Jacob Beck
Biographic Data
| ID | 3602116 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jacob Beck |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jacob |
| FAMILY NAME | Beck |
| SIGNATURE | BECK J |
| AFFILIATIONS | York University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2991-3124 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 10 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1960 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Softening the Border
Approaches to the perception–cognition distinction tend toward two extremes. Many embrace a hard border, treating perception and cognition as mutually exclusive, non‐overlapping categories. By contrast, eliminativism denies that any principled, theoretically useful distinction exists between perception and cognition. This article offers a third way, describing a principled but soft border between perception and cognition. This non‐exclusive appro…
Between perception and thought
Contents and Vehicles in Analog Perception
Building on Christopher Peacocke’s account of analog perceptual content and my own account of analog perceptual vehicles, I defend three claims: that the perception of magnitudes often has analog contents; that the perception of magnitudes often has analog vehicles; and that the first claim is true in virtue of the second —that is, the analog vehicles help to ground the analog contents
Mundane hallucinations and new wave relationalism
Relationalism maintains that mind‐independent objects are essential constituents of veridical perceptual experiences. According to the argument from hallucination, relationalism is undermined by perfect hallucinations, experiences that are introspectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptual experiences but lack an object. Recently, a new wave of relationalists have responded by questioning whether perfect hallucinations are possible: what…
Teaching & Learning Guide for
The idea that perception is distinct from cognition is not just intuitive, it is central to countless debates in philosophy and psychology. For example, when researchers ask which properties can be visually represented or visually experienced? They are assuming that there is a difference between properties being represented in (visual) perception, and them merely being represented in post-perceptual thought and cognition. Indeed, many researchers…
Border Disputes
The distinction between perception and cognition frames countless debates in philosophy and cognitive science. But what, if anything, does this distinction actually amount to? In this introductory article, we summarize recent work on this question. We first briefly consider the possibility that a perception-cognition border should beeliminatedfrom our scientific ontology, and then introduce and critically examine five positive approaches to marki…
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds
The insight gained from Ruth Millikan leads us to investigate animal communication not by considering Gricean communicative intentions, but instead by considering feature of intentional communication, namely the flexible interaction between the participants of the communicative situation. Whether nonhuman primates communicate intentionally, that is, whether they rely on intentions, such as goals and beliefs about goals and knowledge states of the…
Analogue Magnitude Representations
Empirical discussions of mental representation appeal to a wide variety of representational kinds. Some of these kinds, such as the sentential representations underlying language use and the pictorial representations of visual imagery, are thoroughly familiar to philosophers. Others have received almost no philosophical attention at all. Included in this latter category are analogue magnitude representations, which enable a wide range of organism…
Sense, Mentalese, and Ontology
Modes of presentation are often posited to accommodate Frege’s puzzle. Philosophers differ, however, in whether they follow Frege in identifying modes of presentation with Fregean senses, or instead take them to be formally individuated symbols of “Mentalese”. Building on Fodor (1990; 1998), Margolis and Laurence (2007) defend the latter view by arguing that the mind-independence of Fregean senses renders them ontologically suspect in a way that …
Do Animals Engage in Conceptual Thought
This article surveys and evaluates the answers that philosophers and animal researchers have given to two questions. Do animals have thoughts? If so, are their thoughts conceptual? Along the way, special attention is paid to distinguish debates of substance from mere battles over terminology, and to isolate fruitful areas for future research
Learning and Teaching
Learning and Teaching
Analogue Magnitude Representations
Empirical discussions of mental representation appeal to a wide variety of representational kinds. Some of these kinds, such as the sentential representations underlying language use and the pictorial representations of visual imagery, are thoroughly familiar to philosophers. Others have received almost no philosophical attention at all. Included in this latter category are analogue magnitude representations, which enable a wide range of organism…
Do Animals Engage in Conceptual Thought
