Kristie Miller
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3597478 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Kristie Miller |
| NOMBRES | Kristie |
| APELLIDO | Miller |
| FIRMA | MILLER K |
| AFILIACIONES | The University of Sydney |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5092-8419 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 71 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 87 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 71 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2000 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
Do Asymmetries of Temporal Ontology Ground There Being Reasons to Have (Certain) Temporal Attitudes
It has been argued that one or other asymmetry in temporal ontology grounds there being reasons to have certain temporal attitudes which we not only have, but also judge to be reasonable, and that this gives us reason to posit that asymmetry. Call this general form of argument, the Argument from Reasonable Attitudes (ARA). There are several versions of this argument depending on (a) the posited asymmetry and (b) the attitude(s) mentioned and (c) …
Do Time‐Biases Promote or Frustrate Wellbeing
Evidence shows that people have multiple time‐biases. One is near‐bias, another is future‐bias, and a third is present‐bias. Philosophers have argued that, in part, the normative status of these biases depends on the extent to which they tend to promote, or frustrate, wellbeing, where “wellbeing” is taken to be of fundamental value. Since near‐bias is thought to be associated with impulsivity, lack of self‐control, and poor long‐term health and f…
Exploring People’s Normative Judgements About Future Bias and the Temporal Value Asymmetry
This paper empirically probes people’s judgements about whether future-bias and the temporal value asymmetry (TVA for short) are rationally permissible, obligatory, or impermissible. While philosophers are divided about the normative status of these attitudes/preferences, they have typically agreed that non-philosophers will judge that future-bias is at least permissible, and probably obligatory, and will judge that TVA is not permissible. If thi…
Is future bias just a manifestation of the temporal value asymmetry
Future-bias is the preference, all else being equal, for positive states of affairs to be located in the future not the past, and for negative states of affairs to be located in the past not the future. Three explanations for future-bias have been posited: the temporal metaphysics explanation, the practical irrelevance explanation, and the three mechanisms explanation. Understanding what explains future-bias is important not only for better under…
Memory, anticipation, and future-bias
One proposed explanation for a particular kind of temporal preference lies in a disparity between the emotional intensity of memory compared to anticipation. According to the memory/anticipation disparity explanation, the utility of anticipation of a particular event if that event is future, whether positive or negative, is greater than the utility of retrospection of that same event if it is past, whether positive or negative, and consequently, …
Against Actual Timelessness
Free will expressivism
In this paper I argue for free will expressivism, the view that the best interpretation of what people are doing when they utter free will sentences is not, as cognitivists maintain, asserting truth apt propositions, but rather, expressing attitudes towards the performance of certain actions. I argue that free will expressivism has several advantages over its cognitivist rivals in making sense of our free will discourse, and that this is good rea…
A challenge for experiential passage realism
In this paper I outline a challenge for experiential passage realism, the view that we veridically perceptually experience the robust passage of time. The challenge lies in accommodating recent empirical data, according to which ~ 35% of people do not report that it seems as though time robustly passes, and ~ 65% report that it does. I argue that offering a plausible explanation for this data is especially challenging for the experiential passage…
Temporal dynamism and the persisting stable self
Empirical evidence suggests that a majority of people believe that time robustly passes and that many also report that it seems to them, in experience, as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists deny that time robustly passes, and many contemporary non-dynamists—deflationists—even deny that it seems to us as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists, then, face the dual challenge of explaining why people have such beliefs and make such report…
Could we have experiences as of objects enduring
It is often suggested that we have experiences as of objects enduring. If this is a claim about perceptual experience, it is unclear how it could be true. It seems plausible that however objects persist, we would receive the same inputs to perception. Hence, things would seem experientially the same regardless of whether objects endure, or persist in some other manner. So, it cannot be that in any interesting sense we have experiences as of objec…
Metaphysical Explanation
The literature on metaphysical explanation contains three widely accepted assumptions. First, that the notion of metaphysical explanation with which philosophers are interested is a notion with which the folk are familiar: it is at least continuous with the folk notion. Second, that metaphysical explanations are propositions of a certain form that are true (or false), simpliciter. Third, that it is at least the case that mostly, if x metaphysical…
