Bryan Caplan
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3604996 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Bryan Caplan |
| PRENOMES | Bryan |
| SOBRENOME | Caplan |
| ASSINATURA | CAPLAN B |
| AFILIAÇÕES | George Mason University |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 25 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 238 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 25 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2001 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2018 |
| ÍNDICE H | 7 |
The Case against Education
Systematically Biased Beliefs about Political Influence
Many scholars argue that retrospective voting is a powerful information shortcut that offsets widespread voter ignorance. Even deeply ignorant voters, it is claimed, can effectively punish incumbents for bad performance and reward them if things go well. But if voters' understanding of which officials are responsible for which outcomes is systematically biased, retrospective voting becomes an independent source of political failure rather than a …
Positive versus normative economics
The Myth of the Rational Voter
Myth of the Rational Voter
Persuasion, slack, and traps
The Myth of the Rational Voter
Reply to My Critics
This symposium’s objections to my book fall into two main categories: philosophical and empirical. The philosophical objections are largely sophistical. If we took them seriously, they would invalidate far more than my book: We would also have to give up social science and common sense. The empirical objections, in contrast, are often thoughtful and important. The most notable: Kiewiet and Mattozzi’s vigorous defense of the American public’s free…
Roundtable 1
scott althaus: Let me introduce the panelists in the order that they will be presenting. First is Bryan Caplan. He’s an associate professor of economics at George Mason University. His 2007 book, T
Beyond conventional economics
The myth of the rational voter
Caplan argues that voters continually elect politicians who either share their biases or else pretend to, resulting in bad policies winning again and again by popular demand. Calling into question our most basic assumptions about American politics, Caplan contends that democracy fails precisely because it does what voters want. Through an analysis of American's voting behavior and opinions on a range of economic issues, he makes the case that non…
Have the Experts Been Weighed, Measured, and Found Wanting
Tetlock's Expert Political Judgment is a creative, careful, and mostly convincing study of the predictive accuracy of political experts. My only major complaints are that Tetlock (1) understates the predictive accuracy of experts, and (2) does too little to discourage demagogues from misinterpreting his work as a vindication of the wisdom of the average citizen. Experts have much to learn from Tetlock's epistemological audit, but there is still a…
Terrorism
How do voters form positive economic beliefs? Evidence from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy
The Economics of Szasz
Even confirmed economic imperialists typically acknowledge that economic theory does not apply to the seriously mentally ill. Building on psychiatrist Thomas Szasz's philosophy of mind, this article argues that most mental illnesses are best modeled as extreme preferences, not constraining diseases. This perspective sheds light not only on relatively easy cases like personality disorders, but also on the more extreme cases of delusions and halluc…
Mises, bastiat, public opinion, and public choice
The political economy of Ludwig von Mises and Frederic Bastiat has been largely ignored even by their admirers. We argue that Mises' and Bastiat's views in this area were both original and insightful. While traditional public choice generally maintains that democracy fails because voters' views are rational but ignored, the Mises-Bastiat view is that democracy fails because voters' views are irrational but heeded. Mises and Bastiat anticipate man…
Toward a new consensus on the economics of socialism
This has been an unusually productive exchange. My critics largely accept my main theoretical claims about economic calculation and socialism. They have also started to do what advocates of the Misesian view should have been doing for decades: offer empirical evidence that that the calculation problem is serious. While I continue to believe that incentive problems explain most of the failures of socialism, I am slightly less confident than I was …
George Tsebelis, Veto Players
Is socialism really “impossible
In the 1920s, Austrian‐school economists began to argue that in a fully socialized economy, free of competitively generated prices, central planners would have no way to calculate which methods of production would be the most economical. They claimed that this “economic calculation problem” showed that socialism is “impossible.” Although many believe that the Austrian position was later vindicated by the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the Austrian …
The Logic of Collective Belief
Many political failure arguments implicitly assume that voters are irrational. This article argues that this assumption is both theoretically and empirically plausible: in politics, rationality, like information, is a collective good that individuals have little incentive to supply. In consequence, voters are frequently not only rationally ignorant but also `rationally irrational'. Rational irrationality leads to both demand-side and supply-side …
Sociotropes, Systematic Bias, and Political Failure
Objectives . Economic models of politics typically make two assumptions about voters: first, their motives are egocentric, not sociotropic; second, their beliefs are rational, not subject to systematic bias. Political scientists have presented strong evidence against the first assumption (Mansbridge, 1990), but have become increasingly willing to accept the second (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Marcus and Hanson, 1993). This article tests these two ass…
Systematically Biased Beliefs about Economics
Differences between the general public"s "positive" economic views and economists" resemble other judgemental anomalies: Laypeople and experts "systematically" disagree. I analyse this puzzle using data from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy. The paper first tests and decisively rejects the hypothesis that the differences solely reflect economists" self-serving bias. Then it examines whether economists" political ideology and …
