Kentaro Fujimoto
Biographic Data
| ID | 3597549 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kentaro Fujimoto |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kentaro |
| FAMILY NAME | Fujimoto |
| SIGNATURE | FUJIMOTO K |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Bristol |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4830-5861 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The Geach‐Kaplan sentence reconsidered
The Geach‐Kaplan sentence is alleged to be an example of a non‐first‐orderizable sentence, and the proof of the alleged non‐first‐orderizability is credited to David Kaplan. However, there is also a widely shared intuition that the Geach‐Kaplan sentence is still first‐orderizable by invoking sets or other extra non‐logical resources . The plausibility of this intuition is particularly crucial for first‐orderism , namely, the thesis that all our s…
On the Logicality of Truth
Deflationism about truth describes truth as a logical notion. In the present paper, I explore the implication of the alleged logicality of truth from the perspective of axiomatic theories of truth, and argue that the deflationist doctrine of the logicality of truth gives rise to two types of self-undermining arguments against deflationism, which I call the conservativeness argument from logicality and the topic-neutrality argument
Deflationism beyond arithmetic
The conservativeness argument poses a dilemma to deflationism about truth, according to which a deflationist theory of truth must be conservative but no adequate theory of truth is conservative. The debate on the conservativeness argument has so far been framed in a specific formal setting, where theories of truth are formulated over arithmetical base theories. I will argue that the appropriate formal setting for evaluating the conservativeness a…
Unifying the Philosophy of Truth
On the Logicality of Truth
Deflationism about truth describes truth as a logical notion. In the present paper, I explore the implication of the alleged logicality of truth from the perspective of axiomatic theories of truth, and argue that the deflationist doctrine of the logicality of truth gives rise to two types of self-undermining arguments against deflationism, which I call the conservativeness argument from logicality and the topic-neutrality argument
Deflationism beyond arithmetic
The conservativeness argument poses a dilemma to deflationism about truth, according to which a deflationist theory of truth must be conservative but no adequate theory of truth is conservative. The debate on the conservativeness argument has so far been framed in a specific formal setting, where theories of truth are formulated over arithmetical base theories. I will argue that the appropriate formal setting for evaluating the conservativeness a…
Unifying the Philosophy of Truth
Deflationism beyond arithmetic
The conservativeness argument poses a dilemma to deflationism about truth, according to which a deflationist theory of truth must be conservative but no adequate theory of truth is conservative. The debate on the conservativeness argument has so far been framed in a specific formal setting, where theories of truth are formulated over arithmetical base theories. I will argue that the appropriate formal setting for evaluating the conservativeness a…
On the Logicality of Truth
Deflationism about truth describes truth as a logical notion. In the present paper, I explore the implication of the alleged logicality of truth from the perspective of axiomatic theories of truth, and argue that the deflationist doctrine of the logicality of truth gives rise to two types of self-undermining arguments against deflationism, which I call the conservativeness argument from logicality and the topic-neutrality argument
The Geach‐Kaplan sentence reconsidered
The Geach‐Kaplan sentence is alleged to be an example of a non‐first‐orderizable sentence, and the proof of the alleged non‐first‐orderizability is credited to David Kaplan. However, there is also a widely shared intuition that the Geach‐Kaplan sentence is still first‐orderizable by invoking sets or other extra non‐logical resources . The plausibility of this intuition is particularly crucial for first‐orderism , namely, the thesis that all our s…
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis (1 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works)