Exploring Arbitrariness Objections to Time Biases
A bstract There are two kinds of time bias: near bias and future bias. While philosophers typically hold that near bias is rationally impermissible, many hold that future bias is rationally permissible. Call this normative hybridism . According to arbitrariness objections, certain patterns of preference are rationally impermissible because they are arbitrary. While arbitrariness objections have been leveled against both near bias and future bias,…
Assessor Relative Conativism
According to conventionalist or conativist views about personal-identity, utterances of personal-identity sentences express propositions that are, in part, made true by the conative attitudes of relevant persons-stages. In this paper I introduce assessor relative conativism: the view that a personal-identity proposition can be true when evaluated at one person-stage's context and false when evaluated at another person-stage's context, because per…
Locative grounding harmony
In this paper, we explore locative grounding harmony, according to which the location of the grounds mirrors the location of the grounded. We proceed in three stages. First, we clarify the notion of locative harmony and describe different locative harmony principles. Second, we offer two arguments for the claim that grounding between physically located entities obeys principles of locative harmony. Third, we consider and respond to a range of cas…
Is endurantism the folk friendly view of persistence
Many philosophers have thought that our folk, or pre-reflective, view of persistence is one on which objects endure . This assumption not only plays a role in disputes about the nature of persistence itself, but is also put to use in several other areas of metaphysics, including debates about the nature of change and temporal passage. In this paper, we empirically test three broad claims. First, that most people (i.e. most non-philosophers) belie…
Is present-bias a distinctive psychological kind
Present-bias is the preference, all else being equal, for positive events to be located in the present rather than the non-present, and for negative events to be located in the non-present rather than the present.Very little attention has been given to present-bias in the contemporary literature on time biases.This may be because it is often assumed that present-bias is not a distinctive psychological kind; that what explains people's being prese…
Counterpart theory
In this paper, I argue that not only is metaphysical modal normativism an attractive view but that, as a matter of fact, many of us have, all along, been metaphysical modal normativists of a particular stripe. Namely, we have been the kinds of modal normativists, in the form of counterpart theorists, who are robust realists about possibility simpliciter. Having introduced modal normativism as Thomasson does in Norms and Necessity, I go on to reca…
Pretence fictionalism about the non-present
Presentists hold that only present things exist. But we all, presentists included, utter sentences that appear to involve quantification over non-present objects, and so we all, presentists included, seem to commit ourselves to such objects. Equally, we all, presentists included, take utterances of many past-tensed (and some future-tensed) sentences to be true. But if no past or future things exist, it’s hard to see how there can be anything that…
The role of causal manipulability in the manifestation of time biases
We investigate the causal manipulability hypothesis, according to which what partly explains (a) why people tend to prefer negative events to be in their further future rather than their nearer future and positive events to be in their nearer future rather than their further future and (b) why people tend to prefer that negative events be located in their past not their future and that positive events be located in their future not their past, is…
The implicit decision theory of non-philosophers
This paper empirically investigates whether people’s implicit decision theory is more like causal decision theory or more like a non-causal decision theory (such as evidential decision theory). We also aim to determine whether implicit causalists, without prompting and without prior education, make a distinction that is crucial to causal decision theorists: preferring something as a news item and preferring it as an object of choice . Finally, we…
Episodic imagining, temporal experience, and beliefs about time
We explore the role of episodic imagining in explaining why people both differentially report that it seems to them in experience as though time robustly passes, and why they differentially report that they believe that time does in fact robustly pass. We empirically investigate two hypotheses, the differential vividness hypothesis, and the mental time travel hypothesis. According to each of these, the degree to which people vividly episodically …
Locating Temporal Passage in a Block World
This paper aims to determine whether we can locate temporal passage in a non-dynamical (block universe) world. In particular, we seek to determine both whether temporal passage can be located somewhere in our world if it is non-dynamical, and also to home in on where in such a world temporal passage can be located, if it can be located anywhere. We investigate this question by seeking to determine, across three experiments, whether the folk conce…
Against Passage Illusionism
Temporal dynamists typically hold that it seems to us as though time robustly passes, and that its seeming so is explained by the fact that time does robustly pass. Temporal non-dynamists hold that time does not robustly pass. Some non-dynamists nevertheless hold that it seems as though it does: we have an illusory phenomenal state whose content represents robust passage. Call these phenomenal passage illusionists. Other non-dynamists argue that …
