthinkable" without the industrialization of communication in the 1830s. Historians have investigated extensively the way nerve physiologists have borrowed concepts and tools from the field of communications, particularly regarding the nineteenth-century work of figures like Helmholtz and in the American Cold War Era. The following focuses s…
Functions and Populations
The generalized selected effects theory of function (GSE) holds that a trait’s proper function is an activity that historically caused its differential persistence or differential reproduction within a population, construed as a collection of individuals that impact each other’s persistence or reproduction chances. Several critics have taken aim at GSE on the grounds that its appeal to populations is either unfit for purpose or arbitrary. Here I …
Two types of psychological hedonism
The Biological Mind
For some, biology explains all there is to know about the mind. Yet many big questions remain: Is the mind shaped by genes or the environment? If mental traits are the result of adaptations built up over thousands of years, as evolutionary psychologists claim, how can such claims be tested? If the mind is a machine, as biologists argue, how does it allow for something as complex as human thought? Revised and updated to take account of new develop…
Ageing and the goal of evolution
The Introduction of Information into Neurobiology
The first use of the term “information” to describe the content of nervous impulse occurs in Edgar Adrian's The Basis of Sensation (1928). What concept of information does Adrian appeal to, and how can it be situated in relation to contemporary philosophical accounts of the notion of information in biology? The answer requires an explication of Adrian's use and an evaluation of its situation in relation to contemporary accounts of semantic inform…
Function, selection, and construction in the brain
What is the value of historical fidelity in restoration
The Functional Sense of Mechanism
This article presents a distinct sense of ‘mechanism’, which I call the functional sense of mechanism. According to this sense, mechanisms serve functions, and this fact places substantive restrictions on the kinds of system activities ‘for which’ there can be a mechanism. On this view, there are no mechanisms for pathology; pathologies result from disrupting mechanisms for functions. Second, on this sense, natural selection is probably not a mec…
Functions Must Be Performed at Appropriate Rates in Appropriate Situations
We sketch a novel and improved version of Boorse’s biostatistical theory of functions. Roughly, our theory maintains that (i) functions are non-negligible contributions to survival or inclusive fitness (when a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness); (ii) situations appropriate for the performance of a function are typical situations in which a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness; (iii) appropriate rates of functioning …
Two types of psychological hedonism
The Birth of Information in the Brain
ArgumentAs historian Henning Schmidgen notes, the scientific study of the nervous system would have been "unthinkable" without the industrialization of communication in the 1830s. Historians have investigated extensively the way nerve physiologists have borrowed concepts and tools from the field of communications, particularly regarding the nineteenth-century work of figures like Helmholtz and in the American Cold War Era. The following focuses s…
A Critical Overview of Biological Functions
Introduction
Against Organizational Functions
Over the last 20 years, several philosophers have developed a new approach to biological functions, the organizational (or systems-theoretic) approach. This is not a single theory but a family of theories based on the idea that a trait token can acquire a function by virtue of the way it contributes to a complex, organized system and thereby to its own continued persistence as a token. I argue that the organizational approach faces a serious libe…
A Generalized Selected Effects Theory of Function
I present and defend the generalized selected effects (GSE) theory of function. According to GSE, the function of a trait consists in the activity that contributed to its bearer’s differential reproduction, or differential retention, within a population. Unlike the traditional selected effects (SE) theory, it does not require that the functional trait helped its bearer reproduce; differential retention is enough. Although the core theory has been…
How to Be a Function Pluralist
I distinguish two forms of pluralism about biological functions, between-discipline pluralism and within-discipline pluralism. Between-discipline pluralism holds that different theories of function are appropriate for different subdisciplines of biology and psychology (for example, that the selected effects theory of function is appropriate for some branches of evolutionary biology, and the causal role theory is appropriate for disciplines such a…
What Biological Functions Are and Why They Matter
