Hannah Tierney
Biographic Data
| ID | 3602111 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Hannah Tierney |
| GIVEN NAMES | Hannah |
| FAMILY NAME | Tierney |
| SIGNATURE | TIERNEY H |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Davis |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4365-0786 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 12 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Trends in Alcohol Use Before and During the Covid-19 Pandemic Among Women Living With and Without HIV in the United States (2017–2022)
Data on alcohol use trends in women living with HIV (WLWH) are lacking. We examine data collected before and across the COVID-19 pandemic (2014-2022) in WLWH and socio-demographically similar women living without HIV (WLWOH)(n = 1564; 67% WLWH) who self-reported alcohol use to establish and compare trends. Women were categorized into baseline groups based on use pattern from 10/2014 to 09/2017: abstinence (no alcohol at any visit), non-heavy drin…
Do conspiracy-theory interventions rest on a mistake
In this paper we argue that the problem of conspiracy theories circulating through specific social groups runs deeper than is appreciated. The epistemic networks involved in the propagation of conspiracy theories cannot always be deemed to be irrational, with motivated reasoning at their heart. There are, after all, rational epistemic bubbles—those that rightly ignore unreliable information sources. We provide a rational reconstruction of conspir…
Cruel Intentions and Evil Deeds
What it means for an action to have moral worth, and what is required for this to be the case, is the subject of continued controversy. Some argue that an agent performs a morally worthy action if and only if they do it because the action is morally right. Others argue that a morally worthy action is that which an agent performs because of features that make the action right. These theorists, though they oppose one another, share something import…
The Four-Case Argument and the Existential/Universal Effect
Forgetting to Un-Forgive
Much of the literature on forgiveness is dedicated to understanding the reasons to forgive and what changes in attitude are required to do so. But philosophers have been much less attentive to what happens after agents forgive. This is a serious oversight, since the reasons to forgive do not always retain their force and it is not always possible, or advisable, to maintain the changes in attitudes that forgiveness requires. Fortunately, Monique W…
Moving ego versus moving time
It has been hypothesized that our believing that, or its seeming to us as though, the world is in some way dynamical partially explains (and perhaps rationalizes) future-bias. Recent work has, in turn, found a correlation between future-bias and near-bias, suggesting that there is a common explanation for both. Call the claim that what partially explains our being both future- and near-biased is our believing/it seeming to us as though the world …
Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias
Empirical work has lately confirmed what many philosophers have taken to be true: people are ‘biased toward the future’. All else being equal, we usually prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. According to one hypothesis, the temporal metaphysics hypothesis, future-bias is explained either by our (tacit) beliefs about temporal metaphysics—the temporal belief hypothesis—or alternatively by our temp…
Defusing Existential and Universal Threats to Compatibilism
Many manipulation arguments against compatibilism rely on the claim that manipulation is relevantly similar to determinism. But we argue that manipulation is nothing like determinism in one relevant respect. Determinism is a "universal" phenomenon: its scope includes every feature of the universe. But manipulation arguments feature cases where an agent is the only manipulated individual in her universe. Call manipulation whose scope includes at l…
Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias
People are ‘biased toward the future’: all else being equal, we typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. Several explanations have been suggested for this pattern of preferences. Adjudicating among these explanations can, among other things, shed light on the rationality of future-bias: For instance, if our preferences are explained by unjustified beliefs or an illusory phenomenology, we m…
Bias towards the future
All else being equal, most of us typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future rather than the past and negative experiences in the past rather than the future. Recent empirical evidence tends not only to support the idea that people have these preferences, but further, that people tend to prefer more painful experiences in their past rather than fewer in their future (and mutatis mutandis for pleasant experiences). Are such prefere…
The Comparative Nonarbitrariness Norm of Blame
Much has been written about the fittingness, epistemic, and standing norms that govern blame. In this paper, we argue that there exists a norm of blame that has yet to receive philosophical discussion and without which an account of the ethics of blame will be incomplete: a norm proscribing comparatively arbitrary blame. By reflecting on the objectionableness of comparatively arbitrary blame, we stand to elucidate a substantive, and thus far over…
Tackling it Head On
Moving ego versus moving time
It has been hypothesized that our believing that, or its seeming to us as though, the world is in some way dynamical partially explains (and perhaps rationalizes) future-bias. Recent work has, in turn, found a correlation between future-bias and near-bias, suggesting that there is a common explanation for both. Call the claim that what partially explains our being both future- and near-biased is our believing/it seeming to us as though the world …
Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias
