Guy Fletcher
Biographic Data
| ID | 3597459 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Guy Fletcher |
| GIVEN NAMES | Guy |
| FAMILY NAME | Fletcher |
| SIGNATURE | FLETCHER G |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Edinburgh |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0957-5698 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 23 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 55 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 22 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
All's well that ends well? A new holism about lifetime well-Being
Is there more to how well a life goes overall (its lifetime well-being) than simply the aggregate goodness and badness of its moments (its momentary well-being)? Atomists about lifetime well-being say ‘no’. Holists hold that there is more to lifetime well-being than aggregate momentary well-being (with different holists offering different candidates for why this might be). This paper presents and defends a novel form of holism about lifetime well…
Not Living My Best Life: A Reply to Masny
In a recent paper, Michal Masny put forward a novel, interesting, theory of the goodness of a life: the Dual Theory. As Masny’s discussion demonstrates, the Dual Theory, if true, would have very significant implications for various issues related to the goodness of lives and for normative ethics. It is thus worthy of serious attention. In this paper, I first explain the Dual Theory and the motivation Masny provides for it. I then aim to show thre…
A Painful End for Perfectionism
This paper examines perfectionist attempts to explain the prudential badness of pain (its badness for those who experience it). It starts by considering simple perfectionist explanations, finding them wanting, before considering the most sophisticated perfectionist attempt to explain prudential badness: Gwen Bradford’s tripartite perfectionism. The paper argues that Bradford’s view, though an improvement on earlier perfectionist proposals, still …
Measuring Well-Being: Interdisciplinary Perspectives from the Social Sciences and the Humanities
Dear Prudence: The Nature and Normativity of Prudential Discourse
Philosophers have long theorized about which things make people’s lives go well, and why, and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. By contrast, we have spent little time on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse (thought and talk about what is, e.g., good and bad for us, what contributes to well-being, and what we have prudential reason, or prudentially ought, to do). This situation is surpris…
Current recommendations on the selection of measures for well-being
Measures of well-being have proliferated over the past decades. Very little guidance has been available as to which measures to use in what contexts. This paper provides a series of recommendations, based on the present state of knowledge and the existing measures available, of what measures might be preferred in which contexts. The recommendations came out of an interdisciplinary workshop on the measurement of well-being. The recommendations are…
Against Contextualism about Prudential Discourse
In recent times, there has been a surge of interest in, and enthusiasm for, contextualist views about prudential discourse-thought and talk about what has prudential value or contributes to someone's well-being. In this paper, I examine and reject two cases for radical forms of prudential contextualism, proposed by Anna Alexandrova and Steve Campbell. Alexandrova holds that the semantic content of terms like 'well-being' and 'doing well' varies a…
The Philosophy of Well-Being: An Introduction
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being
Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics
A recent trend in metaethics has been to reject the apparent choice between pure cognitivism and pure noncognitivism by adopting views that seek to combine the strengths of each side while avoiding the standard problems for each. Some such views claim that moral judgments are complexes of belief-like and desire-like components. Other such views claim that normative language serves both to ascribe properties and to express desire-like attitudes. T…
Hybrid Views in Meta-ethics: Pragmatic Views
A common starting point for 'going hybrid' is the thought that moral discourse somehow combines belief and desire-like aspects, or is both descriptive and expressive. Hybrid meta-ethical theories aim to give an account of moral discourse that is sufficiently sensitive to both its cognitive and its affective, or descriptive and expressive, dimensions. They hold at least one of the following: (i) moral thought: moral judgements have belief and desi…
A Millian Objection to Reasons as Evidence
Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star have recently proposed the following theory of reasons: Reasons as Evidence : Necessarily, a fact F is a reason for an agent A to Φ iff F is evidence that A ought to Φ (where Φ is either a belief or an action). In this article I present an objection, inspired by Mill's proof of the principle of utility, to the right-to-left reading of the biconditional. My claim is that the fact that you can perform some action can …