Why do people represent time as dynamical? An investigation of temporal dynamism and the open future
Deflationists hold that it does not seem to us, in experience, as though time robustly passes. There is some recent empirical evidence that appears to support this contention. Equally, empirical evidence suggests that we naïvely represent time as dynamical. Thus deflationists are faced with an explanatory burden. If, as they maintain, the world seems to us in experience as though it is non-dynamical, then why do we represent time as dynamical? Th…
Is it identity all the way down? From supersubstantivalism to composition as identity and back again
We argue that, insofar as one accepts either supersubstantivalism or strong composition as identity for the usual reasons, one has (defeasible) reasons to accept the other as well. Thus, all else being equal, one ought to find the package that combines both views – the Identity Package – more attractive than any rival package that includes one, but not the other, of either supersubstantivalism or composition as identity
Is our naïve theory of time dynamical
Temporal phenomenology
Temporal Experience, Temporal Passage and the Cognitive Sciences
Cognitive science has recently made some startling discoveries about temporal experience, and these discoveries have been drafted into philosophical service. We survey recent appeals to cognitive science in the philosophical debate over whether time objectively passes. Since this research is currently in its infancy, we identify some directions for future research
On Preferring that Overall, Things are Worse
Philosophers vigorously debate the rationality of hedonic bias toward the future : a systematic preference for pleasurable experiences to be future and painful experiences to be past. The debate over future bias is distinctive in philosophy because arguments made on both sides concern descriptive and empirically tractable claims about patterns of preferences and the psychological mechanisms that could explain these patterns. Most notably, philoso…
Three Routes to Contingentism in Metaphysics
Recently, the notion that most metaphysical theses are necessary has been challenged by a number of authors. This article considers two different routes to contingentism in metaphysics. The first is via a combination of conceptual analysis and empirical discoveries; the second is via synthetic metaphysical claims. The last of these has the potential to yield contingent truths if each of competing metaphysical theses turn out to be the best theory…
Moving ego versus moving time
It has been hypothesized that our believing that, or its seeming to us as though, the world is in some way dynamical partially explains (and perhaps rationalizes) future-bias. Recent work has, in turn, found a correlation between future-bias and near-bias, suggesting that there is a common explanation for both. Call the claim that what partially explains our being both future- and near-biased is our believing/it seeming to us as though the world …
Future bias in action
Why Do Female Students Leave Philosophy? The Story from Sydney
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Against a normative asymmetry between near- and future-bias
Empirical evidence shows that people have multiple time-biases. One is near-bias; another is future-bias. Philosophical theorising about these biases often proceeds on two assumptions. First, that the two biases are independent : that they are explained by different factors (the independence assumption). Second, that there is a normative asymmetry between the two biases: one is rationally impermissible (near-bias) and the other rationally permiss…
Alethic Openness and the Growing Block Theory of Time
Whatever its ultimate philosophical merits, it is often thought that the growing block theory presents an intuitive picture of reality that accords well with our pre-reflective or folk view of time, and of the past, present, and future. This is partly motivated by the idea that we find it intuitive that, in some sense, the future is open and the past closed, and that the growing block theory is particularly well suited to accommodate this being s…
A psychologistic theory of metaphysical explanation
Causation in a timeless world
What is an Extended Simple Region
A Hyperintensional Account of Metaphysical Equivalence
This paper argues for a particular view about in what metaphysical equivalence consists: namely, that any two metaphysical theories are metaphysically equivalent if and only if those theories are strongly hyperintensionally equivalent. It is consistent with this characterisation that said theories are weakly hyperintensionally distinct; thus, affording us the resources to model the content of propositional attitudes directed towards metaphysicall…
The implicit decision theory of non-philosophers
This paper empirically investigates whether people’s implicit decision theory is more like causal decision theory or more like a non-causal decision theory (such as evidential decision theory). We also aim to determine whether implicit causalists, without prompting and without prior education, make a distinction that is crucial to causal decision theorists: preferring something as a news item and preferring it as an object of choice . Finally, we…
Episodic imagining, temporal experience, and beliefs about time