Standing Tiebout on his Head
Rational Irrationality and the Microfoundations of Political Failure
Daniel Shaviro, When Rules Change
The myth of the rational voter
Caplan argues that voters continually elect politicians who either share their biases or else pretend to, resulting in bad policies winning again and again by popular demand. Calling into question our most basic assumptions about American politics, Caplan contends that democracy fails precisely because it does what voters want. Through an analysis of American's voting behavior and opinions on a range of economic issues, he makes the case that non…
The Myth of the Rational Voter
Systematically Biased Beliefs about Economics
Differences between the general public"s "positive" economic views and economists" resemble other judgemental anomalies: Laypeople and experts "systematically" disagree. I analyse this puzzle using data from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy. The paper first tests and decisively rejects the hypothesis that the differences solely reflect economists" self-serving bias. Then it examines whether economists" political ideology and …
Terrorism
Rational Irrationality and the Microfoundations of Political Failure
The Logic of Collective Belief
Many political failure arguments implicitly assume that voters are irrational. This article argues that this assumption is both theoretically and empirically plausible: in politics, rationality, like information, is a collective good that individuals have little incentive to supply. In consequence, voters are frequently not only rationally ignorant but also `rationally irrational'. Rational irrationality leads to both demand-side and supply-side …
How do voters form positive economic beliefs? Evidence from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy
Is socialism really “impossible
In the 1920s, Austrian‐school economists began to argue that in a fully socialized economy, free of competitively generated prices, central planners would have no way to calculate which methods of production would be the most economical. They claimed that this “economic calculation problem” showed that socialism is “impossible.” Although many believe that the Austrian position was later vindicated by the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the Austrian …
Sociotropes, Systematic Bias, and Political Failure
Objectives . Economic models of politics typically make two assumptions about voters: first, their motives are egocentric, not sociotropic; second, their beliefs are rational, not subject to systematic bias. Political scientists have presented strong evidence against the first assumption (Mansbridge, 1990), but have become increasingly willing to accept the second (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Marcus and Hanson, 1993). This article tests these two ass…
Have the Experts Been Weighed, Measured, and Found Wanting
Tetlock's Expert Political Judgment is a creative, careful, and mostly convincing study of the predictive accuracy of political experts. My only major complaints are that Tetlock (1) understates the predictive accuracy of experts, and (2) does too little to discourage demagogues from misinterpreting his work as a vindication of the wisdom of the average citizen. Experts have much to learn from Tetlock's epistemological audit, but there is still a…
Mises, bastiat, public opinion, and public choice
The political economy of Ludwig von Mises and Frederic Bastiat has been largely ignored even by their admirers. We argue that Mises' and Bastiat's views in this area were both original and insightful. While traditional public choice generally maintains that democracy fails because voters' views are rational but ignored, the Mises-Bastiat view is that democracy fails because voters' views are irrational but heeded. Mises and Bastiat anticipate man…
Standing Tiebout on his Head
Reply to My Critics
This symposium’s objections to my book fall into two main categories: philosophical and empirical. The philosophical objections are largely sophistical. If we took them seriously, they would invalidate far more than my book: We would also have to give up social science and common sense. The empirical objections, in contrast, are often thoughtful and important. The most notable: Kiewiet and Mattozzi’s vigorous defense of the American public’s free…
Systematically Biased Beliefs about Political Influence
Many scholars argue that retrospective voting is a powerful information shortcut that offsets widespread voter ignorance. Even deeply ignorant voters, it is claimed, can effectively punish incumbents for bad performance and reward them if things go well. But if voters' understanding of which officials are responsible for which outcomes is systematically biased, retrospective voting becomes an independent source of political failure rather than a …
Positive versus normative economics
Roundtable 1
scott althaus: Let me introduce the panelists in the order that they will be presenting. First is Bryan Caplan. He’s an associate professor of economics at George Mason University. His 2007 book, T
The Economics of Szasz
Even confirmed economic imperialists typically acknowledge that economic theory does not apply to the seriously mentally ill. Building on psychiatrist Thomas Szasz's philosophy of mind, this article argues that most mental illnesses are best modeled as extreme preferences, not constraining diseases. This perspective sheds light not only on relatively easy cases like personality disorders, but also on the more extreme cases of delusions and halluc…
Toward a new consensus on the economics of socialism
This has been an unusually productive exchange. My critics largely accept my main theoretical claims about economic calculation and socialism. They have also started to do what advocates of the Misesian view should have been doing for decades: offer empirical evidence that that the calculation problem is serious. While I continue to believe that incentive problems explain most of the failures of socialism, I am slightly less confident than I was …
Standing Tiebout on his Head
Rational Irrationality and the Microfoundations of Political Failure
