Jesús Navarro Reyes
Biographic Data
| ID | 3597467 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jesús Navarro Reyes |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jesús Navarro |
| FAMILY NAME | Reyes |
| SIGNATURE | REYES J N |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidad de Sevilla |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7036-3929 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 14 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 12 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Secrecy
Although the ethical and political implications of secrecy are significant, I argue here that its fundamental nature is epistemological and that any account of its nature must be based on its epistemological profile. In particular, I propose examining secrecy within the framework of social and political epistemology, considering secrets as intentional disruptions to the social flow of knowledge. This requires us to postulate a crucial distinction…
The paradox of testimonial injustice
We claim that there appears to be something paradoxical in the phenomenon of testimonial injustice. The awareness that testimonial injustice exists in a society seems to function as pro tanto epistemic evidence that might, in turn, offer the hearer some justification for perpetrating it. Although such justification may be extremely weak and easily outweighed by other epistemic, moral, or political considerations, the evidence itself is not someth…
Event centrality in social anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder
Event centrality is defined by the extent to which a memory of an event has become central to an individual's identity and life story. Previous research predominantly focused on the link between event centrality and trauma-related symptomatology. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the perception of (adverse) events as central to one's self is not exclusive to Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Other disorders where adverse events are linked t…
The boundaries of gnoseology
According to Sosa (2015, 2021), the domain of epistemic normativity divides into gnoseology and intellectual ethics, a boundary that results from the key notion that gnoseological assessments are telic. We share this view here and highlight the implications that the telic claim has for different debates in contemporary epistemology. However, we also raise the complaint that Sosa’s analogy of the archer has suggested that this boundary aligns with…
Epistemic ownership and the practical/epistemic parallelism
We may succed in the fulfilment of our desires but still fail to properly own our practical life, perhaps because we acted as addicts, driven by desires that are alien to our will, or as “wantons,” satisfying the desires that we simply happen to have (Frankfurt, 1988). May we equally fail to own the outcomes of our epistemic life? If so, how may we attain epistemic ownership over it? This paper explores the structural parallellism between practic…
Fake knowledge-How
Knowledge, like other things of value, can be faked. According to Hawley (2011), know-how is harder to fake than knowledge-that, given that merely apparent propositional knowledge is in general more resilient to our attempts at successful detection than are corresponding attempts to fake know-how. While Hawley's reasoning for a kind of detection resilience asymmetry between know-how and know-that looks initially plausible, it should ultimately be…
Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk
The Defeasibility of Knowledge‐How
Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011 a ; 2011 b ; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. If this thesis is correct, then we should expect the defeasibility conditions for knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that to be uniform—viz., that the mechanisms of epistemic defeat which undermine propositional knowledge will be equally capable of imperilling knowledge‐how. The goal of th…
How to Do Philosophy with Words
No achievement beyond intention
Jonathan St.B.T. Evans y Keith Frankish (comps.), In Two Minds
Jonathan St.B.T. Evans y Keith Frankish (comps.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, xii + 369 pp
Can we say what we mean
The aim of this paper is to discuss a basic assumption tacitly shared by many philosophers of mind and language: that whatever can be meant, can be said . It specifically targets John Searle's account of this idea, focusing on his Principle of Expressibility (PE henceforth). In the first part of the paper, PE is exposed underlining its analyticity (1) and its relevance for the philosophy of language (2), mind (3), society and action (4). In the c…
The Defeasibility of Knowledge‐How
Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011 a ; 2011 b ; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. If this thesis is correct, then we should expect the defeasibility conditions for knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that to be uniform—viz., that the mechanisms of epistemic defeat which undermine propositional knowledge will be equally capable of imperilling knowledge‐how. The goal of th…
No achievement beyond intention
Can we say what we mean
The aim of this paper is to discuss a basic assumption tacitly shared by many philosophers of mind and language: that whatever can be meant, can be said . It specifically targets John Searle's account of this idea, focusing on his Principle of Expressibility (PE henceforth). In the first part of the paper, PE is exposed underlining its analyticity (1) and its relevance for the philosophy of language (2), mind (3), society and action (4). In the c…
Can we say what we mean
The aim of this paper is to discuss a basic assumption tacitly shared by many philosophers of mind and language: that whatever can be meant, can be said . It specifically targets John Searle's account of this idea, focusing on his Principle of Expressibility (PE henceforth). In the first part of the paper, PE is exposed underlining its analyticity (1) and its relevance for the philosophy of language (2), mind (3), society and action (4). In the c…
Jonathan St.B.T. Evans y Keith Frankish (comps.), In Two Minds
Jonathan St.B.T. Evans y Keith Frankish (comps.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, xii + 369 pp
No achievement beyond intention
The Defeasibility of Knowledge‐How
Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011 a ; 2011 b ; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. If this thesis is correct, then we should expect the defeasibility conditions for knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that to be uniform—viz., that the mechanisms of epistemic defeat which undermine propositional knowledge will be equally capable of imperilling knowledge‐how. The goal of th…
How to Do Philosophy with Words
Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk
Event centrality in social anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder
Event centrality is defined by the extent to which a memory of an event has become central to an individual's identity and life story. Previous research predominantly focused on the link between event centrality and trauma-related symptomatology. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the perception of (adverse) events as central to one's self is not exclusive to Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Other disorders where adverse events are linked t…
The boundaries of gnoseology
According to Sosa (2015, 2021), the domain of epistemic normativity divides into gnoseology and intellectual ethics, a boundary that results from the key notion that gnoseological assessments are telic. We share this view here and highlight the implications that the telic claim has for different debates in contemporary epistemology. However, we also raise the complaint that Sosa’s analogy of the archer has suggested that this boundary aligns with…
Epistemic ownership and the practical/epistemic parallelism
We may succed in the fulfilment of our desires but still fail to properly own our practical life, perhaps because we acted as addicts, driven by desires that are alien to our will, or as “wantons,” satisfying the desires that we simply happen to have (Frankfurt, 1988). May we equally fail to own the outcomes of our epistemic life? If so, how may we attain epistemic ownership over it? This paper explores the structural parallellism between practic…
Fake knowledge-How
Knowledge, like other things of value, can be faked. According to Hawley (2011), know-how is harder to fake than knowledge-that, given that merely apparent propositional knowledge is in general more resilient to our attempts at successful detection than are corresponding attempts to fake know-how. While Hawley's reasoning for a kind of detection resilience asymmetry between know-how and know-that looks initially plausible, it should ultimately be…
The paradox of testimonial injustice
We claim that there appears to be something paradoxical in the phenomenon of testimonial injustice. The awareness that testimonial injustice exists in a society seems to function as pro tanto epistemic evidence that might, in turn, offer the hearer some justification for perpetrating it. Although such justification may be extremely weak and easily outweighed by other epistemic, moral, or political considerations, the evidence itself is not someth…
Secrecy
Although the ethical and political implications of secrecy are significant, I argue here that its fundamental nature is epistemological and that any account of its nature must be based on its epistemological profile. In particular, I propose examining secrecy within the framework of social and political epistemology, considering secrets as intentional disruptions to the social flow of knowledge. This requires us to postulate a crucial distinction…
Epistemology (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works) · Philosophy of language (5 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Art (2 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (2 works)