We explore the role of episodic imagining in explaining why people both differentially report that it seems to them in experience as though time robustly passes, and why they differentially report that they believe that time does in fact robustly pass. We empirically investigate two hypotheses, the differential vividness hypothesis, and the mental time travel hypothesis. According to each of these, the degree to which people vividly episodically …
Tensed Facts and the Fittingness of our Attitudes 1
We direct different attitudes towards states of affairs depending on where in time those states of affairs are located. Call this the type asymmetry . The type asymmetry appears fitting. For instance, it seems fitting to feel guilt or regret only about states of affairs that are past, and anticipation only of states of affairs that are future. It has been argued that the type asymmetry could only be fitting if there are tensed facts, and hence th…
Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias
People are ‘biased toward the future’: all else being equal, we typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. Several explanations have been suggested for this pattern of preferences. Adjudicating among these explanations can, among other things, shed light on the rationality of future-bias: For instance, if our preferences are explained by unjustified beliefs or an illusory phenomenology, we m…
Bias towards the future
All else being equal, most of us typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future rather than the past and negative experiences in the past rather than the future. Recent empirical evidence tends not only to support the idea that people have these preferences, but further, that people tend to prefer more painful experiences in their past rather than fewer in their future (and mutatis mutandis for pleasant experiences). Are such prefere…
Ditching determination and dependence
Non-naturalistic moral explanation
Quantum gravity, timelessness, and the folk concept of time
Temporal Fictionalism for a Timeless World
Current debate in the metaphysics of time ordinarily assumes that we should be realists about time. Recently, however, a number of physicists and philosophers of physics have proposed that time will play no role in a completed theory of quantum gravity. This paper defends fictionalism about temporal thought, on the supposition that our world is timeless. We argue that, in the face of timeless physical theories, realism about temporal thought is u…
On the Concept of Sexual Perversion
Why has little progress been made in resolving the debate about the concept of sexual perversion? I suggest that the stalemate is due to misunderstandings and poor methodology. I develop a new methodology for resolving disputes about the correct analysis of the contents of concepts where the disputes have social and political ramifications. When deciding between competing analyses of a concept, we should not just consider facts about our inferent…
Eleanor Roosevelt. Vol. 2
Journal Article Eleanor Roosevelt. Vol. 2: 1933–1938. By Blanche Wiesen Cook. (New York: Viking, 1999. xviii, 686 pp. $34.95, ISBN 0-670-84498-5.) Get access Kristie Miller Kristie Miller McLean, Virginia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 87, Issue 3, December 2000, Pages 1078–1079, https://doi.org/10.2307/2675380 Published: 01 December 2000
We Have Come to Stay
Journal Article We Have Come to Stay: American Women and Political Parties, 1880–1960. Ed. by Melanie Gustafson, Kris tie Miller, and Elisabeth I. Perry, Selling Suffrage: Consumer Culture & Votes for Women. By Margaret Finnegan and White Women's Rights: The Racial Origins of Feminism in the United States. By Louise Michele Newman Get access Peggy Pascoe Peggy Pascoe University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon Search for other works by this author on: O…
Isabella Greenway
Journal Article Isabella Greenway: An Enterprising Woman Get access Isabella Greenway: An Enterprising Woman. By Miller Kristie. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2004. xv + 307 pp. Illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. $24.95.) Heidi J. Osselaer Heidi J. Osselaer Arizona State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Western Historical Quarterly, Volume 36, Issue 4, Winter 2005, Page 536, https…
A New Definition of Endurance
In this paper I present a new definition of endurance. I argue that the three-dimensionalist ought to adopt a different understanding from the four-dimensionalist, of what it is to have a part simpliciter. With this new understanding it becomes possible to define endurance in a manner that both preserves the central endurantist intuitions, whilst avoiding commitment to any controversial metaphysical theses. Furthermore, since this endurantist def…
Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds
Many metaphysicians tell us that our world is one in which persisting objects are four‐dimensionally extended in time, and persist by being partially present at each moment at which they exist. Many normative theorists tell us that at least some of our core normative practices are justified only if the relation that holds between a person at one time, and that person at another time, is the relation of strict identity. If these metaphysicians are…
On the Concept of Sexual Perversion
Why has little progress been made in resolving the debate about the concept of sexual perversion? I suggest that the stalemate is due to misunderstandings and poor methodology. I develop a new methodology for resolving disputes about the correct analysis of the contents of concepts where the disputes have social and political ramifications. When deciding between competing analyses of a concept, we should not just consider facts about our inferent…