Daniel Shaviro, When Rules Change
Sociotropes, Systematic Bias, and Political Failure
Objectives . Economic models of politics typically make two assumptions about voters: first, their motives are egocentric, not sociotropic; second, their beliefs are rational, not subject to systematic bias. Political scientists have presented strong evidence against the first assumption (Mansbridge, 1990), but have become increasingly willing to accept the second (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Marcus and Hanson, 1993). This article tests these two ass…
Systematically Biased Beliefs about Economics
Differences between the general public"s "positive" economic views and economists" resemble other judgemental anomalies: Laypeople and experts "systematically" disagree. I analyse this puzzle using data from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy. The paper first tests and decisively rejects the hypothesis that the differences solely reflect economists" self-serving bias. Then it examines whether economists" political ideology and …
The Logic of Collective Belief
Many political failure arguments implicitly assume that voters are irrational. This article argues that this assumption is both theoretically and empirically plausible: in politics, rationality, like information, is a collective good that individuals have little incentive to supply. In consequence, voters are frequently not only rationally ignorant but also `rationally irrational'. Rational irrationality leads to both demand-side and supply-side …
George Tsebelis, Veto Players
Is socialism really “impossible
In the 1920s, Austrian‐school economists began to argue that in a fully socialized economy, free of competitively generated prices, central planners would have no way to calculate which methods of production would be the most economical. They claimed that this “economic calculation problem” showed that socialism is “impossible.” Although many believe that the Austrian position was later vindicated by the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the Austrian …
Mises, bastiat, public opinion, and public choice
The political economy of Ludwig von Mises and Frederic Bastiat has been largely ignored even by their admirers. We argue that Mises' and Bastiat's views in this area were both original and insightful. While traditional public choice generally maintains that democracy fails because voters' views are rational but ignored, the Mises-Bastiat view is that democracy fails because voters' views are irrational but heeded. Mises and Bastiat anticipate man…
Toward a new consensus on the economics of socialism
This has been an unusually productive exchange. My critics largely accept my main theoretical claims about economic calculation and socialism. They have also started to do what advocates of the Misesian view should have been doing for decades: offer empirical evidence that that the calculation problem is serious. While I continue to believe that incentive problems explain most of the failures of socialism, I am slightly less confident than I was …
Terrorism
How do voters form positive economic beliefs? Evidence from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy
The Economics of Szasz
Even confirmed economic imperialists typically acknowledge that economic theory does not apply to the seriously mentally ill. Building on psychiatrist Thomas Szasz's philosophy of mind, this article argues that most mental illnesses are best modeled as extreme preferences, not constraining diseases. This perspective sheds light not only on relatively easy cases like personality disorders, but also on the more extreme cases of delusions and halluc…
Beyond conventional economics
The myth of the rational voter
Caplan argues that voters continually elect politicians who either share their biases or else pretend to, resulting in bad policies winning again and again by popular demand. Calling into question our most basic assumptions about American politics, Caplan contends that democracy fails precisely because it does what voters want. Through an analysis of American's voting behavior and opinions on a range of economic issues, he makes the case that non…
Have the Experts Been Weighed, Measured, and Found Wanting
Tetlock's Expert Political Judgment is a creative, careful, and mostly convincing study of the predictive accuracy of political experts. My only major complaints are that Tetlock (1) understates the predictive accuracy of experts, and (2) does too little to discourage demagogues from misinterpreting his work as a vindication of the wisdom of the average citizen. Experts have much to learn from Tetlock's epistemological audit, but there is still a…
The Myth of the Rational Voter
Reply to My Critics
This symposium’s objections to my book fall into two main categories: philosophical and empirical. The philosophical objections are largely sophistical. If we took them seriously, they would invalidate far more than my book: We would also have to give up social science and common sense. The empirical objections, in contrast, are often thoughtful and important. The most notable: Kiewiet and Mattozzi’s vigorous defense of the American public’s free…
Roundtable 1
scott althaus: Let me introduce the panelists in the order that they will be presenting. First is Bryan Caplan. He’s an associate professor of economics at George Mason University. His 2007 book, T
Persuasion, slack, and traps
The Myth of the Rational Voter
Myth of the Rational Voter
Positive versus normative economics
Systematically Biased Beliefs about Political Influence
Many scholars argue that retrospective voting is a powerful information shortcut that offsets widespread voter ignorance. Even deeply ignorant voters, it is claimed, can effectively punish incumbents for bad performance and reward them if things go well. But if voters' understanding of which officials are responsible for which outcomes is systematically biased, retrospective voting becomes an independent source of political failure rather than a …
The Case against Education
Economics (21 obras) · Political science (17 obras) · Law (16 obras) · Positive economics (15 obras) · Politics (13 obras) · Economic Theory and Institutions (11 obras) · Law (11 obras) · Law and economics (10 obras) · Public finance (9 obras) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (8 obras)