Marisa Ratto
Biographic Data
| ID | 3604904 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Marisa Ratto |
| GIVEN NAMES | Marisa |
| FAMILY NAME | Ratto |
| SIGNATURE | RATTO M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universite Paris‐Dauphine, LEDa‐SDFi |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4521-2448 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 15 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The response of taxpayer compliance to the large shock of Italian unification
Incentives in the Public Sector
We study the impact of team-based performance pay in a major UK government agency, the public employment service. The scheme covered quantity and quality targets, measured with varying degrees of precision. We use unique data from the agency’s performance management system and personnel records, linked to local labour market data. We show that on average the scheme had no significant effect but had a substantial positive effect in small teams, fi…
Smarter Task Assignment or Greater Effort
We use an experiment to study the impact of team-based incentives, exploiting rich data from personnel records and management information systems. Using a triple difference design, we show that the incentive scheme had an impact on team performance, even with quite large teams. We examine whether this effect was due to increased effort from workers or strategic task reallocation. We find that the provision of financial incentives did raise indivi…
Smarter Task Assignment or Greater Effort
We use an experiment to study the impact of team-based incentives, exploiting rich data from personnel records and management information systems. Using a triple difference design, we show that the incentive scheme had an impact on team performance, even with quite large teams. We examine whether this effect was due to increased effort from workers or strategic task reallocation. We find that the provision of financial incentives did raise indivi…
Incentives in the Public Sector
We study the impact of team-based performance pay in a major UK government agency, the public employment service. The scheme covered quantity and quality targets, measured with varying degrees of precision. We use unique data from the agency’s performance management system and personnel records, linked to local labour market data. We show that on average the scheme had no significant effect but had a substantial positive effect in small teams, fi…
Smarter Task Assignment or Greater Effort
We use an experiment to study the impact of team-based incentives, exploiting rich data from personnel records and management information systems. Using a triple difference design, we show that the incentive scheme had an impact on team performance, even with quite large teams. We examine whether this effect was due to increased effort from workers or strategic task reallocation. We find that the provision of financial incentives did raise indivi…
Incentives in the Public Sector
We study the impact of team-based performance pay in a major UK government agency, the public employment service. The scheme covered quantity and quality targets, measured with varying degrees of precision. We use unique data from the agency’s performance management system and personnel records, linked to local labour market data. We show that on average the scheme had no significant effect but had a substantial positive effect in small teams, fi…
The response of taxpayer compliance to the large shock of Italian unification
Economics (3 works) · Incentive (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Public economics (2 works) · Accounting and Organizational Management (1 works) · Actuarial science (1 works) · Ad valorem tax (1 works) · Agency (philosophy (1 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 works) · Business (1 works)