The biological functions debate is a perennial topic in the philosophy of science. In the first full-length account of the nature and importance of biological functions for many years, Justin Garson presents an innovative new theory, the 'generalized selected effects theory of function', which seamlessly integrates evolutionary and developmental perspectives on biological functions. He develops the implications of the theory for contemporary deba…
There Are No Ahistorical Theories of Function
Theories of function are conventionally divided up into historical and ahistorical ones. Proponents of ahistorical theories often cite the ahistoricity of their accounts as a major virtue. Here, I argue that none of the mainstream “ahistorical” accounts are actually ahistorical. All of them refer, implicitly or explicitly, to history. In Boorse’s goal-contribution account, history is latent in the idea of statistical typicality. In the propensity…
Do Constancy Mechanisms Save Distal Content
In this journal, Schulte develops a novel solution to the problem of distal content: by virtue of what is a mental representation about a distal object (say, a snake) rather than a more proximal cause of that representation (say, a snake-shaped retinal impression)? Schulte maintains that in order for a (sensory-perceptual) representation to have a distal content, it must be produced by a constancy mechanism, along with two other conditions. I rai…
Ageing and the goal of evolution
Edmond Goblot’s (1858–1935) Selected Effects Theory of Function
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the French philosopher of science Edmond Goblot wrote three prescient papers on function and teleology. He advanced the remarkable thesis that functions are, as a matter of conceptual analysis, selected effects. He also argued that “selection” must be understood broadly to include both evolutionary natural selection and intelligent design. Here, I do three things. First, I give an overview of Goblot’s th…
Précis of Karen Neander's A Mark of the Mental
Response to Neander's Critics
The Biological Mind
For some, biology explains all there is to know about the mind. Yet many big questions remain: Is the mind shaped by genes or the environment? If mental traits are the result of adaptations built up over thousands of years, as evolutionary psychologists claim, how can such claims be tested? If the mind is a machine, as biologists argue, how does it allow for something as complex as human thought? Revised and updated to take account of new develop…
Madness
Since the time of Hippocrates, madness has typically been viewed through the lens of disease, dysfunction, and defect. Madness, like all other disease, happens when something in the mind or brain does not operate the way that it should, or as nature intended. In this paradigm, the role of the healer is simply to find the dysfunction and fix it. This remains the dominant perspective in global psychiatry today. This book presents a different paradi…
Putting History Back into Mechanisms
Mechanisms, in the prominent biological sense of the term, are historical entities. That is, whether something is a mechanism for something depends on its history. Put differently, while your spontaneously generated molecule-for-molecule double has a heart, and its heart pumps blood around its body, its heart does not have a mechanism for pumping, since it does not have the right history. My argument for this claim is that mechanisms have proper …
Brain Disorders, Dysfunctions, and Natural Selection
I argue that despite the merits of Jefferson’s account of a brain disorder, which are many, the notion of function she deploys is unsuitable to the overall goals of that account. In particular, Jefferson accepts Cummins’ causal role theory of function and dysfunction. As the causal role view, in its standard elaborations, is wedded to human interests, goals, and values, it cannot serve as a value-neutral anchor for her hybrid “harm-dysfunction” a…
Functions and Populations
The generalized selected effects theory of function (GSE) holds that a trait’s proper function is an activity that historically caused its differential persistence or differential reproduction within a population, construed as a collection of individuals that impact each other’s persistence or reproduction chances. Several critics have taken aim at GSE on the grounds that its appeal to populations is either unfit for purpose or arbitrary. Here I …
Proper Functions are Proximal Functions
This paper argues that proper functions are proximal functions. In other words, it rejects the notion that there are distal biological functions – strictly speaking, distal functions are not functions at all, but simply beneficial effects normally associated with a trait performing its function. Once we rule out distal functions, two further positions become available: dysfunctions are simply failures of proper function, and pathological conditio…
Philosophy (20 works) · Computer Science (18 works) · Epistemology (17 works) · Psychology (16 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (13 works) · Biology (10 works) · Function (biology) (10 works) · Mental Health and Psychiatry (10 works) · Cognitive science (7 works) · Evolutionary biology (6 works)