Three Routes to Contingentism in Metaphysics
Recently, the notion that most metaphysical theses are necessary has been challenged by a number of authors. This article considers two different routes to contingentism in metaphysics. The first is via a combination of conceptual analysis and empirical discoveries; the second is via synthetic metaphysical claims. The last of these has the potential to yield contingent truths if each of competing metaphysical theses turn out to be the best theory…
New Papers on the Present
Conditional and Prospective Apologies
Causation in a timeless world
Why Do Female Students Leave Philosophy? The Story from Sydney
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Temporal Experience, Temporal Passage and the Cognitive Sciences
Cognitive science has recently made some startling discoveries about temporal experience, and these discoveries have been drafted into philosophical service. We survey recent appeals to cognitive science in the philosophical debate over whether time objectively passes. Since this research is currently in its infancy, we identify some directions for future research
The Unique Groundability of Temporal Facts
The A‐theory and the B‐theory advance competing claims about how time is grounded. The A‐theory says that A‐facts are more fundamental in grounding time than are B‐facts, and the B‐theory says the reverse. We argue that whichever theory is true of the actual world is also true of all possible worlds containing time. We do this by arguing that time is uniquely groundable: however time is actually grounded, it is necessarily grounded in that way. I…
A Hyperintensional Account of Metaphysical Equivalence
This paper argues for a particular view about in what metaphysical equivalence consists: namely, that any two metaphysical theories are metaphysically equivalent if and only if those theories are strongly hyperintensionally equivalent. It is consistent with this characterisation that said theories are weakly hyperintensionally distinct; thus, affording us the resources to model the content of propositional attitudes directed towards metaphysicall…
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Time
A psychologistic theory of metaphysical explanation
Temporal Fictionalism for a Timeless World
Current debate in the metaphysics of time ordinarily assumes that we should be realists about time. Recently, however, a number of physicists and philosophers of physics have proposed that time will play no role in a completed theory of quantum gravity. This paper defends fictionalism about temporal thought, on the supposition that our world is timeless. We argue that, in the face of timeless physical theories, realism about temporal thought is u…
What is an Extended Simple Region
The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics
One of the greatest metaphysical insights that Aristotle contributed to the history of philosophy is that objects may be partitioned in two ways: into parts and into abstracta. The latter kind of division has not received due attention among contemporary extensional mereologists (who advocate division into parts only), and even in neo-Aristotelian quarters. In addition to clarifying which type of part is relevant for understanding Aristotle’s hyl…
Conativism about personal identity
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the conceptual terrain of what we call conative accounts of personal identity. These are views according to which the same-person relation in some sense depends on a range of broadly conative phenomena, especially desires, behaviours and conventions. We distinguish views along three dimensions: what role the conations play, what kinds of conations play that role, and whether the conations that play that…
Time in a one‐instant world
Many philosophers hold that ‘one‐instant worlds’—worlds that contain a single instant—fail to contain time. We experimentally investigate whether these worlds satisfy the folk concept of time. We found that ~50% of participants hold that there is time in such worlds. We argue that this suggests one of two possibilities. First, the population disagree about whether at least one of the A‐, B‐, or C‐series is necessary for time, with there being a s…
Surviving, to some degree
An Empirical Investigation of Purported Passage Phenomenology
It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that most people unambiguously have a phenomenology as of time passing, and that this is a datum that philosophical theories must accommodate. Moreover, it has been assumed that the greater the extent to which people have said phenomenology, the more likely they are to endorse a dynamical theory of time. This paper is the first to empirically test these assumptions. Surprisingly, our results do not sup…
Temporal phenomenology
What Time-Travel Teaches Us about Future-Bias
Future-biased individuals systematically prefer positively valenced events to be in the future (positive future-bias) and negatively valenced events to be in the past (negative future-bias). The most extreme form of future-bias is absolute future-bias, whereby we completely discount the value of past events when forming our preferences. Various authors have thought that we are absolutely future-biased and that future-bias (absolute or otherwise) …
Philosophy (51 obras) · Epistemology (50 obras) · Psychology (34 obras) · Metaphysics (33 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (32 obras) · Philosophy of language (24 obras) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (19 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (18 obras) · Computer Science (17 obras) · Philosophy of science (16 obras)