A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being
So-called ‘objective-list’ theories of well-being (prudential value, welfare) are under-represented in discussions of well-being. I do four things in this article to redress this. First, I develop a new taxonomy of theories of well-being, one that divides theories in a more subtle and illuminating way. Second, I use this taxonomy to undermine some misconceptions that have made people reluctant to hold objective-list theories. Third, I provide a n…
The Locative Analysis of Good For Formulated and Defended
I begin section 1 by dealing with preliminary issues such as the different relations expressed by the “good for” locution. I then (section 2) outline the Locative Analysis of good for and explain its main elements before moving on to (section 3) outlining and discussing the positive features of the view. In the subsequent sections I show how the Locative Analysis can respond to objections from, or inspired by, Sumner (sections 4–5), Regan (sectio…
Brown and Moore's Value Invariabilism vs Dancy's Variabilism
Journal Article Brown and Moore's Value Invariabilism VS Dancy's Variabilism Get access Guy Fletcher Guy Fletcher University of Reading Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 238, January 2010, Pages 162–168, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.640.x Published: 01 July 2009
Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication - Rachel Cohon
Journal Article Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication – Rachel Cohon Get access Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication. Rachel Cohon, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. viii + 285. Price £39.00.) Guy Fletcher Guy Fletcher Exeter College, Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 241, October 2010, Pages 861–863, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.20…
Resisting buck-passing accounts of prudential value
Sentimental Value
Mill, Moore, and Intrinsic Value
In this paper, I examine how philosophers before and after G. E. Moore understood intrinsic value. The main idea I wish to bring out and defend is that Moore was insufficiently attentive to how distinctive his conception of intrinsic value was, as compared with those of the writers he discussed, and that such inattentiveness skewed his understanding of the positions of others that he discussed and dismissed. My way into this issue is by examining…
The Consistency of Qualitative Hedonism and the Value of (at Least Some) Malicious Pleasures
In this article, I examine two of the standard objections to forms of value hedonism. The first is the common claim, most famously made by Bradley and Moore, that Mill's qualitative hedonism is inconsistent. The second is the apparent problem for quantitative hedonism in dealing with malicious pleasures. I argue that qualitative hedonism is consistent, even if it is implausible on other grounds. I then go on to show how our intuitions about malic…
Variable Versus Fixed-Rate Rule-Utilitarianism
Fixed‐rate versions of rule‐consequentialism and rule‐utilitarianism evaluate rules in terms of the expected net value of one particular level of social acceptance, but one far enough below 100% social acceptance to make salient the complexities created by partial compliance. Variable‐rate versions of rule‐consequentialism and rule‐utilitarianism instead evaluate rules in terms of their expected net value at all different levels of social accepta…
A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being
So-called ‘objective-list’ theories of well-being (prudential value, welfare) are under-represented in discussions of well-being. I do four things in this article to redress this. First, I develop a new taxonomy of theories of well-being, one that divides theories in a more subtle and illuminating way. Second, I use this taxonomy to undermine some misconceptions that have made people reluctant to hold objective-list theories. Third, I provide a n…
Dear Prudence: The Nature and Normativity of Prudential Discourse
Philosophers have long theorized about which things make people’s lives go well, and why, and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. By contrast, we have spent little time on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse (thought and talk about what is, e.g., good and bad for us, what contributes to well-being, and what we have prudential reason, or prudentially ought, to do). This situation is surpris…
Variable Versus Fixed-Rate Rule-Utilitarianism
Fixed‐rate versions of rule‐consequentialism and rule‐utilitarianism evaluate rules in terms of the expected net value of one particular level of social acceptance, but one far enough below 100% social acceptance to make salient the complexities created by partial compliance. Variable‐rate versions of rule‐consequentialism and rule‐utilitarianism instead evaluate rules in terms of their expected net value at all different levels of social accepta…
Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics
A recent trend in metaethics has been to reject the apparent choice between pure cognitivism and pure noncognitivism by adopting views that seek to combine the strengths of each side while avoiding the standard problems for each. Some such views claim that moral judgments are complexes of belief-like and desire-like components. Other such views claim that normative language serves both to ascribe properties and to express desire-like attitudes. T…
Against Contextualism about Prudential Discourse
In recent times, there has been a surge of interest in, and enthusiasm for, contextualist views about prudential discourse-thought and talk about what has prudential value or contributes to someone's well-being. In this paper, I examine and reject two cases for radical forms of prudential contextualism, proposed by Anna Alexandrova and Steve Campbell. Alexandrova holds that the semantic content of terms like 'well-being' and 'doing well' varies a…
Resisting buck-passing accounts of prudential value
The Consistency of Qualitative Hedonism and the Value of (at Least Some) Malicious Pleasures
In this article, I examine two of the standard objections to forms of value hedonism. The first is the common claim, most famously made by Bradley and Moore, that Mill's qualitative hedonism is inconsistent. The second is the apparent problem for quantitative hedonism in dealing with malicious pleasures. I argue that qualitative hedonism is consistent, even if it is implausible on other grounds. I then go on to show how our intuitions about malic…
Mill, Moore, and Intrinsic Value
In this paper, I examine how philosophers before and after G. E. Moore understood intrinsic value. The main idea I wish to bring out and defend is that Moore was insufficiently attentive to how distinctive his conception of intrinsic value was, as compared with those of the writers he discussed, and that such inattentiveness skewed his understanding of the positions of others that he discussed and dismissed. My way into this issue is by examining…
The Consistency of Qualitative Hedonism and the Value of (at Least Some) Malicious Pleasures
In this article, I examine two of the standard objections to forms of value hedonism. The first is the common claim, most famously made by Bradley and Moore, that Mill's qualitative hedonism is inconsistent. The second is the apparent problem for quantitative hedonism in dealing with malicious pleasures. I argue that qualitative hedonism is consistent, even if it is implausible on other grounds. I then go on to show how our intuitions about malic…
Variable Versus Fixed-Rate Rule-Utilitarianism
Fixed‐rate versions of rule‐consequentialism and rule‐utilitarianism evaluate rules in terms of the expected net value of one particular level of social acceptance, but one far enough below 100% social acceptance to make salient the complexities created by partial compliance. Variable‐rate versions of rule‐consequentialism and rule‐utilitarianism instead evaluate rules in terms of their expected net value at all different levels of social accepta…
Sentimental Value
Brown and Moore's Value Invariabilism vs Dancy's Variabilism
Journal Article Brown and Moore's Value Invariabilism VS Dancy's Variabilism Get access Guy Fletcher Guy Fletcher University of Reading Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 238, January 2010, Pages 162–168, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.640.x Published: 01 July 2009
Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication - Rachel Cohon
Journal Article Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication – Rachel Cohon Get access Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication. Rachel Cohon, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. viii + 285. Price £39.00.) Guy Fletcher Guy Fletcher Exeter College, Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 241, October 2010, Pages 861–863, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.20…
Resisting buck-passing accounts of prudential value
The Locative Analysis of Good For Formulated and Defended
I begin section 1 by dealing with preliminary issues such as the different relations expressed by the “good for” locution. I then (section 2) outline the Locative Analysis of good for and explain its main elements before moving on to (section 3) outlining and discussing the positive features of the view. In the subsequent sections I show how the Locative Analysis can respond to objections from, or inspired by, Sumner (sections 4–5), Regan (sectio…
A Millian Objection to Reasons as Evidence
Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star have recently proposed the following theory of reasons: Reasons as Evidence : Necessarily, a fact F is a reason for an agent A to Φ iff F is evidence that A ought to Φ (where Φ is either a belief or an action). In this article I present an objection, inspired by Mill's proof of the principle of utility, to the right-to-left reading of the biconditional. My claim is that the fact that you can perform some action can …