People are ‘biased toward the future’: all else being equal, we typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. Several explanations have been suggested for this pattern of preferences. Adjudicating among these explanations can, among other things, shed light on the rationality of future-bias: For instance, if our preferences are explained by unjustified beliefs or an illusory phenomenology, we m…
Bias towards the future
All else being equal, most of us typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future rather than the past and negative experiences in the past rather than the future. Recent empirical evidence tends not only to support the idea that people have these preferences, but further, that people tend to prefer more painful experiences in their past rather than fewer in their future (and mutatis mutandis for pleasant experiences). Are such prefere…
Tackling it Head On
The Comparative Nonarbitrariness Norm of Blame
Much has been written about the fittingness, epistemic, and standing norms that govern blame. In this paper, we argue that there exists a norm of blame that has yet to receive philosophical discussion and without which an account of the ethics of blame will be incomplete: a norm proscribing comparatively arbitrary blame. By reflecting on the objectionableness of comparatively arbitrary blame, we stand to elucidate a substantive, and thus far over…
Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias
Empirical work has lately confirmed what many philosophers have taken to be true: people are ‘biased toward the future’. All else being equal, we usually prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. According to one hypothesis, the temporal metaphysics hypothesis, future-bias is explained either by our (tacit) beliefs about temporal metaphysics—the temporal belief hypothesis—or alternatively by our temp…
Defusing Existential and Universal Threats to Compatibilism
Many manipulation arguments against compatibilism rely on the claim that manipulation is relevantly similar to determinism. But we argue that manipulation is nothing like determinism in one relevant respect. Determinism is a "universal" phenomenon: its scope includes every feature of the universe. But manipulation arguments feature cases where an agent is the only manipulated individual in her universe. Call manipulation whose scope includes at l…
Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias
People are ‘biased toward the future’: all else being equal, we typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. Several explanations have been suggested for this pattern of preferences. Adjudicating among these explanations can, among other things, shed light on the rationality of future-bias: For instance, if our preferences are explained by unjustified beliefs or an illusory phenomenology, we m…
Bias towards the future
All else being equal, most of us typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future rather than the past and negative experiences in the past rather than the future. Recent empirical evidence tends not only to support the idea that people have these preferences, but further, that people tend to prefer more painful experiences in their past rather than fewer in their future (and mutatis mutandis for pleasant experiences). Are such prefere…
Cruel Intentions and Evil Deeds
What it means for an action to have moral worth, and what is required for this to be the case, is the subject of continued controversy. Some argue that an agent performs a morally worthy action if and only if they do it because the action is morally right. Others argue that a morally worthy action is that which an agent performs because of features that make the action right. These theorists, though they oppose one another, share something import…
The Four-Case Argument and the Existential/Universal Effect
Forgetting to Un-Forgive
Much of the literature on forgiveness is dedicated to understanding the reasons to forgive and what changes in attitude are required to do so. But philosophers have been much less attentive to what happens after agents forgive. This is a serious oversight, since the reasons to forgive do not always retain their force and it is not always possible, or advisable, to maintain the changes in attitudes that forgiveness requires. Fortunately, Monique W…
Moving ego versus moving time
It has been hypothesized that our believing that, or its seeming to us as though, the world is in some way dynamical partially explains (and perhaps rationalizes) future-bias. Recent work has, in turn, found a correlation between future-bias and near-bias, suggesting that there is a common explanation for both. Call the claim that what partially explains our being both future- and near-biased is our believing/it seeming to us as though the world …
Trends in Alcohol Use Before and During the Covid-19 Pandemic Among Women Living With and Without HIV in the United States (2017–2022)
Data on alcohol use trends in women living with HIV (WLWH) are lacking. We examine data collected before and across the COVID-19 pandemic (2014-2022) in WLWH and socio-demographically similar women living without HIV (WLWOH)(n = 1564; 67% WLWH) who self-reported alcohol use to establish and compare trends. Women were categorized into baseline groups based on use pattern from 10/2014 to 09/2017: abstinence (no alcohol at any visit), non-heavy drin…
Do conspiracy-theory interventions rest on a mistake
In this paper we argue that the problem of conspiracy theories circulating through specific social groups runs deeper than is appreciated. The epistemic networks involved in the propagation of conspiracy theories cannot always be deemed to be irrational, with motivated reasoning at their heart. There are, after all, rational epistemic bubbles—those that rightly ignore unreliable information sources. We provide a rational reconstruction of conspir…
Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Psychology (7 works) · Free Will and Agency (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy of language (4 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works)