Ben Martin
Biographic Data
| ID | 3602137 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ben Martin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ben |
| FAMILY NAME | Martin |
| SIGNATURE | BEN MARTIN |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Padua |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2280-0781 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 31 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 16 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1973 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
How logic(ian)s disagree
Philosophical accounts of disagreements within logic tend to focus on how logics themselves disagree with one another, such as how their theorems or (meta)inferences diverge, while neglecting the theoretical disagreements that lead to the advocacy of these logics. This has several shortcomings, amongst which it fails to explain why disagreements over the correct logic occur in the first place, as well as overlooking the possibility of substantive…
Model pluralism for logic
It is well‐recognized in the sciences that a multitude of nonequivalent models are used by researchers to fulfill a range of goals, even for the same target system, a result known broadly as model pluralism . The possibility of the same form of pluralism occurring in logic, however, has not been adequately considered. This is a surprise, given that both logical pluralism and methodological anti‐exceptionalism about logic (AEL), the view that the …
Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic (Part II): Methodological Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic
According to anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), logic is not as exceptional in terms of its subject matter and epistemology as has been conventionally thought. As such, AEL either outright rejects certain traditional properties of logic, such as its formality, apriority, or necessity, or rather proposes that while logic possesses these properties, it does so in a similar way to other research areas. In this second part of a two-part entry on …
Raz’s appeal to law’s authority
Joseph Raz’s Argument from Authority is one of the most famous defences of exclusive positivism in jurisprudence, the position that the existence and content of the law in a society is a wholly social fact, which can be established without the need to engage in moral analysis. According to Raz’s argument, legal systems are de facto practical authorities that, like all de facto authorities, must claim legitimate authority, which itself entails tha…
Reflective equilibrium in logic
Among the areas of knowledge that the method of reflective equilibrium (RE) has been applied to is that of logical validity. According to RE in logic, we come to be justified in believing a (deductive) logical theory in virtue of establishing some state of equilibrium between our initial judgements over the validity of specific (natural language) arguments and the logical principles which constitute our logical theory. Unfortunately, however, whi…
Dialetheism and the countermodel problem
According to some dialetheists, we ought to reject the distinction between object and meta‐languages. Given that dialetheists advocate truth‐value gluts within their object‐language, whether in order to solve the liar paradox or for some other reason, this rejection of the object‐/meta‐language distinction comes with the commitment to use a glutty metatheory. While it has been pointed out that a glutty metatheory brings with it expressive deficie…
Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic (Part I): From Naturalism to Anti-Exceptionalism
According to anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), logic is not as exceptional in terms of its epistemology and subject matter as has been conventionally thought. Whereas logic's epistemology has often been considered distinct from those of the recognised sciences, in virtue of being both non-inferential and a priori, it is in fact neither. Logics are justified on the basis of similar mechanisms of theory-choice as theories in the sciences, and …
Anti-exceptionalism about logic: An overview
Anti-exceptionalism about logic as tradition rejection
While anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL) is now a popular topic within the philosophy of logic, there’s still a lack of clarity over what the proposal amounts to. currently, it is most common to conceive of AEL as the proposal that logic is continuous with the sciences . Yet, as we show here, this conception of AEL is unhelpful due to both its lack of precision, and its distortion of the current debates. Rather, AEL is better understood as the…
Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic and the Burden of Explanation
Considerable attention recently has been paid to anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), the thesis that logic is more similar to the sciences in important respects than traditionally thought. One of AEL’s prominent claims is that logic’s methodology is similar to that of the recognised sciences, with part of this proposal being that logics provide explanations in some sense. However, insufficient attention has been given to what this proposal amo…
Identifying logical evidence
Given the plethora of competing logical theories of validity available, it’s understandable that there has been a marked increase in interest in logical epistemology within the literature. If we are to choose between these logical theories, we require a good understanding of the suitable criteria we ought to judge according to. However, so far there’s been a lack of appreciation of how logical practice could support an epistemology of logic. This…
Obituary: Keith Pavitt
The Isaac Newton Telescope
The New “Old China Hands”: Reshaping American Opinion
The New “Old China Hands”: Shaping a Specialty
Experts in Policy Processes: A Contemporary Perspective
An expert has typically been conceived as one with certain personal qualities of knowledge or skill. Martin suggests an alternative to the empiricist mode of viewing experts (with its faith in the ability of scientists to discover an objective truth), abandoning the notion of an expertise which confers expertness apart from the social setting. Instead he views experts and expertise in more relativistic terms. In the relativist mode, expertness is…
Anti-exceptionalism about logic as tradition rejection
While anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL) is now a popular topic within the philosophy of logic, there’s still a lack of clarity over what the proposal amounts to. currently, it is most common to conceive of AEL as the proposal that logic is continuous with the sciences . Yet, as we show here, this conception of AEL is unhelpful due to both its lack of precision, and its distortion of the current debates. Rather, AEL is better understood as the…
Identifying logical evidence
Given the plethora of competing logical theories of validity available, it’s understandable that there has been a marked increase in interest in logical epistemology within the literature. If we are to choose between these logical theories, we require a good understanding of the suitable criteria we ought to judge according to. However, so far there’s been a lack of appreciation of how logical practice could support an epistemology of logic. This…
Experts in Policy Processes: A Contemporary Perspective
An expert has typically been conceived as one with certain personal qualities of knowledge or skill. Martin suggests an alternative to the empiricist mode of viewing experts (with its faith in the ability of scientists to discover an objective truth), abandoning the notion of an expertise which confers expertness apart from the social setting. Instead he views experts and expertise in more relativistic terms. In the relativist mode, expertness is…
Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic (Part I): From Naturalism to Anti-Exceptionalism
According to anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), logic is not as exceptional in terms of its epistemology and subject matter as has been conventionally thought. Whereas logic's epistemology has often been considered distinct from those of the recognised sciences, in virtue of being both non-inferential and a priori, it is in fact neither. Logics are justified on the basis of similar mechanisms of theory-choice as theories in the sciences, and …
Reflective equilibrium in logic
Among the areas of knowledge that the method of reflective equilibrium (RE) has been applied to is that of logical validity. According to RE in logic, we come to be justified in believing a (deductive) logical theory in virtue of establishing some state of equilibrium between our initial judgements over the validity of specific (natural language) arguments and the logical principles which constitute our logical theory. Unfortunately, however, whi…
Dialetheism and the countermodel problem
According to some dialetheists, we ought to reject the distinction between object and meta‐languages. Given that dialetheists advocate truth‐value gluts within their object‐language, whether in order to solve the liar paradox or for some other reason, this rejection of the object‐/meta‐language distinction comes with the commitment to use a glutty metatheory. While it has been pointed out that a glutty metatheory brings with it expressive deficie…
Anti-exceptionalism about logic: An overview
Experts in Policy Processes: A Contemporary Perspective
An expert has typically been conceived as one with certain personal qualities of knowledge or skill. Martin suggests an alternative to the empiricist mode of viewing experts (with its faith in the ability of scientists to discover an objective truth), abandoning the notion of an expertise which confers expertness apart from the social setting. Instead he views experts and expertise in more relativistic terms. In the relativist mode, expertness is…
The New “Old China Hands”: Shaping a Specialty
The New “Old China Hands”: Reshaping American Opinion
The Isaac Newton Telescope
Obituary: Keith Pavitt
Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic and the Burden of Explanation
Considerable attention recently has been paid to anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), the thesis that logic is more similar to the sciences in important respects than traditionally thought. One of AEL’s prominent claims is that logic’s methodology is similar to that of the recognised sciences, with part of this proposal being that logics provide explanations in some sense. However, insufficient attention has been given to what this proposal amo…
Identifying logical evidence
Given the plethora of competing logical theories of validity available, it’s understandable that there has been a marked increase in interest in logical epistemology within the literature. If we are to choose between these logical theories, we require a good understanding of the suitable criteria we ought to judge according to. However, so far there’s been a lack of appreciation of how logical practice could support an epistemology of logic. This…
Anti-exceptionalism about logic as tradition rejection
While anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL) is now a popular topic within the philosophy of logic, there’s still a lack of clarity over what the proposal amounts to. currently, it is most common to conceive of AEL as the proposal that logic is continuous with the sciences . Yet, as we show here, this conception of AEL is unhelpful due to both its lack of precision, and its distortion of the current debates. Rather, AEL is better understood as the…
Anti-exceptionalism about logic: An overview
Raz’s appeal to law’s authority
Joseph Raz’s Argument from Authority is one of the most famous defences of exclusive positivism in jurisprudence, the position that the existence and content of the law in a society is a wholly social fact, which can be established without the need to engage in moral analysis. According to Raz’s argument, legal systems are de facto practical authorities that, like all de facto authorities, must claim legitimate authority, which itself entails tha…
Reflective equilibrium in logic
Among the areas of knowledge that the method of reflective equilibrium (RE) has been applied to is that of logical validity. According to RE in logic, we come to be justified in believing a (deductive) logical theory in virtue of establishing some state of equilibrium between our initial judgements over the validity of specific (natural language) arguments and the logical principles which constitute our logical theory. Unfortunately, however, whi…
Dialetheism and the countermodel problem
According to some dialetheists, we ought to reject the distinction between object and meta‐languages. Given that dialetheists advocate truth‐value gluts within their object‐language, whether in order to solve the liar paradox or for some other reason, this rejection of the object‐/meta‐language distinction comes with the commitment to use a glutty metatheory. While it has been pointed out that a glutty metatheory brings with it expressive deficie…
Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic (Part I): From Naturalism to Anti-Exceptionalism
According to anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), logic is not as exceptional in terms of its epistemology and subject matter as has been conventionally thought. Whereas logic's epistemology has often been considered distinct from those of the recognised sciences, in virtue of being both non-inferential and a priori, it is in fact neither. Logics are justified on the basis of similar mechanisms of theory-choice as theories in the sciences, and …
Model pluralism for logic
It is well‐recognized in the sciences that a multitude of nonequivalent models are used by researchers to fulfill a range of goals, even for the same target system, a result known broadly as model pluralism . The possibility of the same form of pluralism occurring in logic, however, has not been adequately considered. This is a surprise, given that both logical pluralism and methodological anti‐exceptionalism about logic (AEL), the view that the …
Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic (Part II): Methodological Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic
According to anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), logic is not as exceptional in terms of its subject matter and epistemology as has been conventionally thought. As such, AEL either outright rejects certain traditional properties of logic, such as its formality, apriority, or necessity, or rather proposes that while logic possesses these properties, it does so in a similar way to other research areas. In this second part of a two-part entry on …
How logic(ian)s disagree
Philosophical accounts of disagreements within logic tend to focus on how logics themselves disagree with one another, such as how their theorems or (meta)inferences diverge, while neglecting the theoretical disagreements that lead to the advocacy of these logics. This has several shortcomings, amongst which it fails to explain why disagreements over the correct logic occur in the first place, as well as overlooking the possibility of substantive…
Philosophy (13 works) · Epistemology (11 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 works) · Law (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Exceptionalism (5 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Metaphysics (4 works)