This article surveys and evaluates the answers that philosophers and animal researchers have given to two questions. Do animals have thoughts? If so, are their thoughts conceptual? Along the way, special attention is paid to distinguish debates of substance from mere battles over terminology, and to isolate fruitful areas for future research
Border Disputes
The distinction between perception and cognition frames countless debates in philosophy and cognitive science. But what, if anything, does this distinction actually amount to? In this introductory article, we summarize recent work on this question. We first briefly consider the possibility that a perception-cognition border should beeliminatedfrom our scientific ontology, and then introduce and critically examine five positive approaches to marki…
Learning and Teaching
Learning and Teaching
Do Animals Engage in Conceptual Thought
This article surveys and evaluates the answers that philosophers and animal researchers have given to two questions. Do animals have thoughts? If so, are their thoughts conceptual? Along the way, special attention is paid to distinguish debates of substance from mere battles over terminology, and to isolate fruitful areas for future research
Sense, Mentalese, and Ontology
Modes of presentation are often posited to accommodate Frege’s puzzle. Philosophers differ, however, in whether they follow Frege in identifying modes of presentation with Fregean senses, or instead take them to be formally individuated symbols of “Mentalese”. Building on Fodor (1990; 1998), Margolis and Laurence (2007) defend the latter view by arguing that the mind-independence of Fregean senses renders them ontologically suspect in a way that …
Analogue Magnitude Representations
Empirical discussions of mental representation appeal to a wide variety of representational kinds. Some of these kinds, such as the sentential representations underlying language use and the pictorial representations of visual imagery, are thoroughly familiar to philosophers. Others have received almost no philosophical attention at all. Included in this latter category are analogue magnitude representations, which enable a wide range of organism…
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds
The insight gained from Ruth Millikan leads us to investigate animal communication not by considering Gricean communicative intentions, but instead by considering feature of intentional communication, namely the flexible interaction between the participants of the communicative situation. Whether nonhuman primates communicate intentionally, that is, whether they rely on intentions, such as goals and beliefs about goals and knowledge states of the…
Contents and Vehicles in Analog Perception
Building on Christopher Peacocke’s account of analog perceptual content and my own account of analog perceptual vehicles, I defend three claims: that the perception of magnitudes often has analog contents; that the perception of magnitudes often has analog vehicles; and that the first claim is true in virtue of the second —that is, the analog vehicles help to ground the analog contents
Mundane hallucinations and new wave relationalism
Relationalism maintains that mind‐independent objects are essential constituents of veridical perceptual experiences. According to the argument from hallucination, relationalism is undermined by perfect hallucinations, experiences that are introspectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptual experiences but lack an object. Recently, a new wave of relationalists have responded by questioning whether perfect hallucinations are possible: what…
Teaching & Learning Guide for
The idea that perception is distinct from cognition is not just intuitive, it is central to countless debates in philosophy and psychology. For example, when researchers ask which properties can be visually represented or visually experienced? They are assuming that there is a difference between properties being represented in (visual) perception, and them merely being represented in post-perceptual thought and cognition. Indeed, many researchers…
Border Disputes
The distinction between perception and cognition frames countless debates in philosophy and cognitive science. But what, if anything, does this distinction actually amount to? In this introductory article, we summarize recent work on this question. We first briefly consider the possibility that a perception-cognition border should beeliminatedfrom our scientific ontology, and then introduce and critically examine five positive approaches to marki…
Between perception and thought
Softening the Border
Approaches to the perception–cognition distinction tend toward two extremes. Many embrace a hard border, treating perception and cognition as mutually exclusive, non‐overlapping categories. By contrast, eliminativism denies that any principled, theoretically useful distinction exists between perception and cognition. This article offers a third way, describing a principled but soft border between perception and cognition. This non‐exclusive appro…
Psychology (11 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Perception (6 works) · Cognitive psychology (5 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Cognition (4 works) · Cognitive science (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Cognitive and developmental aspects of mathematical skills (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works)