A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being
So-called ‘objective-list’ theories of well-being (prudential value, welfare) are under-represented in discussions of well-being. I do four things in this article to redress this. First, I develop a new taxonomy of theories of well-being, one that divides theories in a more subtle and illuminating way. Second, I use this taxonomy to undermine some misconceptions that have made people reluctant to hold objective-list theories. Third, I provide a n…
Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics
A recent trend in metaethics has been to reject the apparent choice between pure cognitivism and pure noncognitivism by adopting views that seek to combine the strengths of each side while avoiding the standard problems for each. Some such views claim that moral judgments are complexes of belief-like and desire-like components. Other such views claim that normative language serves both to ascribe properties and to express desire-like attitudes. T…
Hybrid Views in Meta-ethics: Pragmatic Views
A common starting point for 'going hybrid' is the thought that moral discourse somehow combines belief and desire-like aspects, or is both descriptive and expressive. Hybrid meta-ethical theories aim to give an account of moral discourse that is sufficiently sensitive to both its cognitive and its affective, or descriptive and expressive, dimensions. They hold at least one of the following: (i) moral thought: moral judgements have belief and desi…
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being
The Philosophy of Well-Being: An Introduction
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination
Against Contextualism about Prudential Discourse
In recent times, there has been a surge of interest in, and enthusiasm for, contextualist views about prudential discourse-thought and talk about what has prudential value or contributes to someone's well-being. In this paper, I examine and reject two cases for radical forms of prudential contextualism, proposed by Anna Alexandrova and Steve Campbell. Alexandrova holds that the semantic content of terms like 'well-being' and 'doing well' varies a…
Current recommendations on the selection of measures for well-being
Measures of well-being have proliferated over the past decades. Very little guidance has been available as to which measures to use in what contexts. This paper provides a series of recommendations, based on the present state of knowledge and the existing measures available, of what measures might be preferred in which contexts. The recommendations came out of an interdisciplinary workshop on the measurement of well-being. The recommendations are…
Measuring Well-Being: Interdisciplinary Perspectives from the Social Sciences and the Humanities
Dear Prudence: The Nature and Normativity of Prudential Discourse
Philosophers have long theorized about which things make people’s lives go well, and why, and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. By contrast, we have spent little time on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse (thought and talk about what is, e.g., good and bad for us, what contributes to well-being, and what we have prudential reason, or prudentially ought, to do). This situation is surpris…
A Painful End for Perfectionism
This paper examines perfectionist attempts to explain the prudential badness of pain (its badness for those who experience it). It starts by considering simple perfectionist explanations, finding them wanting, before considering the most sophisticated perfectionist attempt to explain prudential badness: Gwen Bradford’s tripartite perfectionism. The paper argues that Bradford’s view, though an improvement on earlier perfectionist proposals, still …
Not Living My Best Life: A Reply to Masny
In a recent paper, Michal Masny put forward a novel, interesting, theory of the goodness of a life: the Dual Theory. As Masny’s discussion demonstrates, the Dual Theory, if true, would have very significant implications for various issues related to the goodness of lives and for normative ethics. It is thus worthy of serious attention. In this paper, I first explain the Dual Theory and the motivation Masny provides for it. I then aim to show thre…
All's well that ends well? A new holism about lifetime well-Being
Is there more to how well a life goes overall (its lifetime well-being) than simply the aggregate goodness and badness of its moments (its momentary well-being)? Atomists about lifetime well-being say ‘no’. Holists hold that there is more to lifetime well-being than aggregate momentary well-being (with different holists offering different candidates for why this might be). This paper presents and defends a novel form of holism about lifetime well…
Epistemology (17 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (14 works) · Philosophy (14 works) · Sociology (10 works) · Psychology (9 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Mathematics (7 works) · Free Will and Agency (6 works)